Tag: United States
Syria: no attractive propositions, so Biden is staying the course
Secretary of State Blinken at a press conference with the Israeli and UAE foreign ministers today said more about Syria than I remember since the beginning of the Biden Administration, in response to a question about normalization that other countries are indulging in:
…let me talk about Syria first and then come to the second part of the – the first part of the question second.
First, to put this in focus, these initial nine months of the administration we have been focused on a few things when it comes to Syria: Expanding humanitarian access for people who desperately need that assistance, and we had some success, as you know, with renewing the critical corridor in northwestern Syria to do that; sustaining the campaign that we have with the coalition against ISIS and al-Qaida in Syria; making clear our commitment, our ongoing commitment to demand accountability from the Assad regime and the preservation of basic international norms like promoting human rights and nonproliferation through the imposition of targeted sanctions; and sustaining local ceasefires, which are in place in different parts of the country. So this has been the focus of our action for these last nine months.
As we’re moving forward, in the time ahead, keeping violence down; increasing humanitarian assistance and focusing our military efforts on any terrorist groups that pose a threat to us or to our partners, with the intent and capacity to do that. These are going to be the critical areas of focus for us, and they’re also, I think, important to advancing a broader political settlement to the Syrian conflict consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
What we have not done and what we do not intend to do is to express any support for efforts to normalize relations or rehabilitate Mr. Assad, or lifted [sic] a single sanction on Syria or changed [sic] our position to oppose the reconstruction of Syria until there is irreversible progress toward a political solution, which we believe is necessary and vital.
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-israeli-alternate-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister-yair-lapid-and-united-arab-emirates-foreign-minister-sheikh-abdullah-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-at-a-joint-press-availab/
This is a restatement of well-established US priorities: humanitarian assistance, reduction in violence, counter-terrorism, and irreversible progress toward a political solution before reconstruction or normalization.
So nothing new. What’s missing? should always be the next question.
Tony fails to deal with the threat of a serious military clash between NATO ally Turkey and the Kurdish-led forces that are conducting the campaign against both terrorists and the regime in northeastern Syria, with American support. He is silent on concerns about Iran using Syrian territory to threaten Israel. Nor does he indicate that the United States opposes normalization by others, in particular Jordan and the UAE. And he is silent on brutality-laced Russian and Iranian support for the Syrian regime, which in due course may become capable of challenging the Kurdish presence in the northeast and the Turkish presence inside Syria’s northern border. So yes, continuity of a policy that is silent on important issues and has so far failed to produce substantial results.
Is there a better approach? We could certainly tighten sanctions so that jet-setting scions of the Syrian elite don’t roam Los Angeles in Ferraris, but that won’t change anything in Syria. We could help the Germans mount a “universal jurisdiction” case against President Assad himself, in absentia, but that would set a legal precedent that might boomerang on prominent Americans. We could try harder to mediate some sort of accommodation between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey, as we did once with a modicum of success between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey. Or we could try to negotiate autonomous status for the Kurds within Syria in return for US withdrawal, though the regime would be no more likely than the Taliban to stick to the terms of a withdrawal agreement. The Kurds would likely revert to attacking inside Turkey as well as Turkish-controlled Syria in order to curry favor with Assad. It suits the Kurds and Turkey to have the Americans remain in Syria.
I won’t even bother with military options against the Russians or the regime. The Americans take some shots against the Iranians and their proxies in Syria, but they aren’t going to risk war with Russia or the civilian casualties that taking on the regime would entail.
So no, there are not a lot of attractive propositions in Syria. Especially after the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Administration can ill afford a comparable mess in Syria, never mind an influx into the US of tens of thousands Syrian Kurds and Arabs who helped the US during the past decade and have legitimate claims to asylum. No wonder Biden is staying the course.
Iraq’s election: a mixed bag is better than a mess
My Middle East Institute colleagues have already elegantly parsed the October 10 Iraqi election results and their implications. It’s a mixed bag: Moqtada al Sadr, who already controls more seats than anyone else in parliament gained, as did former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki; Shia militia politicians, more moderate Shia, and Sunni Islamists weakened; Sunni secularists, independents, regional advocates, and both the leading Kurdish party and a newish one gained. Turnout was low, due in part to a boycott encouraged by activists who had previously campaigned for the early poll. What it all means for election of the President, Parliament speaker, and Prime Minister won’t be known for weeks if not months.
Just as interesting to me is the process: it came off pretty well, with little violence and intimidation by Iraqi standards. Almost two decades after the American invasion, Iraqis have grown accustomed to something like a democratic regime, albeit more than a little tainted with lack of voter enthusiasm, corruption, patronage, sectarianism, and armed groups only nominally under state control. Politics is a rough sport in Iraq, but not now a deadly one, unless you are a demonstrator fired on by sectarian militias.
The main issues are now economic. The American presence, down to a couple of thousand troops plus contractors, is no more discussed than Iranian influence, exercised in part through the Popular Mobilization Forces and their politicians. Kurdistan’s independence aspirations have faded but still simmer. Even with oil prices at a 7-year peak, the new government will face big challenges in maintaining and growing oil and gas production while steering the economy towards non-hydrocarbon development and adjusting to global warming, which threatens to make parts of the country uninhabitable.
If the next government can even begin to meet those challenges, Iraq could play an important role in a Middle East that is adjusting to the prospect of reduced American attention. As a Shia and Arab majority country with a large Kurdish population and many other smaller minorities, a prosperous Iraq could be a multivalent force for stability and coexistence, helping to bridge divides among Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. The current Prime Minister has made some good but still tentative steps in that direction. It is no secret that the Americans and Europeans will hope he is able again to form a government, unlikely as that may seem in a volatile political environment. They also liked his two predecessors, both of whom are, at least for now, down and out.
It is hard to be optimistic about the prospect of serious economic reform in Iraq, which has so far failed to turn its oil wealth into benefits–or even electricity and water–for ordinary citizens. Moqtada’s minions have not governed in the past in transparent and accountable ways. The country lacks an independent judiciary and much of its press is under the control of major politicians. But if law and order prevail, the next government will have an enormous opportunity both domestically and internationally to enable Iraq to benefit both its own citizens and the region. A mixed bag is better than a mess.
Stevenson’s army, October 11
Happy federal holiday, whatever you call it.
– WaPo reminds us that Columbus Day started in response to an atrocity against Italian immigrants.
– NYT makes the case for Indigenous People.
– Lawfare sees lessons in Spanish counterterrorism policy.
– Guardian notes fighting still going on in Syria.
-WaPo writers suggest South Korea should go nuclear.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
So far so good, but we’ll need to wait and see
I’ve gotten more praise than criticism for yesterday’s piece on Serbia under President Vuvic, but my friend Ylber Hysa, Kosovo’s former ambassador in Macedonia and Montenegro, is super talented at posing questions. Here go my answers:
1. Do you see the EU really ready and open for any enlargement soon towards the Balkans?
No, I don’t, but I don’t see any aspirant that will be ready any time soon, especially given the tightened criteria. Under its previous government, Montengro might have been ready before the end of this decade. Kosovo has the legislation mostly right, but not the implementation. Macedonia is better, but also suffers from a lag in implementation. Bosnia and Herzegovina can’t get it right because its constitutional system is faulty. Albania is making progress, even if it has not yet opened accession negotiations, but it isn’t quick or easy.
2. With Merkel gone, and Macron with a tough election ahead, is there any leadership there for “Europe One and Free”?
No, but entry of Western Balkan states into the EU and NATO should not depend on that. Enlargement should now be seen in the context of strengthening the European counterweight to Russia and China. There too leadership has been lacking and it is not clear Biden will be able to mobilize Europe to the kind of efforts required.
3. Do you believe that Trans-Atlantic unity is better with this administration, or much better than we all hoped for…?
It’s better, as illustrated in the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on license plates. The Americans and Europeans acted in unison and got a reasonable result. Now they need to extend that practice to bigger issues. Gabriel Escobar and Miroslav Lajcak need to be joined at the hip.
4. Do you really see the Biden Administration seriously engaged in the Balkans after Afganistan?
The Biden Administration has the right approach to the Balkans: strengthening the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic legitimacy of all the states. But it has not yet developed detailed plans for how to do that. That requires hard work and serious engagement that they are now pursuing. I wish them success.
I didn’t see the Biden Administration engaged at a high level in the Balkans before the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Certainly the messy withdrawal has made pulling US troops out of Kosovo less likely. What is needed now is a clearer program that will advance the European perspective.
5. Do you see any progressive, liberal and serious opposition in Serbia?
No, and that’s what I said in the piece. I know lots of individual progressive liberals who are in opposition, but they have failed to construct a viable alternative to Vucic with mass appeal. We should be helping them do that, but the time before next year’s Serbian election is short. I expect Vucic will win another 5-year mandate as a committed ethnic nationalist and friend of Russia and China.
6. Do you believe that in the last “licence plates war” in Northern Kosovo Kurti demonstrated any strategic thinking (or that he picked the right time for war games)?
I can’t say I saw strategic thinking, but Albin applied the principle of reciprocity and got a reasonable outcome that I hope will lead to a satisfactory final agreement on license plates. That’s not strategic, but it’s not a bad start in the right direction.
Now he needs to show some of the same grit inside the dialogue and produce results he can vaunt. Doing that will give him what he needs to get the Europeans to give Kosovo the visa waiver. That would be closer to strategic: opening Europe to young Kosovars without a visa would put his country on a far clearer European path. So too will asking for Kosovo membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and ensuring that the Kosovo army is fully functional by 2027, which will open the question of NATO membership.
7. Do you really believe that Kurti is a real liberal, democratic and visionary leader?
Albin has at least for now what a good prime minister needs: strong support in the population, which is tired of the nepotism, ineffectiveness, and corruption of the more established governing parties. In my experience, he is a vigorous proponent of individual human rights and an opponent of the group rights dear to ethnic nationalists, including Kosovo’s Serbs. But he also enjoys strong support among Albanian ethnic nationalists, many of whom want union with Albania. That’s a vision, but it is not a liberal democratic one or even a Kosovo patriotic one.
We’ll just need to wait and see whether Vetevendosje sticks with liberal democratic ideals or falls victim to the temptations of power and the Balkan tendency towards default ethnic nationalism.
PS: Ylber asks in addition:
8. Do you believe regional initiatives can substitute for EU Enlargement: Open Balkans, Berlin Process, Partition and border changes i.e “Jansa nonapaper” etc.
I am dead set against border changes, which will lead to mass displacement and likely death and destruction. We know this from the experience of the 1990s when Milosevic tried to change the borders of Serbia. I see no reason to believe the consequences would not be bad also today, not only for Kosovo and Bosnia but also for Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, all of which have minorities who will want union with a neighbor. Not to mention the negative consequences for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, where border changes in the Balkans would be regarded as a license for Russia to annex more territory.
The Berlin Process in my way of thinking is part of the process of preparing the Western Balkans for EU membership, in particular by encouraging neighborly relations. Open Balkans is not clearly defined for me yet, but if it can remove non-tariff and tariff barriers to trade that would be a good thing, provided it is done on a reciprocal and equal basis. Certainly a more prosperous Western Balkans would have a greater stake in peace and stability. But the devil is in the details, and I haven’t seen a lot of details.
No one should be fooled: Serbia is lost for now
Colleagues I know and respect think that Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic aims a) to get neighboring countries to treat their Serb populations correctly, and b) thereby avoid any mass migration of Serbs, as occurred in the 1990s when they left Croatia and Kosovo.
I beg to differ. I see no evidence of these two claims and lots of contrary indications.
Let us count them:
- In Kosovo, Vucic controls the Serbian List, which occupies all the Serb seats in the Kosovo Assembly. The Serbian List does not cooperate with other political parties to improve the lot of the Serbs but instead has conducted itself as a spoiler, boycotting parliament often. Belgrade has threatened and harassed Serbs who join Kosovo’s nascent army, and recently deployed army units, as well as the Russian ambassador, to the boundary/border with Kosovo in response to a dispute over license plates (sic).
- Vucic has toyed with the idea of trading Albanian-majority municipalities in Kosovo’s south for Kosovo’s Serb-majority municipalities in the north. But the majority of Serbs in Kosovo live south of the Ibar river. This “border correction” scheme would end the viability of those communities and lead to their eventual, if not immediate, abandonment.
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the now Vucic-allied Serb member of the tripartite presidency (Milorad Dodik) has tried to undermine the state institutions in preparation for secession and independence of Republika Srpska (RS), which occupies 49% of the country’s territory. Dodik objects to any strengthening of the state’s judiciary, police, army, and parliament.
- Vucic has taken up the cudgels in favor of a “Serbian Home,” that is a state that would annex the Serb populations of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The idea is indistinguishable from “Greater Serbia” and “all Serbs in one country,” the slogans that led Milosevic to four wars in the 1990s, all of which were lost and led to the mass migration of Serbs to Serbia.
- In Montenegro, a new Vucic-aligned government dominated by people who identify as Serbs is welcoming Russian and Serbian dominance and undermining the independence and sovereignty of NATO’s newest member, while also mistreating the country’s minorities.
It is hallucinatory to think that the Serbian Home and the behavior of Vucic-allied Serbs in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montnegro is intended to improve the lot of Serbs in neighboring countries or to avoid mass migration. This is no doubt a line Vucic uses with Westerners, as he knows what they want (and don’t want) to hear. But that doesn’t make it true.
In addition to threatening his neighbors, Vucic is taking Serbia in a definitively autocratic as well as Russia- and China-focused direction. Belgrade’s foreign policies are only 60% or so aligned with the European Union, the lowest ratio in the Western Balkans. Serbia has joined the free trade area of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, which is incompatible with EU membership. Belgrade has declared itself “neutral” with no intention of joining NATO (unlike all its neighbors). Its media are not free, its judiciary is not independent, and its economy is largely state-directed, with big investments from Russia and even bigger ones from China. Belgrade’s recent arms purchases are likewise largely from Moscow and Beijing.
Vucic faces an election, albeit not a free or fair one, next year. There is no viable liberal democratic alternative. The only current threat to his dominance comes from ethnic nationalists. He sees no hope of joining the European Union within his next five-year mandate and is behaving accordingly: grab what you can from Russia and China, promise to protect Serbs in other countries, look for opportunities to bring them and the land they occupy into Serbia, and stave off the the Europeans and Americans by telling them that you are anxious to avoid mass migration and improve the lot of Serbs in neighboring countries.
No one should be fooled. It is time for Washington and Brussels to wake up and smell the coffee. The geopolitical challenges from Russia and China have dashed hopes for early realization of a Europe “whole and free.” Serbia is lost to the liberal democratic world so long as this Vucic is president. He is a chameleon. For now, he has surrounded himself with autocrats and ethnic nationalists. Courting his favor won’t get us anywhere. Supporting serious liberal democrats inside Serbia and in the region might get us something. But we’ll still need to wait six years or more for a serious alternative.
Reciprocity is right, and making it stick is vital
Kosovo in recent days has imposed on cars coming from Serbia a requirement to use Kosovo license plates. This mirrors a Serbian requirement that cars coming from Kosovo use Serbian plates. Serb residents of northern Kosovo are protesting by blocking roads. Kosovo police have so far not cleared them.
Reciprocity is correct from the Pristina perspective. It is a basic principle of relations between sovereign states. That is also precisely why Serbia rejects it. Belgrade regards Kosovo as Serbian sovereign territory. Reciprocity is not a principle that governs relations between a sovereign and part of its own territory, even if that part has its own goverrnment, police, and in this case security forces.
From my perspective, Kosovo is a sovereign state: its declaration of independence breached no international law, Serbia has recognized the validity of Kosovo’s constitution on its entire territory, and it has its own democratically validated parliament, prime minister, and president. Serbia does not contest this and claims the territory but not 90% of the people. But if Kosovo Albanians are not citizens of Serbia, then they must be citizens of something else, which is the Republic of Kosovo for all practical and legal purposes.
So demanding reciprocity is consistent with Kosovo’s sovereignty, but that doesn’t mean applying that principle to license plates is smart. Once you do that, you need to anticipate what Belgrade will do in response, like blocking the roads. If you can leave them blocked without any serious economic harm, or if you can clear them without creating a mess, you could come out on top, but only if Belgrade yields. You have to also think about what else Belgrade might do next: create trouble in the Serb communities south of Ibar, complain to the European Union and the Americans, or make a show of military force on its side of the border, which is what it has done in addition to the complaints. It doesn’t suffice to be right about reciprocity; you have to make it stick.
There are other areas where the principle of reciprocity might be invoked, perhaps with greater effect. Certainly Kosovo should ask of Serbia, which wants an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo, an Association of Albanian-majority municipalities in Serbia, with equivalent functions and powers. It could also ask for guaranteed Albanian seats in Serbia’s parliament, as 10 seats in Kosovo’s are reserved to Serbs. It was a mistake not to insist that the Specialist Chambers now prosecuting Kosovo Liberation Army leaders in The Hague also be able to prosecute crimes committed on the territory of Serbia, not just Kosovo.
But to do these things successfully, Pristina needs to line up unequivocal international support in Washington and Brussels. Both have instead adopted an attitude of impartiality. This is a mistake. Serbia is no long “sitting on two stools.” It has committed itself to Russia and China, which have reciprocated with arms and investment. The EU and US need to open their eyes and realize that the current geopolitical competition requires a much firmer commitment to pro-Western forces throughout the Balkans, not only in Kosovo but also in Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
President Biden, who has expressed unequivocal support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries of the Balkans, needs now to put his thumb of the scale in favor of democracy throughout the region. That will mean favoring some over others, rather than retreating to a “Europe whole and free” mantra that was appropriate for the unipolar moment but now faces concerted Russian troublemaking and Chinese influence-peddling throughout the continent. Serbia has made itself handmaiden to those efforts.
Kosovo is America’s most loyal friend in the region. It is time for Washington to recognize it as a strategic partner in countering Russian and Chinese influence and to support unequivocally its sovereign equality with Serbia. With that support, reciprocity will stick.