Tag: United States
No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.
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Reversal of the progress for women and the press in Afghanistan is imminent
Nearly two decades ago, Bernard-Henri Lévy spent a month in Afghanistan shortly after Taliban rule had been removed and wrote an extensive report for the French government. In it he outlined the challenges, but more importantly the opportunities now available for modernizing and improving the lives of Afghans. Now, with the Western presence in Afghanistan drawing to a close, Lévy is publishing a book reflecting on the report and the years that followed. With an introduction by former US General David Petraeus, Lévy assesses the successes and mistakes that occurred in Afghanistan, and reflects on the threats facing it now that renewed Taliban rule seems imminent.
The Middle East Institute organized a seminar July 26 with Lévy, Petraeus and two discussants to discuss the origins of the report and to assess the last twenty years in Afghanistan. The panel agreed that much has been achieved in women’s rights, civil society, and the free press, but that all of these achievements will be reversed as the Taliban returns to power.
The speakers were:
Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus
Former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan;
former director
Central Intelligence Agency
Bernard-Henri Lévy
Philosopher, journalist, filmmaker, and public intellectual
Javid Ahmad
Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates;
non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council
Marvin Weinbaum (moderator)
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies
MEI
Paul Salem (introduction)
President
MEI
Lévy’s report 20 years on
Lévy gave a behind the scenes insight into the origins of his remarkable 2002 assignment. “Even in France”, he emphasized, it isn’t normal for a philosopher to be tasked with making a report such as this. It came to be because Lévy had met with Afghan guerilla leader and later Minister of Defense Massoud several times since the 1980s, and had arranged for him to meet French president Chirac in 2001. Massoud was defending the Panjshir Valley from the Taliban at the time. At the last moment, Chirac decided not to meet with Massoud, and he instead met with the French Foreign Minister and spoke to the European Parliament. He warned of the ties between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and of their growing plans against the West. Five months later, Massoud was assassinated and two days later the 9/11 attacks on the United States took place. After victory against the Taliban was achieved, Chirac called on Lévy to write his report and outline how France could participate in building of a new Afghanistan. According to Lévy, this was partially due to his disappointment over failing to meet with Massoud before his death.
In the report, Lévy aimed to encourage France to take up an active role. In his introduction, Petraeus summarized the contents of the report. Its core recommendations were two-fold:
- Build a centralized state with institutions such as an army, a police force, and public agencies in order to counter the rule of warlords.
- Circumvent ‘stubborn mullahs’ by forming a sort of ‘Black Hussar’ corps made up of teachers, doctors, civil engineers, and other educated citizens. These should be sent out to the most remote provinces to spread republican values at the grassroots level.
Petraeus reflected that it is difficult to assess to what extent France followed Lévy‘s recommendations because the war effort in Afghanistan became entirely US-led, particularly by the time Petraeus took command in 2010. Nonetheless, his report tells us a great deal about what might have been done by both France and the US.
Missed opportunities and mistakes
All panelists agreed that the occupation of Afghanistan generated many mistakes. Lévy even went so far as to say they’re innumerable and decided to forgo naming them, focusing instead on the now threatened achievements, mentioned below. Ambassador Javid Ahmad did elaborate on two key dependencies established by the US that Afghanistan has been unable to shake to this day.
- A reliance on ‘warlords’. Ahmad emphasized that this is a broad term that today indicates most of the country’s organized crime, kleptocratic governance, and terrorist financing. In the early days, these warlords and power brokers were seen as the only option for effective governance in Afghanistan. This established an entrenched, toxic, kleptocratic power dynamic which is similar to the situation in the 1990s.
- Reliance on Pakistan. Ahmad considers this the core of the failure of the mission in Afghanistan. The US has failed to identify Pakistan as either a ‘fickle friend’ or even a ‘clever enemy’. Pakistani activity in Afghanistan consists of a large military force of which the Taliban are one part. It amounts to an effective invasion. Pakistan today doesn’t seek a political settlement. Instead, it aims for a military settlement that recognizes Taliban gains and then builds a political settlement.
Other minor mistakes include starting the training of Afghan forces late and focusing on quantity rather than quality. Additionally, Afghan forces were loosely modeled after the US forces, which rely heavily on air force. However, Afghanistan barely had an air force, and therefore became even more reliant on the United States for success.
Petraeus recognized several of these issues. The US effort failed in combating the Taliban efficiently. The enemy lacked urgency. It had sanctuary in Pakistan. There is a reason that the Taliban leadership is known as the Quetta Shura, not to mention the Peshawar Shura (named for cities in Pakistan). Petraeus describes this as the most challenging issue in the country. The US effort also lagged in resources because of the drain of Iraq. Only in 2010 did Afghanistan receive the appropriate resources.
Achievements
The panel all agreed that there have been many significant successes in Afghanistan. Petraeus emphasized that the original mission was to eliminate Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, which succeeded. Afterwards, the continued presence was partially aimed at preventing a return of that sanctuary, which was also successful.
Along with Lévy and Weinbaum, he emphasized the many civil advancements. Women’s rights and education improved massively, as did the spread of modern technology, healthcare, and infrastructure. Lévy is particularly struck by the strength of the Afghan press, particularly TOLOnews. He praised the brave journalists that use a freedom of speech and investigation that would have been unimaginable previously.
Imminent reversal
The key issue that kept returning, however, was that all of these achievements are now likely to be reversed at a rapid pace. The Western withdrawal from Afghanistan has already led to Taliban victories. The panel feared that much worse is to come. Petraeus lamented that America must learn that “endless wars do not end with a withdrawal or drawdown of American involvement.” In Afghanistan the fight is worsening. When fighting Islamic extremism, it is impossible to win in a traditional military sense. Instead, you need to keep pressure on even after the enemy is entirely destroyed. Petraeus therefore argued for a “sustained, sustainable position.” He believes that such a position had been achieved in recent years, and that the U.S. “will come to regret our decision to draw down our forces.” He fears “it will usher back in very violent civil war which will lead to millions of refugees, terrible loss of lives and bloodshed targeting those that helped us during our time in the country, and other challenges.”
Ahmad observed that Afghans tend to be optimistic about the achievements of the last decades. They see Afghanistan as a glass half-full. However, they fear that the glass half-full won’t matter if we’re going to throw the glass away as the Taliban advance. Lévy considers the withdrawal a betrayal by America and the West in general of its allies in Afghanistan. “The progress was considerable. The task well-achieved was huge. We were on the good road. We decided to erase all that and to quit.”
Watch the recording of the event here:
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Trump still has consequences, none of them good
I’d like to forget about Donald Trump. It is certainly a blessing that those of us who think him a disloyal jerk don’t have to put up with his constant media presence, now that he is out of office. But his years in the White House have consequences. None of them good.
Let’s start at home. The prevalence of COVID-19 infections is looking increasingly like a map of voter preferences in the last presidential election, with the former Confederacy and some Western states suffering the most.
This is not surprising. Trump discouraged social distancing and vaccination, though he was himself was quietly careful to do both. The Delta variant is therefore finding lots of host humans in areas that voted for him. Some will die. More will infect others, including people whose immune systems don’t allow them to be vaccinated as well as children not yet permitted to be vaccinated. The result could be an even more infectious variant popping up, with devastating consequences not only for public health but also for the economy. If you are unvaccinated against COVID-19 and haven’t had polio or smallpox, maybe you should be thinking about why not.
Do I need to spell it out? No one has had polio or smallpox in the US for decades. Because vaccines.
The slow start of vaccination in poorer countries is also in part a result of Trump’s presidency. He wasn’t interested in supporting the World Health Organization’s COVAX program to get them vaccines. Beggar they neighbor and America First are essentially the same thing. The trouble of course is that this, too, contributes to the likelihood of more virulent variants evolving. Yes, evolving: for those who don’t believe in evolution, the existence of COVID-19 variants due mutations should give you pause.
But Trump’s impact on world affairs is unfortunately not limited to COVID-19. Iran is now much closer to having all the material it needs for nuclear weapons than it was when Trump in 2018 withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal. So close, that the newly elected hardline President Raisi is thinking about not reentering it. The Supreme Leader is hinting at that possibility as well, while the Americans have resorted to saying the moment to do so is passing. If you live in one of those states with high COVID infection rates, maybe you are happy about that, because Trump convinced you it was a bad deal. But no deal is clearly worse.
Another sad consequence of Trump’s time in office is the current situation in Syria. He needs to share the blame with Barack Obama, but the fact is neither president ever figured out what to do in Syria other than kill the Islamic State. Andrew Tabler gives an interesting account of Trump Administration thinking on the subject, but he is unable to come up with more than a generic wish for what needs to be done:
A new Syria policy must be carefully calibrated to avoid getting mired in bureaucracy and competing interests. The Biden administration should appoint a special envoy for Syria charged with developing what the Trump team never did—a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
The fact is that Assad, supported by Iran and Russia, has closed down options other than himself and reduced the Americans and Europeans to begging for humanitarian border crossings so they can provide relief to the millions of Syrians who remain outside Assad’s control, thereby preventing a new flood of refugees. While the Trump Administration finished Obama’s “kill ISIS” project, it did nothing thereafter to stabilize the situation and begin to provide something more than humanitarian relief outside Assad-controlled areas. The result of course is that ISIS is resurging, or at least regrowing.
The situation isn’t much better in other parts of the world. While Biden is understandably trying to keep his focus on the big picture of strategic competition with Russia and China, North Korea has more nuclear weapons and more capability to deliver them to the continental US than ever before. The love letters with Trump never accomplished anything. Nicholas Maduro still holds power in Venezuela, despite much Trump Administration blah-blah about replacing him. The Communist regime in Cuba is looking shaky at the moment, but it survived Trump’s tightening of the embargo and isn’t yielding to protests yet.
The House Select Committee on the January 6 insurrection started its hearings this week with testimony from four law enforcement officers who tried to defend the Capitol. They asked the Committee to find out who was behind the attack, that is who “hired the hitman.” It is important to get an official answer to that question. But we know who it was. Donald Trump called for the attack on the Capitol and expected it to encourage the Congress to reject the results of the Electoral College vote, or even to prevent it from certifying the Electoral College result. It will take the United States a long time to emerge from the shadow Trump has cast over its history.
Trump still has consequences. None of them good.
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Who comes to equity must come with clean hands
Serbian President Vucic, after meeting with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti yesterday, said:
We have received EU proposals that have been harmonized with our chief negotiators and Serbia has fully agreed with what the EU has proposed, three points – to intensify efforts to identify the remains of missing persons, to refrain from actions that could potentially destabilize the situation…on the ground and third, that the main negotiators meet regularly once a month and prepare meetings when necessary. We could not agree on these three points.
Kurti was rather more graphic:
The lack of agreement is not a surprise. It was foretold. Belgrade and Pristina are into the blame game. Neither Kurti nor Vucic has much to gain politically at home from an agreement. Both are posturing, mainly for their respective domestic political audiences but also for Brussels and Washington.
What can we learn from the posturing? Vucic is taking a minimalist approach. Agreement on missing persons 20 years after the war is no big step. Nor is a proposal on destabilization, because it would apply presumably inside Kosovo, not in Serbia. Meeting once a month is easy too, since it is unlikely given the current atmosphere that more than one or two meetings more will be necessary before Brussels tires of the posturing and lets the schedule slide.
Kurti is taking a maximalist approach, in part to distinguish himself from his predecessors. He regards them as patsies. A non-aggression pact would apply principally to Serbia, as there is no likelihood of Kosovo, which lacks an army, attacking Serbia, which has a big and well-armed one. Facing the past applies to both, but in much larger measure to Serbia, as it was the prime aggressor and human rights abuser in the 1990s conflict. And the barriers to free trade cited are all Serbia’s of course.
I am personally more sympathetic to Kurti’s maximalist agenda than Vucic’s minimalist one, but that doesn’t mean we are likely to see progress. These two are talking past each other, not with each other. The EU mediator, Miroslav Lajcak, is under pressure to produce something, so he may well want to continue the process. But if he does, he needs to underpin it with a more constructive conversation at lower levels, out of the public eye.
My guess is–and it is only a guess–that Belgrade and Pristina could really make some progress on missing people, on protection of Serbs in Kosovo and Albanians in Serbia, and on freeing up trade. Kurti seems intent on threatening to reimpose tariffs on Serbian goods if he gets no satisfaction on access to Serbia’s markets. It’s a good idea only if it leads to lowered barriers. Protection of their respective minorities in the other country is important. There is no excuse for interethnic violence in Kosovo, and in southern Serbia there is a concerted effort to displace the Albanian population through administrative means. Both should stop.
I don’t know what to say that hasn’t already been said about missing people. Twenty years is far too long for governments that claim to be democratic to fail to give a full accounting and return the bodies. I fear that in both countries it is people responsible for the crimes that killed civilians who are now sufficiently powerful to prevent their respective governments from doing what they know is right.
If there is one thing I would prioritize to improve the prospects for the dialogue, it is not at the table in Brussels but before anyone gets there. The day Pristina comes to the table with visible support from Kosovo’s Serb population is the day things will begin to move in a more peaceful, stable direction. Vucic has worked hard to prevent that from happening: he controls the political party that holds all the Serb seats in the Kosovo Assembly. Kurti should be working hard to gain Kosovo Serb support by preventing violence against Serbs and Serb property in Kosovo, ensuring that both are respected fully, and facing Kosovo’s own past, which includes deadly violence by fighters of its Liberation Army against both Serbs and Albanians before, during, and after the 1999 war.
Who comes to equity must come with clean hands. Kosovo can wash its hands a lot easier, and with much greater effect, than Serbia can.
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Afghanistan after the Americans: it’s either peace or chaos
Hamid Bayati of Iran’s Mehr news agency asked questions yesterday. I responded:
Q: As you know new round of Afghans talks began in Qatar and CNN reported that US intelligence assessments paint an increasingly bleak picture of the Taliban’s quickening advance across Afghanistan and the potential threat it poses to the capital of Kabul, warning the militant group could soon have a stranglehold on much of the country in the wake of the US withdrawal of troops. So how do you predict Afghanistan’s future with this assessments?
A: I don’t predict Afghanistan’s future, which is a fool’s game. But its security forces are having a hard time with Taliban, there is no doubt about that.
Q: Some experts said that the situation in Afghanistan and Taliban quickening advance in Afghanistan is a result of an unwritten agreement between US and Taliban. In other words, if the US gives green light to take control of the country, what do you think about this issue?
A: The U.S. agreed under President Trump to an unconditional withdrawal that President Biden is implementing. That was not intended as a green light to a military takeover by the Taliban, who however are taking advantage of it. Washington wanted them engaged seriously in negotiations, not conflict.
Q: Experts believe the US does not want peace and stability in Afghanistan, because if there is not any tension in Afghanistan there is no need for the presence of US troops in the region, so is it true or not and why?
A: The experts who think this need to think again. The US wants out of Afghanistan, not in. I see no reason Washington would not be happy with peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Q: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the US have different interests in Afghanistan, so how is it possible these countries reach a common goal about it and end the conflict in Afghanistan?
A: The interests are different, but not entirely incompatible. All would be well-served by a more stable, unaligned Afghanistan. The question is whether they will allow that to happen. The US will no longer be a big player. The more immediate neighbors (Russia, China, India, and Pakistan) will need to collaborate to create an Afghanistan that threatens none of them and is threatened by none of them. It won’t be easy, but the alternative is chaos.
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What to expect from renewal of the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue
Alma Baxhaku of Klan Kosova asked some questions today; I answered:
Q: The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is resuming. The new Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has said that this process is not a continuation of what it was until now. Do you think that Kosovo should radically change its approach to dialogue with Serbia?
A: The Prime Minister has good reason to want to underline that he will take a different approach, as the past several years of the dialogue have not been productive. I do think some changes are in order.
Q: What should be Kosovo’s position at the negotiating table?
A: Kosovo needs to insist on equality and reciprocity. If something is agreed for Serbs in Kosovo, an equivalent should be available to Albanians inside Serbia. The Specialist Chambers violated this principle. I’d like to see their jurisdiction extended to Serbia, where the Albanian American Bytyqi brothers were murdered after the war.
Kosovo also needs to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. And it needs to strengthen its international support.
Q: In the first meeting with President Vucic, PM Kurti came up with four new proposals. How did you see them?
A: I’m mostly in agreement. I obviously agree with him on reciprocity in general, though I might have some quarrels with how it is applied in practice. I also agree that the missing persons of all ethnicities need to be identified and their remains returned.
On CEFTA/SEFTA I’m inclined to agree as well. Mini-Schengen seems to me an ill-defined enterprise, one in which Kosovo’s equality is not clearly recognized. I also like the idea of a non-aggression agreement, though I imagine Serbia will hesitate because it implies Kosovo sovereignty and Belgrade would want NATO to sign on as well.
Q: PM Kurti said in front of the MEPs that the authors of the documents that would bring ideas for a final solution between Kosovo and Serbia are missing. Do you think the EU should offer a concrete solution to the parties?
A: Only if it is one that recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo. In the meanwhile, the EU should allow Kosovo into the visa waiver program.
Q: What should be the role of the US in this resumed process?
A: The US should be supporting the EU, but it will also be called on to “deliver” Kosovo. I think Brussels and Washington should form an entity like the International Civilian Office to monitor implementation of agreements reached in the dialogue as well as name and shame those who fail to implement them.
Q: According to the statements made public, both Kurti and Vucic have much opposite attitudes. Do you think that a final agreement between Kosovars and Serbs is near?
A: I don’t. President Vucic sees little prospect of EU membership in the near term and has consequently turned toward Moscow and Beijing rather than Brussels. He has made it eminently clear he is not prepared for a major move before next year’s Serbian presidential election.
Kosovo in these circumstances has to do what it can to use the time to strengthen its bargaining position. The recent movement of non-recognizers Greece and Spain toward upgrading their relationships with Kosovo is precisely the kind of thing needed. I’d like Pristina to improve relations with Beijing, which is more interested in commerce in the Balkans than politics. The Kosovo government should also be doing everything it can to improve relations with the Serb and other communities inside Kosovo, including identifying and returning the remains of missing people, implementing the Constitutional Court decision of the Decan/Decani monastery’s property, and protecting all of the communities from interethnic violence.
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