Tag: United States
Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
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Impunity spawns carelessness, the time for accountability is nigh
Donald Trump and his minions are shocked. New York State has indicted the Trump Organization for tax fraud. A Federal grand jury has indicted about 500 of the people who stormed The Capitol on Trump’s instructions January 6. There is now a real possibility that they and their leader will be held accountable for their criminal behavior. How did this happen?
The January 6 rioters have mostly indicted themselves. Their own cell phone videos and social media communications will constitute a lot of the evidence presented at trial. They felt they were immune from prosecution. After all, they were following the President’s instructions and defending their version of democracy, in which the votes of black people and immigrants don’t count. Some thought they were entitled to arrest members of Congress for certifying the electoral votes of the 50 states. Such “citizens arrests” are legal in DC during commission of a felony, though it is not clear to me that applies on The Capitol grounds. I’d be astonished if it were permitted for members of Congress. Only people intoxicated with the impunity that white privilege bestows could imagine they would get away with it.
The Trump Organization is similar. It apparently kept detailed records of the off-the-books perqs with which it compensated selected employees, who didn’t pay taxes on the implicit income. New York State alleges they got away with it for 15 years, but I imagine it is closer to 50. This is just the tip of the iceberg. The prosecutors have filed these charges in part to turn the CFO of the organzation into a cooperating witness. If ever they succeed, there will be far more tax fraud revealed. Even without that, Trump’s gaming of the value of his properties–high for the banks when seeking a loan but low for the tax authorities–is sure to get the company, if not Trump himself, into big trouble. The impunity white privilege bestows is beginning to evaporate.
It will not be hard to show that Donald Trump approved the tax returns of the Trump Organization, just as it is easy to show that he approved and even encouraged the storming of The Capitol on January 6. But showing that he intended to commit tax fraud and intended the demonstration to turn violent will be harder. Trump has always avoided written communications. His style is that of organized crime groups: everything is done orally, and often implicitly rather than explicitly. Trump did not explicitly tell the rioters to be violent, only to “stop the steal.” He also stood by and watched on TV while they entered and trashed The Capitol, but that only implies intent.
Still there will be consequences for Trump personally. What bank would be interested in renewing his loans, hundreds of millions of which are coming due soon? Who would want his name attached to their property? The value of much of his own real estate has likely declined during the epidemic and may not recover for years. He can of course use bankruptcy as a shelter, but this time around it may be his personal bankruptcy rather than his all too often used corporate bankruptcy. This man is in financial trouble.
Trump’s supporters remain fervent, but there is growing evidence they are a fraction of the Republican Party. A declining percentage of Americans is identifying as Republican or independents leaning Republican. Trump has still managed to hold on to his leadership in the Party, largely by raising a lot of money and threatening those who don’t toe his line with primary competition. But the Democrats are also raising a lot of money and winning primaries doesn’t necessarily get you a seat in Congress. The Democrats have only a thin majority in both Houses right now, and it will not be easy to expand it. But Trump’s strength in the Republican Party will help them with independents and disenchanged Republicans.
The best hope of the Republicans is to limit the number of people, especially the poor and minorities, who can vote. They are pursuing that objective brazenly, and with support from the Republican majority on the Supreme Court, by imposing restrictions on voting in the states they control. That works because of the over-representation of those states in the Senate and in the Electoral College. This strategy too is careless, as success requires that people don’t react by coming out in even greater numbers to vote. They appear to have done that in the 2020 election.
This is where the Democrats need to find a solution, by reducing barriers to voting and the gerrymandering of Congressional districts, as well as admitting at least two new states to the Union. The Douglas Commonwealth (aka DC) and Puerto Rico as states would help to offset the gross inequity of representation in Congress, where the Democratic Senators represent tens of millions more people than the Republican Senators and House seats are engineered by state legislatures to favor Republican candidates.
2022 will be a crucial year for Trump, his organization, and his supporters. If they are all held accountable and the Democrats retain control of the Congress, accountability really will be night.
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Better jaw jaw than war, but the strategic risks are real
Former IAEA Inspector Pantelis Ikonomou writes:
The sixth round of the Vienna negotiations aimed at restoring the multilateral Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA) were halted last week. At the same time, the temporary technical agreement between the IAEA and Iran, intended to enable the revival of the Iran deal, expired. Iran denies any obligation to provide an answer on the fate of this accord. Stalemate or death of JCPOA? Will this open the door to an additional de facto nuclear weapon state?
Judging intentions is difficult. Learning from facts has mostly proven wise. Some relevant facts are outlined below.
The development of the current North Korea and Iran nuclear challenges show similarities. The key common shortcoming of the world powers in dealing with these two challenges is that we (ineffectively) talk but they (strategically) continue. Equivalent lessons could also be learned from the earlier “peaceful” nuclear explosion of India in 1974 that has led to about 140 nuclear warheads in its arsenal today and to approximately the same number in Pakistan.
As for North Korea:
I1. n the period 1994–2002 of the “Agreed Framework” implementation, great attention went to terminating the possibility of plutonium production in the Yongbyon reactor while the country’s potential in enriching uranium was neglected.
2. During the years 2003–2009 of the “Six Party Talks,” the US linked other issues to the negotiations instead of concentrating on the main nuclear objective: how to curb fissile material acquisition.
3. Keen observers note the North Korean nuclear program “nuclear progress slowed significantly during times of diplomacy and accelerated during times of isolation, sanctions and threats.”
Result: Creation of an additional de-facto nuclear weapons state, North Korea, with an estimated number of 20 to 30 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, including thermonuclear capacity.
As for Iran:
- The crisis began in 2003 when IAEA inspectors identified a possible military dimension in Tehran’s civilian nuclear program. From 2003 to 2012, despite twelve IAEA and two UNSC resolutions culminating in trade and economic sanctions, Iran continued its non-compliance with obligations under the international Safeguards Agreement. Tehran regarded nuclear activities as its inalienable national right.
- This dangerous escalation was halted by the JCPOA in July 2015, after almost a decade of complex and sensitive diplomatic negotiations between the six world powers (the five UNSC permanent members plus Germany) and Iran. This Agreement stipulated obligations on both sides: termination of critical nuclear activities as well as limits to certain installed equipment, material stockpiles and uranium enrichment levels in Iran in exchange for lifting of sanctions.
- This honeymoon period lasted until May 2018 when US withdrew from the JCPOA and started reimposing sanctions. In January 2020, after the killing of Iran’s General Qasem Soleimani, Tehran changed its stance towards JCPOA. Progress achieved through the Agreement was then reversed.
- In February 2021, Iran’s parliament passed a law on terminating the JCPOA, including the associated voluntary implementation of the rigorous Additional Protocol (AP) to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.
Result: Increased instability and volatility in the region.
“What is next?” is the justified question. A few practical reflections:
- An eventual positive conclusion of the Vienna talks on the revival of JCPOA will not automatically bring definitive relief. The damage done after 2018 to the Iran deal cannot be verifiably restored quickly. Notwithstanding the professionalism and objectivity of the IAEA, restoration of the Agreement will require enormous effort, high additional costs, as well as the continuous and smooth cooperation of Iran’s competent authorities.
- For the successful revival of JCPOA the recently expired temporary arrangement between Iran and the IAEA needs to be extended immediately. Re-establishing the inspectors’ continuity of knowledge of Iran’s nuclear program is sine qua non for the IAEA to be able to draw the necessary broader conclusions on the exclusively peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program.
- In case the JCPOA is not renewed, monitoring Iran under its IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement without the AP in place would perpetuate unresolved issues relating to questionable findings of materials, locations and activities. This unfortunate situation would create problems not only with Iran but also with other states in the region, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, who are being called to satisfy the same universal safeguards criteria.
The omens for stability and security of the world are not encouraging while the responsibility of the parties involved is growing larger.
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Stevenson’s army, July 1, second edition
Donald Rumsfeld was a strong but flawed Secretary of Defense. He asserted civilian control of the U.S. military and tried to reshape it for 21st century warfare, only to embrace conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq that turned into forever wars.
I started writing SecDef: the nearly impossible job of Secretary of Defense during his second tour and published it a few months before he was fired. At the time I was impressed by his performance in office. I believed in civilian control as a principle and liked his assertiveness. I believed DOD needed radical reforms and welcomed his efforts at “transformation.” I began to question his management of the war in Afghanistan and became disillusioned by his handling of the war in Iraq.
Then I began to hear stories from my students at the National War College and read insider journalistic accounts of his conduct.
He was so determined to assert civilian control that he often demanded that military officers sit as backbenchers rather than at the main table. He told subordinates that, in interagency meetings, they could not agree to anything that had not already been decided within DOD, nor could they agree to anything else. This attitude constipated the interagency process.
Rumsfeld managed the Pentagon with “snowflakes,” short memos on major and petty topics, that forced officials into crisis response modes rather than careful deliberation. While many subordinates appreciated his demanding style and were willing to respond to his challenges, others found him abusive.
As I write in SecDef, the job has 4 major responsibilities: managing the Pentagon, advising the president and the NSC, planning wars, and serving as an important diplomat. He did reasonably well only in that last case.
His management of DOD was flawed by his over-reliance on snowflakes. His NSC role undermined the interagency process. He criticized the National Security Council processes and meetings run by Condoleezza Rice and worked to avoid them. As the youngest Secretary of Defense, under President Gerald Ford, he fought Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on policy grounds, especially policy toward the Soviet Union. In his second tour, now the oldest SecDef, under President George W. Bush, he again fought the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, over policy, turf, politics, and governmental processes.
As a war planner, he often excluded others, including the State Department and even the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He nitpicked deployment plans, causing numerous disruptions. He cuts military requests for troops for Iraq in a risky effort to prove he was transforming the military. He demanded control over operations but cleverly avoided responsibility when problems arose, blaming others instead.
He once told an audience of soldiers who complained about problems in the Iraq war, “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”
Rumsfeld was the secretary of defense we had at the time, not necessarily the one we might have wanted or needed.
Here are some of the other, more critical assessments of his service. From George Packer, Spencer Ackerman, and Sarah Jones.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 28
US air strikes in Iraq and Syria against Iranian-linked militias. NYT background. Official release.
UN told Russian mercenaries commit war crimes in Africa.
Bruce Riedel remembers the Khobar Towers bombing 25 years ago. He notes how US retaliated against Iran. The incident also led to a civ-mil clash when SecDef Cohen wanted to punish senior officers and USAF Chief of Staff wanted to punish only those immediately responsible. The chief retired early in quiet protest. For me it was a clash between the Navy and Air Force approaches to command responsibility.
Fred Kaplan reviews West Point’s long history of teaching about race.
Tucker Carlson attacks Gen.Milley.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Ghani looks for partners and opportunities in the future
The withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan is soon to be a reality. The last troops will leave before September 11. There is still no political resolution of the country’s decades-old civil war. Fighting is escalting as foreign support declines. Experts have speculated that the Kabul regime led by president Ashraf Ghani may fall to the Taliban as soon as six months after the withdrawal is complete. In this context, the Arab Center Washington DC organized a conference on Looking towards Peace in Afghanistan after the US-NATO Withdrawal. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani gave a keynote speech June 22, before meeting with President Biden on three days later on the new context Afghanistan finds itself in and the opportunities that it affords.
The speakers were:
H.E. Dr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani (keynote)
President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Sultan Barakat (introduction)
Founding director,
Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, Doha institute for Graduate Studies
A withdrawal foretold
The President focused first on the reality of the current situation. The US withdrawal is a game changer. “By ending the guessing game” surrounding the presence of US forces,” Biden forced all stakeholders to reassess their assumptions in the new context. This decision was no surprise to the Afghan government: “this is a transition for which, mentally, we have been ready.” President Ghani respects Biden’s decision and thanked the troops that helped Afghanistan so generously. Now, Afghanistan needs to be ready to establish new relations with the US and NATO. Far from abandoning Afghanistan, these allies will now become partners in assuring the prosperity and development of the country.
Focusing on opportunities, not risks
Ghani cited Nobel-prize winner Daniel Kahneman, who demonstrated that when strategic situations change people tend to focus on threats, rather than opportunities. For now, however, it is important to focus on opportunities. Afghans have been living with uncertainty for 43 years. They have grown accustomed to see potential despite this. The president explicitly reminded the academics present at the conference that they are speaking of a nation of 30 million. “The specter of Najibullah’s fall haunts us,” he admitted. The more people compare the current situation to that, as well as to the fall of Vietnam, the more they add to the anxiety and fears of the Afghan people. President Ghani does not believe that either of those situations is a good comparison.
“We do not ask the world for a sense of indebtedness, because that is not the reality. But we ask for understanding and we ask for partnership in a meaningful way.” There are two key processes to successfully shape the opportunities now presented:
- All stakeholders must acknowledge the strategic shift. All must frame and reframe their partnerships and resist the urge to pretend that the context hasn’t changed. The Kabul government immediately accepted and acknowledged that the withdrawal changes everything. Ghani called on foreign nations to stop hedging and waiting for events to unfold. Avoid atavistic behavior. Accept the changing context and look towards the new future of Afghanistan without applying historical ideas. “Join us to create a peaceful Afghanistan based on the noble quest for peace, cooperation, and prosperity.”
- Afghanistan needs to focus on new and changing partnerships. Ghani is pleased that, together with all of its core interlocutors (US, NATO) his government has immediately been able to change focus to the new chapter, which will bring peace, prosperity, and connectivity to Afghanistan. The region is crucial in this regard.
To secure the peace of Afghanistan by avoiding foreign competition over influence, “we are seriously considering the permanent neutrality of Afghanistan” so that all can be sure that Afghanistan will not be the theater of competition. “We are not looking for patrons, we are looking for partners.”
Challenging the Taliban to govern
The President turned last to the Taliban and the future of Afghan governance. “My colleagues and I have been very clear we are not interested in power, we are interested in principle and commitment. We are willing to bring elections forward to ensure orderly succession.” The Taliban movement is making a strategic mistake by continuing violence when political pathways are on the table in Doha. Why continue with violence when the context has changed and none of the assumptions of the past continue to be relevant? “A tragedy is in the making. This tragedy is a long and distractive civil war. The Taliban and the Taliban alone will be responsible for the scope of this tragedy.”
Ghani put two core questions to the Taliban:
- Will the Taliban acknowledge the centrality of an Afghan nation of common interest, or will they put their relations with their network and sponsors first, as they did in 2001? They must choose where their loyalties truly lie, and make this clear to the people of Afghanistan.
- What is the Taliban’s practical vision for Afghanistan? They can’t avoid explaining their proposed solutions for governance issues such as COVID, the return of refugees, women’s rights, education, water management, etcetera.
By focusing on governance and development despite continuous fighting, “we have changed the discourse in the world and the region to stop looking at us as just poor Afghanistan, but rather as potentially rich Afghanistan and a partner.”
Ghani concluded by emphasizing his personal commitment to Afghanistan’s prosperity: “Never will I leave this country, never will I abandon my people, and never will I stop urging peace and prosperity for all of us.” “If war is imposed on us, we will surprise the world as has been our habit and our destiny in the past.”
Watch the recording of the speech below:
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