Tag: United States
Border changes should be ruled out of bounds
In this interview with Radio Television Kosova (RTK) Wednesday, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Palmer had this exchange with an interviewer (start at 14:28 in the video):
Q: Is still alive idea for changing borders?
A: I don’t think that’s on the agenda. It’s not up to me to identify the redlines in this process. It’s up to the parties. The Kosovo side has been pretty clear about that issue.
This answer is unwise, counterproductive, and inconsistent with stated Biden Administration policy.
Unwise
The question of border changes in the Balkans has been thoroughly aired, including in discussions between Serbian President Vucic and former Kosovo President Thaci, not to mention in a raft of papers and nonpapers. Vucic and Thaci failed to come to an agreement: each wanted territory in the other’s country but wasn’t willing to give up the territory required to cut a deal. Leaving the door open to further discussion is foolish, because it has already been tried and failed. Putting the burden of killing the idea on Kosovo is unfair, as it absolves Serbia of responsibility, though it is true that no parliament in Kosovo, including the current one with a wider majority governing coalition than usual, could approve a “land swap,” which would also suffer a resounding defeat in a referendum.
Leaving the door open is also foolish because of the regional and international implications. Any change of Kosovo’s borders would lead to demands for changing Bosnia’s borders by secession of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-controlled 49% of its territory. How do we know? The de facto autocratic leader of the RS, Milorad Dodik, has promised it. In addition, Russian President Putin would demand the same for Russian-controlled portions of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Every illiberal politician worldwide would feel free to unleash irredentist sentiments, which exist throughout Asia and Africa. There is no quicker way of killing the Biden Administration’s hopes for a revival of democracy than leaving the door open to border changes in the Balkans.
Counterproductive
The purpose of Matt’s trip to Kosovo and now Serbia is to display solidarity with the European Union in pursuing a Belgrade/Pristina dialogue that has been unproductive for the better part of a decade. The EU is now aiming to revive it. The lead EU negotiator, Miroslav Lajcak, has been firm in ruling out border changes, which several EU countries have indicated they will not accept, most notably Germany. Each EU member has a veto on this question, since accession of any new members requires all existing member states to agree. Solidarity with the EU requires clarity on this point, not a wishy-washy statement that leaves it up to Pristina. That approach is precisely what got the Trump Administration into several years of unproductive friction with the EU in the Western Balkans. If Washington really wants the dialogue to produce anything, it needs to be crystal clear in public and private that it will not accept border changes.
Inconsistent
Biden, both as candidate and president, has unequivocally supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries of the Western Balkans, including both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the right position for a liberal democrat who believes in liberal democracy, that is democracy based on individual rights of citizens protected by the rule of law.
The problem is that sincere liberal democrats are still few and far between at the leadership level in the Western Balkans. Ethnic nationalists dominate, especially in Serbia but also elsewhere. President Vucic and his minions have been touting what he calls a “Serbian home,” which is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia whose pursuit led Slobodan Milosevic into four or five wars (depending on how you count). Prime Minister Kurti has sometimes aspired to a referendum in Kosovo on union with Albania. RS President Dodik has the same aspiration, for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some Bosnian Croats share the aspiration for themselves.
None of these propositions is consistent with aspirations for EU membership and should be ruled out of bounds both by the EU and the US.
PS: In case anyone wonders whether the video above was a slip-up, here is Matt declining again the same day, during an appearance with Lajcak, to rule out landswaps and saying that it is not up to the EU or the US to identify the compromises but up to “the parties determine the contents of the talks” (start at 6:14, apologies for the sound quality):
PPS: Then in Belgrade, Matt led out change of borders for Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not for Kosovo:
The borders of BiH and North Macedonia are fixed. Nobody talks about changing he borders of BiH, nobody talks about changing the borders of North Macedonia. That’s out of the question.
When it comes to Kosovo, Matt puts the burden entirely on Pristina:
When it comes to borders and territories, I do not see this as an issue that Kosovo is ready to engage on.
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Stevenson’s army, May 31
[In memory of my ancestor, Captain Levi Ely of the Massachusetts militia, killed at the battle of Stone Arabia, October 19, 1780.]
– LTG [Ret.] Mike Flynn calls for a coup.
– Politico says the Danes helped NSA spy on Merkel.
– North Korea criticizes US decision on South Korea.
– Susan Glasser of the New Yorker wonders about threats to American democracy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Taking score of the GCC at 40: better on economics than politics
On 05/27, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) celebrated this weeks’ 40 year anniversary of the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council by discussing the organization’s origins, achievements, and future challenges. A Eurocentric approach to the GCC yields few results. The member states’ and region’s different dynamics make an EU benchmark counterproductive. Nonetheless, the panel agreed that this anniversary should be an opportunity to reconsider and renew the GCC’s Charter and mission. The GCC’s achievements are many. As the recent inter-GCC conflict showed, however, it faces serious challenges for the future too.
The speakers were:
Abdullah Baabood
Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies & Visiting Professor
School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University
Matteo Legrenzi
Professor of International Relations
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Emma Soubrier
Visiting Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kristin Smith Diwan
Senior Resident Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
The GCC’s origins: no ‘Gulf-EU’
Matteo Legrenzi thinks it is important to acknowledge the different factors that led to the GCC. It is true that worries about Iran were a key reason. However, Gulf cooperation had been on the rise since independence from the UK in the 1970s. Furthermore, the GCC was intended to keep Iraq out, as much as it was intended to unite against Iran. Iraq had been seeking inroads in the Gulf in the context of its Arab nationalist leadership aspirations. Keeping Iraq out of the GCC was a clear signal in the context of the Iran-Iraq War. Diwan remarked that ironically the GCC’s secretary-general’s speech this week emphasized the efforts underway to involve Iraq in the GCC more. Baabood added that the Arab state system’s instability at the time also contributed to the Gulf’s desire for cooperation. Egypt’s peace with Israel and the Arab League’s outrage at the time put regional security on shaky footings.
Emma Soubrier explained that the GCC never became a regional security system, nor was it intended to. It did achieve a strong Gulf identity alongside the prevailing Arab identity of the time. This succeeded both domestically and internationally. Abdullah Baabood commented that the GCC achieved a tariff and trade union. It managed to become greater than the sum of its parts and outperformed expectations in doing so.
Matteo Legrenzi took some time to emphasize the differences between the GCC and the EU model. The domestic organization of GCC states – where a small ruling class wields absolute power – allows quick action to be taken when leaders agree. However, GCC institutions should not be expected to develop supra-national powers. All countries freely admitted to this from the start. Because of this, certain fields see less cooperation than others. Security and defense are less integrated than trade and economics for this reason.
Facing today’s challenges
The Middle East faces a new security order today. Rather than a post-US order, this is a multipolar order in which the US plays a definite part, according to Soubrier. We should therefore not be afraid to be a little US-centric. The conclusion of the al-Ula agreement (which ended the blockade of Qatar) mere weeks before Biden took office is no coincidence, for example. The conflict surrounding Qatar is a major elephant in the room in the GCC.
Baabood acknowledged that it is unprecedented. Its scope went beyond the political to include the societal and public opinion. It hurt the Khaleeji (Gulf) identity that the GCC had so successfully helped establish. Furthermore, it went directly against the GCC common market, without using any GCC mechanisms for resolving disputes. This seriously harmed the trust the GCC is built upon. Much remains to be restored after al-Ula particularly between Qatar and the UAE. Soubrier did emphasize that the GCC leaves much room for bilateral projects and cooperation. This “integration at different speeds” is one of the GCC’s strengths.
The war in Yemen is another conflict in which the GCC might play a part. However, Legrenzi warned that the GCC should not be expected to play a role in political resolutions. Rather, its strength will be in reconstruction of the Yemeni economy, once the political disputes have been resolved. Yemeni accession to the GCC is unlikely because the monarchical model is central to the GCC.
The future
The panel concluded with discussion of the directions the GCC could and should take in the near future. Soubrier emphasized the need for more human-based security. Humanitarian issues in the region are at a peak and the disconnect between Gulf leaders’ vision and public sentiment – e.g. on the recent Gaza war – shows the need for a new focus. Legrenzi and Baabood agreed that the 40th anniversary would be a good occasion to review the GCC Charter. As Legrenzi noted, the charter is a product of the 1970s and 80s. It is full of language relating to Arab nationalism, making it a historical document rather than a modern guideline. There are some mechanisms and aspirations mentioned in the charter which never came to fruition. The GCC countries should take the opportunity to reassess their vision for the organization. This could reinvigorate the project in the process.
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Republican disrespect for America is a big win for Democrats
Memorial Day Monday commemorates those lost defending America in its too many wars. Yesterday the Republicans in the Senate, using the filibuster, blocked creation of a bipartisan commission to investigate the January 6 attack on The Capitol. The irony should be lost on no one: while commemorating those who defend America, elected representatives are preventing investigation of the most successful physical attack on its institutions, and on them, since 1812. Why?
It’s not because they don’t want to know why January 6 happened. It’s because they know perfectly well. Supporters of then-President Trump were attempting to disrupt the constitutionally mandated tabulation in Congress of the Electoral College results. Trump himself encouraged them to do so, claiming fraud during the November election that did not occur and urging his supporters to march on The Capitol. The January 6 rioters, hundreds of whom are now charged in court, included white supremacists and others who wanted to prevent the votes of Black and Brown minorities from deciding the outcome of the election.
Creation of the bipartisan commission would have been an excellent opportunity for the Republican Party to separate itself from the racist miscreants who led the January 6 insurrection. The party leadership–which includes not only Trump himself but notably also Senate Minority Leader McConnell–passed on that opportunity, despite McConnell’s speech after the second impeachment blaming Trump for the assualt. The result is all too apparent: the GOP is now fully committed to racism and white supremacy, not only in Congress but also through the dozens of bills introduced in state legislatures to limit voting by non-whites.
The main question now is whether this racist political program will thrive or not. The six Republican senators who voted in favor of the January 6 commission will soon have to decide whether they can continue to inhabit the GOP or need to break definitively from it. That kind of formal split would doom the Republicans to serious losses in the 2022 election. Even without a formal split, racist strength among GOP loyalists, who are the main participants in primaries, guarantees that it will nominate for the House and Senate more candidates who back Trump than the six defectors. The 2022 election will be a referendum not only on Biden’s performance, which is garnering solid approval so far, but also on Trump Republicanism, which retains something like 30% support.
That’s why the voting rights issue is so important. The electorate that put Biden in office would unquestionably inflict a massive defeat on the racist version of the GOP. But mid-term elections like 2022 do not bring out the same electorate as a presidential contest. Fewer people, and fewer minorities in particular, vote. If Republicans at the state level suppress the vote by making it more difficult for people to register, cast absentee ballots, get to the polls, and cast their votes, Trumpism has a far better chance, even though he will not be on the ballot.
He won’t be in 2024 either, despite his effort to suggest that he might run again. There are indications prosecutors in New York will be charging Trump within the next few months with financial crimes, including tax fraud and election campaign violations as well as other associated felonies. Conviction could take a long time, so he will be wrapped up in court for years to come, if his health holds up. It is hard for me to imagine that Trump will continue to be a fundraising paladin once indicted, but if he is donors will be throwing good money down a rat hole. The notion of a Republican presidential nominee who is under indictment or convicted is beyond my imagination, though of course it is possible.
Speaker Pelosi will now appoint a select commission, including a quotient of non-Trumpist Republican-affiliated big shots. If it manages to report truthfully before the end of the year or early next, the impact could be close to that of a bipartisan commission. By defeating that proposition, Trump has guaranteed he will be blamed for January 6. The Republicans are defeating themselves. Democrats should not be too unhappy.
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Deal likely, but can it go any farther than rollback?
This discussion of the possible return of the US to the Iran nuclear deal was convened by the Middle East Institute May 26, as US-Iranian talks in Vienna entered their fifth round. Participants analyzed the prospects for a deal between the US and Iran and its implications for the region’s security. The panel discussed the possibility of expanding on the original JCPOA, as well as broader regional security dynamics and specifically their implications for Iraq. They agreed a new JCPOA seems to be imminent. However, the question remains whether it can be used to reduce Iranian influence in the region and if it should.
The speakers were:
Amb. (ret.) Rend al-Rahim
Co-founder and President
The Iraq Foundation;
former Iraqi Ambassador to the US
Michael Rubin
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute
Ali Vaez
Iran project Director
International Crisis Group
Alex Vatanka (moderator)
Director, Iran Program
Middle East Institute
A mutually beneficial deal?
All speakers agreed that a deal appears imminent. Ali Vaez pointed out that sequencing will remain an issue, but that the largest problems will likely be solved at the 11th hour. Iranian or Israeli brinkmanship is unlikely to derail the negotiations. This was shown by their continuation after the attack on the Natanz facility and Iran’s announcement that it would start enriching to 60%. Rubin believes Congress should be asked to ratify the agreement. Congress might prove more concerned about brinkmanship than the negotiators in Vienna. Ali Vaez expects that the deal will be announced right after the Iranian presidential elections. In this way, the result will not influence the popularity of conservative candidates. At the same time, Rouhani would still be responsible for the deal’s implementation, meaning he can serve as a scapegoat for any of its shortcomings: a win-win for conservatives in Iran.
The speakers disagreed on whether more than the original JCPOA should be on the table. Ali Vaez argued that a return to the original deal is needed to build trust after the unwarranted American abandonment of the deal under president Trump. Ambassador al-Rahim, however, said she does not believe that any further progress can be made after this deal. Just like after the initial JCPOA’s conclusion, no further deals – for example on ballistic missiles – will be forthcoming. Michael Rubin argued that some important issues need to be addressed. In this ‘JCPOA+’ framework, attention needs to be paid to the role of the IRGC in Iran’s economy. Rubin emphasized that any easing of sanctions could go to the IRGC’s economic wing, rather than benefiting the Iranian people in dire need of economic relief. In fact, lifting sanctions without addressing the IRGC’s entanglement in the economy would only aid in its projects throughout the region.
Thinking about a new Middle Eastern security arena
This brought the discussion to the second point of disagreement: the level of Iranian influence that is desirable. Ambassador al-Rahim outlined the difference in strategic visions between Iran and the US. According to her, the US fails to use its potential in the region (for example through the Iraqi Strategic Dialogue). Instead it focuses on disengaging and setting up a post-US strategic order. The US needs to consider whether it is content with leaving Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon under Iranian influence, with an Israeli-Gulf alliance hegemonous over the rest of the region. Iran, as Rubin pointed out, meanwhile sees itself as a pan-regional power, not merely Shia. It is unlikely to accept such a limited sphere of influence. He emphasized that there are ways of resisting Iranian influence without major US investments. Regional countries need to be armed to do so themselves.
Ali Vaez also sees these problems, but challenges the US to consider how much Iranian influence is acceptable. If the US and its allies are content only when Iranian influence in Iraq is zero, then the goal is simply unrealistic. Should we consider influence in a country like Iraq as zero-sum, as Israel and the Gulf appear to do? Also, can we expect Iran to disarm while we are arming its neighbors to the tune of billions of dollars? A regional détente with concessions from all sides is his preferred means of lowering tensions. Ambassador al-Rahim contends that Tehran sees its influence as zero-sum too. If it is allowed to have any influence, it will aim for total influence. Furthermore, she contends that Iran did have zero influence in Iraq before 2003. Its entanglement in Iraqi power structures is not unavoidable she thinks. She and Vaez agree that both Washington and Tehran should agree that Iraq needs to be allowed to be its own sovereign country. Recent Shia protests in Iraq show that the population shares this desire.
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If you hijack an airplane, you are a hijacker
Belarus’ hijacking of a Ryanair flight crossing its territory in order to arrest a dissident journalist is a quantum jump in contemporary autocratic behavior. No doubt autocratic governments will justify it on the basis of exerting national sovereignty over their own air space. But it endangered close to 200 innocent people and set a precedent for future actions of this sort. The punishment in most countries is life imprisonment or death.
What can be done about Belarus’ perfidy? The objectives should be the freeing of the journalist and making it clear that there is nothing to be gained from state hijacking of aircraft. The US, EU, UK, and other willing countries should engage as quickly as possible with both Minsk and Moscow to determine if there is any possibility of an early release of the journalist and to convey their willingness to take further action if he is not released right away.
That effort may well fail, so here are a few ideas of next steps to pressure Minsk:
- The US, UK, and EU could expand their travel and financial sanctions on regime figures and institutions in Belarus. These could include SWIFT restrictions on transactions involving Belarusan banks.
- They could end EU, World Bank and International Monetary Fund grants, lending, and programs in Belarus.
- They could prevent Belavia, the national airline, from landing on their territory.
- They could recall their ambassadors for consultations, expel Belarusan diplomats, or break diplomatic relations with Minsk.
- They could pledge to detain for questioning about the incident Belarusan officials found on their territory, including but not limited to President Lukashenko (yes, I know heads of state are supposed to have diplomatic immunity).
- They can insist on an investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
While this hijacking was manifestly a threat to peace and security, convening the UN Security Council may not be useful, as Belarus can likely rely on Russia to prevent any serious action there, even a presidential statement. After all, that’s what the US did for Israel just in the past couple of weeks to prevent a statement on the Gaza war.
I am not advocating any of the above options, just pointing them out. The trick is to craft some reasonable combination of them and other ideas. Most important is that the US, EU, and UK act together. If they do, the message will be greatly amplified.
There is a real possibility that this is the beginning of the end of Belarusan independence. Russian President Putin, while nominally backing Lukashenko’s right to do what he did, might take the opportunity to defenestrate him (figuratively if not literally), knowing that the West won’t seriously object under current circumstances. Even before this incident, the Russians were taking over. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to complete the process?
President Biden now faces a second crisis situation he doesn’t want, following on the Hamas/Israel war. He looked reasonably adept in that instance. With Belarus, he should expect the EU to play a stronger role, but he has to be prepared to lead if need be. The world will notice if the West is unable to deal with state hijacking. Let’s see what Biden can do.
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