Tag: United States
America has lost the right stuff
America has lost the right stuff. Chuck Yeager, a World War II ace who broke the sound barrier in his “Glamorous Glennis” X-1 in 1947, was a master pilot possessed of calm and humble commitment to duty and country. He died at 97 yesterday, having broken many more flying records:
His character seems almost foreign in today’s America. We have a president who can’t understand why people serve in the armed forces. We’ve got a party in Congress that won’t acknowledge that president’s loss in the election. We’ve got people who think wearing a mask to protect themselves and others from a deadly virus is an infringement on their political liberty. We’ve got police departments that kill with impunity. We’ve got more than 74 million people who voted for a president responsible for the deaths of more than 280,000 of their fellow citizens.
I don’t know how far the election of Joe Biden can go in curing these ailments. He is going to have his hands full first with Covid 19 and then the economy. He would have to be extraordinarily lucky to have the unequivocal support of the Congress. That will be decided January 5, when two Georgia Senate seats are decided in an unusual second-round election. Most states don’t do that, but Georgia does because it was thought an integrationist could squeak by in a multi-candidate first round but not in a two-candidate second round.
Today, all 50 states met the deadline for certification of election results, guaranteeing that they cannot be challenged in Congress after they are transmitted there when the Electoral College meets on December 14 in state capitals. In theory, that ensures the electoral vote outcome will be 306 to 232, precisely the same outcome as four years ago.
Trump has described that win in 2016 as a landslide. This time around he is refusing even to acknowledge that Joe Biden has won. I doubt Trump is deluding himself. He knows he has lost. He keeps up the charade of opposition to the outcome in order to maintain his dominance of the Republican party and to raise money from fools who believe his nonsense. He is even pretending that he might run in 2024, ignoring the facts of life in order to stifle the Republican competition. He is in poor physical condition already and will be plagued in the next few years by legal and financial troubles. While he might try to forecast the election lights to Don Jr. four years hence, the idea of his running is ludicrous.
Duty and country would require that Donald Trump fade quickly from the limelight and crawl into history as the worst president in a century, if not since the founding. But the man is neither calm nor humble. In an America where duty and country were important, he would never even have dared try to overturn the results of the election with phone calls to governors and state legislators. He never had the right stuff, and the country seems to have lost it.
Forty-five years is too long to wait for a referendum
Bouela Lehbib, who was a Middle East Institute research intern with me in 2019 during his time as the first Fulbrighter from Western Sahara, writes:
The 29-year UN-brokered ceasefire that had been in place since September 1991 between the Polisario Front and Morocco has collapsed. Morocco’s military incursion on November 13 in the Guergarat’s buffer-strip — a UN- designated demilitarized zone in the south-western corner of Western Sahara — prompted the Polisario Front, a liberation movement seeking independence, to resume armed struggle.
Morocco claims its operation comes as a response to “restoring free circulation and commercial traffic” towards sub-Saharan Africa. It had been blocked since October 21 by dozens of Saharawi civilians protesting peacefully against what they consider Moroccan occupation of their land and plundering of their natural resources.
The Polisario Front sees Morocco’s move as a violation of the ceasefire and a bid to alter the status quo in its favor. Both parties had agreed according to the UN peace plan of 1991 to keep maintain the status quo until the final status of the territory is decided.
Tensions have been on the rise in Guergarat since 2016, when Morocco tried to asphalt an approximately 5-km road in Western Sahara, across the buffer strip and into Mauritania near Nouadhibou. The Polisario interfered with the work, claiming it was illegal. The military agreement No.1, signed in the late 1990s, forbids any military presence in the buffer strip. It allows, though, Saharawi civilian circulation under Polisario Front control.
There was no crossing point at the time of the ceasefire agreement. It was introduced by Morocco on March 2001. Although MINURSO, the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara, warned Morocco the road construction and change of the status quo “raised sensitive issues and involve activities that could be in violation of the ceasefire agreement,” the latter went ahead with the work.
For Rabat, ensuring a crossing point and an asphalted road in Guergarat is strategically and economically significant. Since 2010, Morocco has invested widely in West African countries, becoming the first investor in the region and the third in all Africa, with its communication, construction, and bank enterprises leading the market. In 2017, it had officially requested to become a member of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. Though admission was blocked, Morocco still has political and economic clout in the region and seeks to neutralize the Saharawi Republic in the African Union, which it joined on January 2017. An asphalted road in Guergarat would link Morocco to ECOWAS economically but, most importantly, it contests the Polisario Front in the 20% territory it considers liberated.
Pundits blame the UN for the region slipping into tension. MINURSO has not fulfilled its mandate of holding a self-determination referendum according to Security Council resolution 690. Nor has it maintained a neutral position as an independent entity. Its vehicles carry Moroccan plates and its staff passports carry Moroccan stamps. The UN is playing a waiting game.
Security Council members, including the US, bear some of the blame. Its do-nothing policy and effort to ignore 45 years of low-intensity conflict have allowed the return of war. Joe Biden’s victory has raised the possibility that a shift in US policy towards Western Sahara could fix past mistakes. A self-determination referendum that both Morocco and the Polisario Front accept and the UNSC ratifies remains by far the best way out of this long-standing dispute.
With war in Libya and chaos in Mali, the new conflict in Western Sahara is likely to expose the region to much more instability. But it can also be an opportunity for the new Administration, as the moment looks ripe to bring a just solution to what many see as the last colony in Africa.
Restoring individual rights and hope in Bosnia
I joined happily with knowledgeable colleagues in signing Fixing Dayton: A New Deal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, published yesterday by Dan Hamilton of the Woodrow Wilson Center. But my own thoughts go beyond that paper in some respects. Here is what I would advise the Biden Administration about what Dan Hamilton calls the “why, what, and how” of fixing Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Why: The Dayton agreements that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a striking US foreign policy success in 1995, but the country risks becoming a disaster in the 2020s due to growing inter-ethnic strife. State failure in Bosnia would spew refugees into the EU and bring an end to a successful NATO effort to protect a vulnerable Muslim population. Breakup of the Bosnian state would strengthen Russian-sponsored secessionists not only in the Balkans but also in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and cause further fraying of the NATO Alliance. The US needs to re-assert it leadership, in partnership with the EU, which is unable for now to proceed expeditiously with enlargement. Europe whole, free, and democratic is still a worthy vision, but the Europeans need America to help make it happen.
What: The objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a functional, effective, and united state within its current borders capable of meeting the requirements for entry into NATO and the European Union. This will require elimination of the elaborate governing architecture created at Dayton that froze in place the warring parties (Republika Srpska and the Federation) and rewarded their commitment to ethnically based control of territory. Bosnia and Herzegovina should be governed in the future by a government in Sarajevo capable of negotiating and implementing its obligations to the EU as well as municipalities delivering services to citizens, with equal rights for individuals and vigorous legal and judicial protection for minorities.
How:
- Diplomatic: US/EU agreement on initiating a process of constitutional and other reforms, Zagreb and Belgrade convinced to support the effort, re-empowerment of the High Representative, deployment of additional NATO (read British and American) troops to Brcko to prevent either Serb or Muslim seizure of this vital chokepoint, pressure on Russia and Serbia to halt financial assistance Repubika Srpska.
- Legal: preparation by Bosnians of a new constitution that eliminates or drastically curtails the entities, full implementation of European Human Rights Chamber and Constitutional Court decisions, professionalization of the judicial sector, restoration of international prosecutors and judges in the court system, and prohibition of heavily armed police and paramilitary forces.
- Economic: an end to IMF and World Bank assistance to the entities and instead resources shifted to the municipalities and the “state” government (Sarajevo), vigorous enforcement of anti-corruption laws with European Union assistance, personal sanctions on corrupt officials levied by the US and EU in tandem, recovery and return to worthy causes of ill-gotten gains stashed in Europe or the US, strict conditionality on international financing requiring in response support for political and legal reform.
- Political: reform of the electoral law to disempower the ethically based political parties, election in parliament of a single president and two vice presidents, strict limits on the vital interest veto and the power of the House of Peoples, adoption of a law rendering all financing of political parties transparent and requiring democratic procedures for election of party leaderships.
- Public affairs: VoA/RFE/DW programming to counter Russian disinformation, redoubled international support to civil society and political forces that support serious reforms, diplomatic protection for citizens demonstrating against corruption and police abuse, and a concerted effort to publicize corruption among politicians and officials.
The obstacles to an effort of this sort are substantial. Those who govern today in Bosnia, who come to power in unfree and unfair elections conducted within a constitutional system that favors ethnic nationalists, have no interest in seeing serious reform or in preparing the country to become a serious candidate for NATO or EU membership. They will seek to use any reopening of the Dayton agreements as a means of increasing their own power and possibly breaking apart the state. The US and EU will need to be prepared to act vigorously against strong resistance by those who seek secession, ethnic separation, or ethnic domination by one group over others.
The rewards of success would be substantial. Making Bosnia into a serious candidate for NATO and EU accession would have a demonstration effect worldwide. It would restore American and European soft power, weaken ethnic nationalists in the Balkans and elsewhere, and illustrate the unmatched capacity of liberal democracy to govern effectively.
It’s getting serious, even if it isn’t
President Trump’s refusal to begin the transition to President-elect Biden was at first an annoyance with relatively little practical impact. Now, however, it is blocking serious planning for distribution of Covid-19 vaccines, making intelligence briefings for Biden and his team impossible, and casting doubt on US troop commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Trump is, as usual, prioritizing his personal interests in maintaining control of the Republican Party and raising money under the guise of contesting a stolen election. He knows he has lost but won’t give up until someone either chucks him out or he gets something in return. It is up to Republicans in Congress to chuck him out, at least until December 14 when the Electoral College meets and confirms Biden’s election. I can’t think of anything anyone respectable would want to give him in exchange for allowing the transition planning to start, but no doubt he would like some guarantees from Biden not to pursue judicial investigations.
The claims about a stolen election are demonstrating once again how far from reality so many of Trump’s supporters have wandered. There weren’t many at his “million” MAGA march last weekend in DC, perhaps 5,000 but certainly not 10,000. Describing downtown DC as flooded with demonstrators, as NPR did, was ludicrous. Downtown DC requires at least ten times that number to be even remotely described as flooded. Last weekend wasn’t much more than a sprinkle.
But out in the country there are still lots of people–70% of Republicans–who believe there were serious election irregularities, despite the fact that no one has found any. Aware of the likelihood such charges would arouse, state election officials appear to have run the cleanest, most correct elections ever, despite the onslaught of early voting and mailed-in ballots. I hope that the recounts and certifications to come will convince some people, but there is little sign of openness among the Republican base to the notion that Trump lost. Period.
He lost big in the popular vote–by more than 5 million–but that doesn’t really count. The Electoral College looks to be divided precisely as it was in 2016 (306/232), a margin Trump has always described as a landslide. I would say decisive, not a landslide. People are still trying to figure out just what happened, but it appears Trump lost support in the suburbs. I guess they weren’t so interested in his saving them from lower-income people, partly because lots of lower-income people already live there.
Biden now faces the prospect of trying to govern without a full transition period, with a narrowed majority in the House, and with a Republican majority in the Senate, unless the Democrats manage to pull of the unlikely feat of winning the two run-off contests in Georgia January 5. But he faces that prospect with an unusually wide and deep talent pool, many with fairly recent experience in governing and four years in the wilderness to think about how to do it better. So the President-elect may be handicapped, but when you are choosing your Secretary of State from among Susan Rice, Bill Burns, Tony Blinken, Chris Murphy, and some other political stars you are still well off.
Trump may of course still have some tricks up his sleeve, though so far his lawyers have lost two dozen election-related cases in court and won just one that will not affect the election outcome. The only virtue of the agony he is putting the nation through is the possibility it will convert a few of his cultists to reality-based politics. But there is no sign of that yet. The lack of transition is getting serious, even if the people who are causing it are not.
May his memory be a blessing
My brother-in-law, Drew Days, died in the early hours of this morning. He was a man of many distinctions: Yale Law School graduate and professor, NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyer, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the Carter Administration, Solicitor General of the United States in the Clinton Administration, board member of his alma mater Hamilton College, “of counsel” at Morrison and Foerster, board member of the MacArthur Foundation, and–one of his favorite functions–a Proprietor of Common and Undivided Lands at New Haven (i.e. the New Haven Green).
Our professional paths only occasionally crossed. I knew him in other ways. He was four years ahead of me and in my older brother’s class at New Rochelle High School when I first fell for his younger sister, Jackie Days. He knew how to have a good time as a not too serious student at Hamilton. Until this year, he stayed in touch with and met every summer with his Hamilton roommates. He worked harder at Yale Law, but also sang tenor and did his share of carousing with the Yale Russian Chorus, where he met Ann Ramsay Langdon. Her joining the Peace Corps precipitated marriage, at the Yale chapel of course, in 1967, when I was graduating from Haverford.
Off they went, first to Puerto Rico for training and Spanish language class, then to Honduras, where Drew tried to put together a tomato canning coop, if I remember correctly. Two years later they were back in NYC, where Drew signed on with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to focus on school desegregation throughout the South. He was surprised and tickled when Attorney General Griffin Bell asked him to run the Civil Rights Division. Ann and his by now two daughters, Alison and Elizabeth, moved to DC not long before Jackie and I took off for my first Foreign Service posting in Rome.
Drew was unsparing in his enforcement of civil rights laws. His parents had moved to New Rochelle from Tampa to give their children better opportunities in an integrated environment. Drew rarely complained about any racial slights directed at himself, but he was determined to prevent discrimination from blocking the education, voting rights, employment, and opportunities of others. “Color blind” was not his goal. He was convinced the United States suffered from systemic racism well before it got that moniker and therefore believed affirmative action of many different sorts was required to overcome it.
A popular professor at Yale, Drew established the Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for Human Rights at its law school, but he declined to move into the dorms to be “master” of one of the colleges. He laughed at the title. But then again, Drew laughed a lot. He had a wry, sometimes biting, sense of humor, though many didn’t know it as he was impeccably polite and respectful even to those he found overbearing or foolish. There were of course some of those at Yale, but Drew loved the place and its people. One of the only times I saw him a bit shaken was when he feared he might not get tenure, hard as that is to believe in retrospect.
Drew enjoyed his challenging time as Solicitor General, a job made for his talents. But he felt he lost too many cases, including one in which the Senate voted later 99-1 against the position he had taken in a pornography case. He was still convinced, however, that his position was right. That and other adversities never prevented us from enjoying his and Ann’s company, along with our two sons and their two daughters, both in Washington and summers in Little Compton, Rhode Island, where his mother-in-law owned a house. Drew was a strong swimmer and would dare go much farther than I did in rough water. His self-confidence was almost always justified.
Drew also enjoyed his post-government life. He never tired of teaching at Yale, though he was chagrined when I taunted him a bit about all the conservative lawyers and judges the school managed to produce. His “of counsel” lawyering often brought him to DC, where his sister and I were always ready for a dinner out with him. We all hoped he would be appointed to the Supreme Court, but that possibility faded with age, as the Republicans taught everyone that appointing younger jurists was smarter: they carried less baggage into confirmation hearings and were likely to last longer on the Court.
It was a few years ago that Drew, who had suffered from small strokes, told us over dinner at Woodward Table that he had been diagnosed with dementia. I’m not a big hugger, but I gave him a big hug and assured him we’d all be supporting him as he faced this last challenge. We’ve managed a few visits in DC or New Haven every year during his decline, which has been painful to watch and no doubt more painful to experience. He died peacefully during the night, with his devoted wife Ann and younger daughter Liz close by.
May his memory be a blessing,
PS: Here is Drew as Solicitor General of the United States, 1995:
High hopes for Biden in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ismet Fatih Čančar gave this interview, originally published in Politicki.ba:
Q: Why are US presidential elections important for Bosnia and Herzegovina?
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the defeat of the Soviet Union, the global order was marked by American hegemony, which gained its greatest momentum during the 1990s. A good part of those nineties was marked by the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, first through aggression against our country, and then in the post-Dayton period. The United States has historically been involved in these processes. First, they stopped the war through the Dayton Peace Agreement. In the post-Dayton period, a new process of “state-building” began, which has not yet been completed.
The upcoming US presidential election is an opportunity to continue this process for several reasons. First due to the fact that the Democratic presidential candidate Joseph Biden is one of the last active politicians in the United States who has a personal connection and experience with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, as early as in 1993, Biden has correctly identified, in his speech on “Face the Nation,” war criminals in Bosnia, clearly warned about genocide, and then, as he is today, was a strong advocate of a more proactive American role in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Biden’s vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina was too ambitious and too radical for the Clinton administration. For our country, that vision is far-sighted and far-reaching. It is still the same vision that Biden wholeheartedly defended behind the speaker podium of the Senate. Back then he explained it as a national interest and a moral obligation of the United States in the post-Dayton framework. Biden reaffirmed that vision in his recently published program. The founding idea of this program is to building a civil state based on the experiences of a multicultural and multiethnic democratic society.
And that is why the presidential elections in the United States are an opportunity for a turning point in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where we have been witnessing a general deterioration of conditions, both political, economic and social, for some period now.
Q: Biden has announced his vision which he intends to pursue when it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is good and what is bad in that document?
Biden’s vision that has been published is substantially positive. In any case, it is good that such document has come to life. This is perhaps the first concrete signal in the last decade of bureaucratic autopilot by both the US and the EU that the very top of the US leadership is putting the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the agenda, as well as the Balkans which have seen increased instability, growing appetite for redrawing borders, an increasing number of right-wing populist movements.
This document, of course, has its own political context. It is an expression of Biden’s own election campaign; promoting democracy as the most effective social order, but also restoring the credibility of American leadership in the world as a reliable partner that can constructively and successfully solve extremely complicated problems. The character of the Bosnian state – a sui generis state – is such that cosmetic changes cannot help this country, but which rather requires serious structural reforms, which first imply the reform of the Dayton Constitution, and then a strong step forward towards NATO and EU membership. Biden’s vision recognizes a more efficient approach and its engagement means including Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Atlantic Pact, protecting Bosnia from foreign malignant influences such as Russia and China, and preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The document itself would have had a much stronger appeal if it happened in some normal circumstances, when no political career is being auctioned and in the midst of the presidential campaign. Hence, there is some doubt as to how high Bosnia and Herzegovina will be on the list of American politics even after the presidential election.
However, there is one dimension that is rarely talked about. Biden’s document testifies that in the American heterogeneous society, the Bosnian community has become visible, for whose interest are fighting both sides of the political spectrum, the Democrats and the Republicans. I appreciate that this is a positive phenomenon. These are our great national resources and opportunities that exist in interstate relations, which we do not know how to use. Or at least not yet.
Q: What if Trump wins?
No need to dramatize. We already have four years of experience of Trump’s mandate behind us. Nothing radical has happened in the region, although attempts have been made from all directions to push through a new, much more dangerous and insidious plan to redraw the borders and exchange territories between Kosovo and Serbia; a plan which would have very bad consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Under Trump’s mandate, US leadership in the world has weakened significantly. The image of democracy has been destroyed through the constant undermining of the basic principles of multilateralism, disregard for human rights, and the encouragement of autocrats and nationalist movements. In addition, the importance of the alliance and the historical partnership between the US and the EU has been weakened. The so-called “soft power” has been undermined and an unprecedented level of polarization is caused in all fields.
Regardless of the outcome, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to continue its work to improve the security framework for all its citizens and peoples, through the joint work of all relevant institutions and international partners. It is certain that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have the support of the US administration in this process.
Q: All polling shows that Biden is the winner and the next resident of the White House. What preparatory work should Bosnia and Herzegovina do?
First of all, we should wait for the election results. All polling showed Hilary Clinton’s victory in 2016 and we received a surprise instead.
However, it is true that our country has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this moment that could come from the Biden administration. Pro-Bosnian patriotic forces should take the initiative, in terms of creating a program and a roadmap for the radical changes identified in Biden’s document.
One should not be deceived that Bosnia and Herzegovina will so easily and so quickly position itself within the priorities of American foreign policy. From our side, it is necessary to purposefully engage all our resources that are available in American academic and business circles. This also requires a sophisticated diplomatic way of involving our traditional friends and partners in the project. A mitigating circumstance for achieving these goals is that Biden was personally and heavily involved in the Bosnian case and that his political influence and image in the world were partly built on it.
All this together requires the creation of a diplomatic orchestra that could meet these demanding tasks.
It is important to note that the foundations already exist. Through the actions of the US Embassy so far (previous and current Ambassadors) we could sense the possible development of the political concept of reforms. A civil democratic state, modeled on the example of dozens of modern European states, is the only possible solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Western Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina must uncompromisingly insist on such principles.
Q: Trump has two special envoys for the Balkans. Does Biden need (at least) one? Is the Embassy enough?
The fact is that the outcome and effectiveness of a program or initiative does not largely depend on how many actors are involved. Especially in this case, efficiency is based on commitment, determination, and strength of material, political and diplomatic support put into the project.
During his visits, Special Envoy Matthew Palmer has on several occasions expressed a clear position on the indivisibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina, US support for our country’s Euro-Atlantic path, and the continuation and development of the partnership between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United States. The goal is to raise this relationship to a higher level.
I still think that the two envoys for the small Balkans are a little too much. If we go back to the history of the 1990s and compare it with the mission of Holbrooke and the Clinton administration, who managed to create the Dayton Peace Agreement in a relatively short time, but in much more difficult war conditions, we can conclude that quantity is not crucial in these processes.
In addition, the question of both the Peace Implementation Council and its role in all of this arises. We are witnesses that the mandate of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been derogated for a long time and that it is at a very low level. Perhaps it would be more economical, politically profitable for the US administration to focus on the function of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina instead of creating new initiatives. I am deeply convinced that resolving the Bosnian issue opens the way for the complete integration of the Balkans into the Western currents of the advanced democratic world.
Q: Given that Biden will work closely with the EU, how much will that prevent him from implementing this plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina?
It is clear that Biden has identified the EU as a necessary partner in this process, with a desire for the Western bloc to act in a coordinated manner. At the same time, I think that will be the biggest challenge for Biden. How to successfully bring partners together in a Europe that, although there has been increased rhetoric about European independence, suffers from even larger internal lines of division. There is also the United Kingdom, which, as the most loyal partner in the transatlantic alliance, is looking for its place in the post-Brexit space and I believe that they can play a very important role in key processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina together with the United States.
Under the Obama administration, transatlantic ties have been successful or very successful through a number of joint programs in Europe. With the arrival of Biden, the caliber of people who would return to leading foreign policy positions would be consistent with that alliance. The US and the EU need each other, and the current experience of the Trump administration is an exception. To Democrats, this is proof of the value of the alliance. Hence, we can expect that Biden will work on renewing that alliance, but also on restoring American leadership on the European continent. This means reaffirming NATO’s role as the most effective security umbrella in the world, a closer relationship with Brussels for a coordinated approach, a tougher stance towards Russia and further investment in democratic processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU-led “structural dialogue” in Bosnia has shown all the shortcomings in its actions. American leadership is therefore a necessary corrective factor.
In addition, it is important to point out that the main motivator of US cooperation with the EU is not Cold War nostalgia, but rather the understanding in Washington that – America alone – is a weak America, and that in a more competitive world we face, Europeans are still the most important American allies.
All this is a complex process. I appreciate that in the efforts to implement fundamental reforms and build lasting peace and prosperity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, partnership and close cooperation between the United States and the EU is desirable for the realization of this project.