Tag: United States
Peace Picks | September 8 – 11, 2020
- Election 2020: Challenges & Opportunities for U.S. Policy in the Middle East | September 8, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM EDT | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East is going through one of the most unstable periods in its recent history. Each country in the region faces its own unique challenges, but there are also cross-cutting issues ranging from proxy conflict and terrorism to climate change and water security that permeates throughout the region. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to launch Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East. The briefs in this book offer policy insights from MEI scholars on key issues in the Middle East and serve as a contribution to the broader discussion about the challenges and opportunities for US policy in the region.
What are the key issues the next administration must prioritize? In what ways can the US pursue and achieve its policy goals in the Middle East through diplomacy, conflict resolution, and military engagement? How can a concerted regional strategy address region-wide issues and their global impacts?
Speakers:
Amb. Gerald Feierstein (Moderator): Senior Vice President, Middle East Institute
Paul Salem: President, Middle East Institute
Randa Slim: Senior Fellow & Director, Conflict Resolution & Track II Dialogues Program, Middle East Institute
Gen. Joseph Votel: Distinguished Senior Fellow on National Security, Middle East Institute - U.S. Policy in the Middle East: A Conversation With Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker | September 9, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:15 AM EDT | Brookings Institution | Register Here
The United States has been very active diplomatically in the Middle East as of late, despite public focus elsewhere, on issues ranging from the crisis in Lebanon, to maritime tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, to U.A.E.-Israeli normalization of relations.
On September 9, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion with David Schenker, assistant secretary of Near Eastern affairs at the U.S. Department of State to examine the current state of U.S policy and diplomacy in the region and its future trajectory. Assistant Secretary Schenker will be returning from a mission to the region, which includes stops in Kuwait, Qatar, and Lebanon and will offer thoughts on his recent meetings. Natan Sachs, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, will moderate the conversation.
Speakers:
Suzanne Maloney (Introduction): Vice President & Director, Foreign Policy, Brookings
David Schenker: Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Natan Sachs: Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings - Rising Political Polarization in Southeast Asia | September 9, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:30 AM CEST | Carnegie Endowment | Register Here
Rising levels of political polarization are hurting democracy in many Southeast Asian countries. Drawing on a recent Carnegie Endowment report on the topic, this event will examine three critical cases—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—to gain a regional understanding of why polarization is increasing, its political effects, and how political and civic actors can take steps to address it.
This event is being held in collaboration with the Institute of Asian Studies.
Speakers:
Thomas Carothers: Senior Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment
Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: Associate Fellow, German Institute for Global & Area Studies
Naruemon Thabchumpon: Deputy Director for Research Affairs, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University
Eve Warburton: Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Asia Research Institute, National Research University of Singapore
Bridget Welsh: Honorary Research Associate, Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham Malaysia - A New Direction for U.S. Policy on North Korea | September 9, 2020 | 5:00 – 6:30 PM EDT | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register Here
Since the February 2019 Hanoi Summit failed to reach an agreement, the United States and North Korea have been mired in a diplomatic stalemate with minimal negotiations. At the same time, Pyongyang has continued to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs while reversing many of the inter-Korean tension reduction measures achieved in 2018. The next U.S. administration, whether Republican or Democratic, will have the opportunity to break this deadlock with a North Korean regime that is increasingly confident in its nuclear capabilities but still insecure about its longevity.
The next U.S. administration will encounter a North Korean regime that has promised to demonstrate a “new strategic weapon” in its nuclear weapons program and vowed to withstand the international sanctions campaign. The policy approach taken by the next administration will help determine whether Pyongyang will cling to its nuclear weapons or if the two countries will set a new course for building peace and reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Speakers:
Frank Aum (Moderator): Senior Expert, North Korea, U.S. Institute of Peace
Christine Ahn: Founder & Executive Director, Women Cross DMZ; Co-Founder, Korea Peace Network
Suzanne Dimaggio: Chair, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment
Markus Garlauskas: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Former National Intelligence Officer for North Korea, Office of the Director for National Intelligence
Van Jackson: Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington; Former Senior Defense Strategist, U.S. Department of Defense
Ankit Panda: Stanton Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment - Ecological Threats to Peace | September 10, 2020 | 1:00 – 2:00 PM EDT | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register Here
Global warming, extreme weather events, and rising sea levels are already adversely affecting food and water security throughout the world—leaving the least resilient countries with an increased risk of political instability, social fragmentation, and economic collapse. A more accurate measurement of levels of exposure to tomorrow’s ecological threats is key to helping these countries maintain peace today and can enable others to better prepare and adapt for the future.
The new Ecological Threat Register (ETR), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, synthesizes and visualizes data on environmental indicators to estimate which countries, regions, and areas are most vulnerable to environment-induced conflict. In particular, the ETR underscores that 141 countries are vulnerable to ecological threats, and that approximately 1.2 billion people could be displaced globally by ecological disasters in the next 30 years.
Speakers:
Tyler Beckelman (Moderator): Director, International Partnerships, U.S. Institute of Peace
Sagal Abshir: Nonresident Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
Michael Collins: Executive Director, Institute for Economics & Peace
Dr. Joseph Hewitt: Vice President for Policy, Learning, & Strategy, U.S. Institute of Peace - Jihadism at a Crossroads | September 11, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:00 PM EDT | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Almost 20 years after 9/11, jihadi groups are no longer in the spotlight. However, ISIS, al-Qaida, and al-Shabab remain active, and new groups have emerged. The movement as a whole is evolving, as is the threat it poses.
On September 11, the Center for Middle East Policy will host a virtual panel event to discuss the current status of jihadi groups. The panel will feature Thomas Hegghammer, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment and author of the new book, “The Caravan: Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad.”Other panelists will include Tricia Bacon, assistant professor at American University, and Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Brookings Senior Fellow Daniel Byman will moderate the discussion.
Speakers:
Daniel L Byman: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings
Tricia Bacon: Professional Lecturer, School of Public Affairs, American University
Thomas Hegghammer: Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
Bruce Riedel: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings
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No closer to full normalization
Drilon S. Gashi* writes:
US-led, high stakes Kosovo-Serbia peace talks culminated Friday in an “economic normalization” deal signed at the White House. I had recommended that early, politically contentious discussions be replaced by a bilateral trade deal, but this agreement is less about trade and more about economic infrastructure, with notable extras. It is unclear whether it is binding, or will be implemented, which likely depends on President Trump’s re-election.
Nonetheless, Kosovo should follow through on the good, mitigate the bad, and better articulate its interests going forward—achieving Serbia’s recognition and tangible international subjectivity. Serbia would benefit from strategically aligning with the US and fully normalizing ties with Kosovo.
Political Adversaries
Kosovo and Serbia are political adversaries with important outstanding disagreements. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and actively undermines it. Kosovo retaliated in the past by levying tariffs on Serbian goods. The sides have different interpretations of the 1999 Kosovo war and real reconciliation is lacking. Serbia does not accept that it led a state-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo.
The sides began peace talks in 2011 under EU auspices, agreeing on many small deals but implementing few of them. Creative ambiguity allowed each to claim that the deals were in its interest—treating Kosovo as a state according to Pristina, and strengthening Serbia’s presence in Kosovo according to Belgrade. But without implementation the talks risked becoming never-ending.
Serbia and especially Kosovo welcomed renewed White House interest in a Balkan peace deal. A jolt of energy and new ideas was needed. Yet the heightened interest yielded little in new modalities for full bilateral normalization. Serbia did not budge from earlier negotiation positions. Kosovo elected new political leadership, but it quickly returned to a more traditional governing coalition.
The parties agreed on 16 points, organized around the below four main themes.
Regional Cooperation
The parties agreed on:
- formalizing agreements on road, rail, and airline networks;
- Kosovo joining a “mini-Schengen” (border-free) zone with Serbia; Albania, and North Macedonia;
- recognizing each others diplomas and professional certificates; and
- opening and operationalizing an important border crossing.
Joint infrastructure projects between neighbors pursuing EU membership is commonsense. Kosovo should, however, consider whether this will enable it to expand its export markets in Serbia or elsewhere, or just increase imports from Serbia. The mini-Schengen idea was previously rejected by all Kosovo leaders, so it was a concession to accept it here. A much-needed reduction of bilateral non-tariff trade barriers was not agreed. Kosovo needs to guard against becoming more economically dependent on Serbia, which has undermined Kosovo sovereignty in energy, telecommunications, and other sectors.
- Cross-border issues
A contentious point states US government entities will work with the parties “on a feasibility study for the purposes of sharing Ujman/Gazivoda Lake, as a reliable water and energy supply.” Nearly 80 percent of the lake is in Kosovo and 20 percent in Serbia. Kosovo should not allow Serbia to meddle in its resource management. They agreed also to diversify energy sources, which may mean importing US gas, which is particularly interesting for Kosovo.
The deal touches on enhancing religious tolerance and calls for “implementing judicial decisions on the Serbian Orthodox Church.” It commits the sides to make progress on identifying the remains of missing persons, although it does not call out Serbia as the major perpetrator of war crimes, leading to nearly 2,000 missing persons from Kosovo.
- Foreign policy
Another controversial point places a 1-year moratorium on Kosovo applying to join international organizations. This was equated with Serbia halting its Kosovo de-recognition campaign, with both states and international organizations, for a year. Kosovo was strong-armed into agreeing to drop tariffs before this negotiation, although the earlier parallel was Kosovo tariffs on Serbian goods with Serbia’s de-recognition campaign. As an independent country seeking global recognition, Kosovo should not have to desist any attempts at achieving greater internal subjectivity.
Kosovo received the consolation of Israel’s diplomatic recognition, and also recognized Israel. This was the firmest outcome of the deal, and is symbolically important for Kosovo, Israel, and the US.
- Endorsing US foreign policy
Kosovo and Serbia agreed to support several items of US concern. This included:
- prohibiting 5G from untrusted vendors (a reference to Huawei);
- adopting strict US screening and information systems for airline passengers;
- encouraging decriminalization of homosexuality in the 69 countries that criminalize it; and
- designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
These are administration policy priorities and personal initiatives of Special Envoy Grenell. These and as well as Serbia and Kosovo locating their respective embassies to Israel in Jerusalem are US wins.
Full Normalization Still Needed
This deal is a lost opportunity for Kosovo, which needs a breakthrough on Serbian recognition and steps towards unlocking NATO and UN membership. Serbia made strides towards rapprochement with the US, achieving US infrastructure and energy assistance, and alignment with US foreign policy.
Serbia may continue to use Kosovo-Serbia normalization to normalize its US relations, and re-balance its partnerships with China and Russia. Kosovo needs to assure it gets real progress on recognition. It should also further diversify its international support base and not be overly reliant on one ally. Much of this deal may not stick.
Although it contains aspects that both parties may benefit from, Kosovo and Serbia still need to achieve full normalization. This deal does not get them close.
*Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.
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Trump disdains the US military
I’m just going to leave this here for a while:
I’ll leave this here as well, also from Fox News:
I think I’ll leave this here too, as he not only disdains the US but also its citizens:
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Failure in the Oval Office
Emil Kerenji@EmilKerenji· A joke currently making rounds in Serbia. What do a Serb and an Albanian say to each other when taking leave? Next year in Jerusalem!
That’s the best local commentary I’ve seen on yesterday’s non-normalization agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. But I’ve had some other local comments worth recording, along with my own reactions.
Kosovars are relieved that the agreement implies no ethnically-based exchange of territories. Even the suggestion to study joint management of Gazivoda, the lake that crosses the border/boundary with Serbia, has aroused a vigorous, sovereignty-based protest from former Prime Minister Haradinaj, an essential participant in Prime Minister Hoti’s governing coalition.
Everyone is noticing the lack of serious implementation mechanisms as well as the degree to which the agreement gives the Americans what they want. The most important of these goodies is the movement of the Serbian embassy to Jerusalem, a provision that appears to have taken President Vucic by surprise and displeased him:
Some in Serbia think the country has enough problems without sticking its nose into the Middle East. Others will criticize Vucic for caving to Jewish demands.
Prime Minister Hoti won some prestige over internal rivals from the last couple of days in Washington, but at a price. Kosovo has also committed to establishing its new embassy in Jerusalem, a move that some Kosovars think will make its relations with the Arab countries more difficult. Designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization could also be risky, as is the anti-Huawei G5 provision for relations with China, but more for Serbia than Kosovo.
Many Balkanites welcome what they view as the renewed commitment of the United States to the Balkans, but that is smoke and mirrors. There is really nothing in the agreement that suggests a stronger American commitment, and its failure to deal with the vital issue of Serbian recognition of Kosovo sovereignty and independence suggests the US did not use its full weight on the issue.
I asked two well-read and well-informed Americans this morning whether they had heard of the signing yesterday. They had not. The only thing that has attracted any (minimal) media attention here is Israel’s recognition of Kosovo and the commitment of Pristina to have its embassy in Jerusalem. I suppose there are some evangelicals out there who will take notice, but Grenell’s effort to boost the re-election campaign with a Balkans spectacular has failed.
Here is another good commentary on the President’s performance yesterday:
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Much ado about nothing
President Trump today claimed to have done what no one else has ever done before: negotiated an historic agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. He said: “this is a historic day. It took decades as there was no one to get it done.”
This is false. History is littered with agreements between Serbia and Kosovo, many of them unimplemented or only partially implemented. The more technical agreements culminated in the 2013 Brussels agreement on normalization, which among other things acknowledged that Serbia and Kosovo would qualify for and accede to the European Union separately, each at its own pace. That was an implicit recognition of Kosovo sovereignty, since only sovereign states can accede to the EU.
The agreement signed at the White House today is nowhere near as dramatic as that. It is basically an agreement to agree on a series of economic steps that some think will eventually lead to progress on the political front, with a few bells and whistles added for Trump glitter purposes. The economic steps are good ones, as far as they go. But they are unlikely to transform the relationship between Serbia and its one-time autonomous province, now an independent state recognized as such by about 100 other states but not a member of the United Nations.
If there is any big news in the announcement today, it is that Israel has agreed to recognize Kosovo, which must really gall President Vucic as Serbia has long cultivated its relationship with Israel. The other, modest, news is a mutual one-year moratorium: Kosovo agrees to suspend its effort to enter international organizations in exchange for Serbia agreeing to suspend its “de-recognition” campaign. That is renewal of an earlier agreement on a shorter timeline.
Serbian President Vucic explicitly rejected recognizing Kosovo during the talks at the White House. This move came when the Americans, who had repeatedly pledged to focus the White House meetings exclusively on economic issues, put in front of him a draft containing recognition language. He dismissed it out of hand and in public. I hope no one in the Administration expected anything different.
It may even have given Vucic some political room to agree on the economic issues, which are however a bit a yawn. The first part is just promises to implement existing transportation and border agreements. Then comes joining “mini-Schengen,” which is still more aspirational than actual, and mutual recognition of diplomas and professional certificates, which I believe has been agreed in the past but I’ll have to check. Then comes a non-agreement to work with the US Department of Energy for arrangements on Trepca and Gazivoda, again more aspirational than actual for now.
Switch channels to things Washington insisted on: blocking Huawei provision of 5G, tougher airport screening, and commitment to freedom of religion as well as implementation of judicial decisions on church property (which is a reference to a longstanding dispute over the quiet zone around Decani monastery in Kosovo). Plus decriminalization of homosexuality and treating all of Hizbollah as a terrorist group.
Along the way there is a pledge to work on missing people from the 1999 war and its aftermath, something that should have been done long ago and has been pledged many times. It is a human issue, not an economic one, but the more explicit language hopefully portends more implementation than in the past.
I am not seeing President Vucic’s signature on the document I picked up on Twitter from Agron Bajrami. I hope it is there. If not, this isn’t really an agreement but rather an unilateral pledge by Kosovo, which would make it an even less impressive achievement.
Even with the Serbian President’s signature, it’s okay, but a long way short of historic. One might even say much ado, about nothing.
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Why bother with the Balkans?
The short answer to this question is the election campaign. Failed Ambassador to Germany/failed Acting Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell is trying to deliver a foreign policy spectacular to President Trump’s re-election prospects, which right now are dim. The model is the Israel/UAE agreement: bragging rights to something the President can say no one else has ever achieved. Thus the invitation to Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti to meet under White House auspices and maybe even get a meeting with the President, if the two leaders give him something he can use in the electoral campaign.
The Administration is suggesting that the focus will be on economic issues, perhaps just implementation of agreements on air, rail, and highway links between the two countries. That however would be hard to dress up as worthy of the President’s attention, so more than likely some other things will be on the agenda: maybe special economic zones on the border/boundary between the two, or some sort of agreement to redevelop the mining complex known as Trepca and manage the water supply known as Gazivoda, both of which transcend the border/boundary. Depending on the details, where the devil resides, those could be useful economically.
Everyone is going out of their way to deny that any ethnically-based exchange of territory between Kosovo and Serbia is contemplated, a bad idea that would destabilize the region and help Vladimir Putin justify Russian aggression in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. But that of course doesn’t mean someone won’t try to revive the zombie and repackage it as a Trump achievement. It would be consistent both with his pattern of being good to Putin and with his white nationalist inclinations. Prime Minister Hoti has pledged his government will oppose the idea. His thin majority in parliament would likely evaporate if he returned to Pristina trying to sell it.
There is little likelihood of a so-called “final” agreement that normalizes relations between Kosovo and Serbia through mutual diplomatic recognition, exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives, and membership for Kosovo in the United Nations. President Vucic has telegraphed that he is not prepared for anything big of this sort, despite the fact that he is in a strong political position at home and could likely do it with minimal and temporary political damage. Prime Minister Hoti insists that full normalization is the goal of the talks. He would be a historic figure in Kosovo if he could achieve normalization, but it doesn’t look likely during this visit to Washington. If it happens, I’ll be the first to applaud.
One important issue the President and Prime Minister have seemed ready to proceed on is missing people from the 1999 Kosovo war and its aftermath. The still unidentified whereabouts of the missing (bodies) is inexcusable. This should have been settled soon after the war. But better late than never, as it would give both Hoti and Vucic something their citizens would appreciate on returning from Washington.
But that is not what Trump wants or needs. He is looking for a diplomatic triumph to parade in front of the American electorate. Few Americans care about the Balkans, but in our current highly polarized political scene a Rose Garden ceremony, which President Trump has promised if the two do something really good, might give the flagging Trump campaign a bit of a fillip. That is certainly what Grenell needs, if only for getting the next job he can fail at.
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