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Be prepared

After the calamitous failure of the Trump Administration’s attempt to take over the economic aspects of dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, the European Union reasserted its primacy in a flurry of meetings last week between Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti with French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel, and EU High Representative Borrell. Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak is putting the dialogue, which aims at achieving in months rather than years comprehensive normalization between Serbia and Kosovo, back on track within the European context, which is where it belongs. The Europeans are open to working in tandem with the US, which is necessary for success.

But haste can make waste. Preparation for negotiation is often more important than what is said at the negotiating table. I see lack of preparation in all four major capitals: Pristina, Belgrade, Brussels, and Washington.

Pristina

With President Thaci sidelined by a pending indictment, the Prime Minister will lead Kosovo’s negotiating team. His government has a razor-thin majority in parliament. It needs to strengthen that to more than two-thirds, and preferably 75%–before engaging seriously with Serbia. That would ensure that whatever he agrees in Brussels can be implemented in Pristina. It will also blunt the role of the Serb representatives, who are controlled by Belgrade, and enable election of a new President, if the indictment is confirmed and Thaci resigns.

Hoti has laid out a reasonable platform for his opening position, but I haven’t seen signs yet of serious preparation on the many issues that will be on the agenda, including major political items: will Kosovo aim for bilateral recognition by Serbia, or will it be content with UN membership? How can that be achieved? Will Kosovo allow formation of an Association of Serb Municipalities in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s requirements? How will disputes over property issues be settled in the aftermath of normalization? How will Serbs, Serb religious sites and other property in Kosovo be protected?

Belgrade

President Vucic has what Hoti lacks: more than two-thirds support in parliament, thanks to an election boycott by most of his opposition. He dominates the media and the courts in ways that any autocrat would admire. He also has an enviable best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA): he can live with the status quo, at least until the EU decides to make it painful for him or presents a more attractive alternative.

But he is trapped in that comfortable position. While most Serbs care far more about jobs and Covid-19 than Kosovo, Vucic has done nothing to prepare his citizens for acceptance that Kosovo is lost. He has instead repeatedly suggested that he would only give up Kosovo, which is no longer his, if he gets something in return. There isn’t much to be given. When former Finnish President Ahtisaari wrote the plan that led to Kosovo’s independence declaration, he gave Serbia everything it really wanted, because he thought Belgrade would recognize the new state.

Vucic, or some future leader of Serbia, needs to set out to convince its citizens that they would gain more from good, normalized, neighborly relations with Kosovo than from the current situation. Belgrade’s current stance–that Kosovo may not be under its control but that is no reason to give it up–is counter-productive for the Serbian economy and Serbia’s EU ambitions.

Brussels

Brussels has helped to kill the idea of a land and people swap between Belgrade and Pristina, which is what Vucic was hoping for. Now it needs to think about what it can offer as either carrots or sticks to get Vucic out of his comfortable stance. The carrots could include Covid-19 recovery aid, Green Deal funding, and a regional reconciliation fund. I can also imagine sticks: Serbia’s progress in accession talks with Brussels should be strictly conditional on its performance in the dialogue with Pristina, including implementation of existing agreements, renewal of prosecutions of war criminals, and willingness to accept essential elements of normalization like cooperation with the Kosovo army and intelligence services.

On the Pristina side of the equation, Brussels also has a lot of work to do:

1. Resolve member state objections to admitting Kosovo into the EU’s visa waiver program, the conditions for which Pristina long ago satisfied.
2. Invent a serious mechanism, if possible jointly with the US, to monitor and ensure implementation of existing and future agreements emerging from the dialogue.
3. Convince the five EU members that have not recognized Kosovo to pledge to do so not on accession, which is far in the future, but rather on achieving candidate status.

These moves would give Brussels the kind of credibility it needs, and currently lacks, in Kosovo. Of course it would lose that credibility quickly if any carrots offered to Belgrade are not also provided to Pristina.

Washington

Richard Grenell, still President Trump’s special envoy for the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue, is not a credible interlocutor for either Europe, which he has gone out of his way to offend on numerous occasions, or Kosovo, whose territory he would have happily traded away. He may continue his parallel, mostly uncoordinated effort to achieve economic agreements between Belgrade and Pristina, but the odds are long for anything substantial. He is already refocusing his attention on the election campaign, which all along was one of his motives in pursuing a diplomatic spectacular with Pristina and Belgrade.

Vice President Biden has made clear that he would return the United States to its normal posture in the Balkans: support for democracy, the rule of law, Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and normalization between Pristina and Belgrade. While Biden is far ahead in current polling, there are still more than three months left before the election, and six before inauguration day. It is hard for me to picture anything good coming from official Washington before Trump is out of office, though participation in an implementation monitoring mechanism should be feasible. Brussels, Belgrade, and Pristina should all be trying to ensure that if Biden is elected, they will be ready to welcome more serious American engagement.

Kosovo’s worries

A Kosovar friend writes:

I believe this is where all the problems started: by the narrative that Kosovo is about to die soon as it does not have a final deal with Serbia! This is where all lobbyists for dialogue at any cost have brought the narrative, claiming that we depend on Serbia’s willingness to recognize us. They want us to devote all our energy to a deal.

Yes, dealing with Serbia is important, but not at any cost. The technical dialogue in Brussels had a perverse effect: it stopped recognition of Kosovo, as some in the international community felt they should wait for the results. The dialogue also eliminated the authentic Kosovo Serb parties who accept the Kosovo state. That was done because Serbian President Vucic in the dialogue made a lot of promises and accepted a lot of responsibilities (as he always does). It seemed to the internationals logical to allow him to have his own Kosovo Serb politicians organized in the Lista Srpska. That enables him to control even Kosovo’s internal political life.

Had we devoted our energies after the Ahtisaari plan (2007) and the International Court of Justice decision (2010) advisory opinion about our independence to a real state-building agenda, we would have been in much better position. Instead we depended on the dialogue, which solidified the impression that the Kosovo story was still unfinished. We are where we are and the world has not changed in our direction. But, still I oppose the logic that Kosovo’s future depends on Serbia’s consent.

The ingredients for success in the dialogue do not lay entirely with us. We need Washington and Brussels to have a more supportive approach. Vucic is not going to sacrifice anything for the dialogue. He wants carrots that reward Serbia. Kosovo had to play in the dialogue, as he did. But now the pending indictment of our President and other Kosovo Liberation Army leaders by the Specialist Chambers have made it far more difficult for us.

What is alternative? I am not Nostradamus. Now the situation is more difficult and more complex than ever before.
The Specialist Chambers might drag on for many years. It will damage our image and put at risk our functionality and statehood. The Kosovo political opposition thinks only of how to take power at any cost. We could even end up with two of the worst outcomes: partition without recognition. I am afraid of negative scenarios offering us only a status akin to that of Palestine or union with Albania.

I am speaking as a worried friend and I hope you understand.

Biden on Kosovo/Serbia

Vice President Biden knows which way is up in the Balkans. He issued this statement today:

I have been a longtime and vocal supporter of peace and reconciliation in southeastern Europe, and the decision by Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to restart dialogue on the normalization of relations between their countries is a vital step forward in this critical region. A comprehensive settlement that will lead to mutual recognition, preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both states, and strengthen their democratic institutions is essential for Kosovo and Serbia to move forward. [my bolding] It would enhance both countries’ security and prosperity, advance their aspirations for membership in the European Union and other multilateral institutions, and support the enduring aim of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

Reaching this goal requires transatlantic cooperation. History teaches us that when the United States and Europe lead together, we can succeed in ending conflicts and ushering in new opportunities for peace and prosperity – in southeastern Europe and beyond. This partnership is as necessary today as it has ever been, and it requires all parties to work together toward our shared goal. It requires American leadership and partnership. Yet, the Trump administration failed to coordinate with the European Union’s envoys — who have facilitated a dialogue between the two countries for nearly a decade — in planning a White House meeting with the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia last month. While the meeting was ultimately cancelled, the message to our EU partners was still loud and clear. The United States should be working together with our European partners, not turning our back on them. [again my bolding] That’s our best hope to facilitate a sustainable resolution that can unlock a more peaceful, prosperous, and European future for both countries. And if I am elected president, my administration will facilitate peace and security in southeastern Europe and work in tandem with our EU partners to make that dream a reality.

I encourage the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo to approach these talks with a spirit of compromise and reconciliation, knowing that they have the full support of the American people.

Kosovo and Serbia need a better process

Drilon Gashi writes:

Kosovo should set up a technocratic government to counter the dual health and economic crises created by the Coronavirus. Serbia should reevaluate its aims for the “normalization” talks. US and EU facilitators should outline a Kosovo-Serbia deal framework, before serious negotiations begin.

Peace talks between Kosovo and Serbia have rarely had more attention. Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti met with French President Macron today, and the two of them will meet with German Chancellor Merkel and Serbian President Vucic on Friday via videoconference. A planned Washington summit was cancelled last month due to the announcement of a proposed indictment of Kosovo President Thaci on war crimes charges. In Washington the parties were allegedly to discuss a US-led economic agreement, to be followed by a EU-led political agreement in Paris.

There are important economic issues to be resolved. Reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers between the two countries, supporting bilateral industry linkages, and discussing business, trade, and academic coordination would be mutually beneficial. But issues of sovereignty abound in both economic and political talks, and politically contentious topics have often dominated the discussion and eliminated hopes for a Kosovo-Serbia deal. The economic talks are allegedly to discuss co-ownership of Kosovo’s mining assets in Trepca, in its north, and a unique arrangement between Kosovo and Serbia customs.

This would not be bilateral economic cooperation; it would be Serbian incursion into Kosovo’s economic sovereignty. Swapping or partitioning economic assets is no better—perhaps, even worse—than swapping or partitioning land. It would, in the worst case scenario, make independent Kosovo economically defunct—precisely what an ethno-nationalist Serbia government may desire.

Technocrats for Kosovo

The announcement on war crimes charges has embroiled Kosovo politics at a challenging moment. If the charges are confirmed, Thaci has vowed to step down. The current government will find it difficult to elect a new President, as it has a thin majority and lacks public support. Kosovo, Serbia, and several other Balkan countries are witnessing alarming increases of COVID cases and deaths. Not only will their vulnerable health systems come under immense pressure, but the economies of the region will face deepening recession.

Kosovo needs a new, technocratic government, empowered to elect (in parliament) a new President as well as deal with the health and economic impacts of Covid-19 for 6-9 months. This will require political compromise between Hoti’s political party (LDK) and the one that led the previous government (Vetevendosje), which is soaring in the polls and wants elections sooner rather than later. A technocratic government would require support by a grand coalition of parties ministers with public health and economic recovery experience. It should continue anti-corruption efforts, while leaving the more contentious Kosovo-Serbia talks to a newly elected, politically legitimate government.

Serbia needs a rethink

President Vucic is in a much more comfortable position than Prime Minister Hoti. He recently won 75% of the seats in parliament due to an opposition boycott. Serbia’s government has been pushing to keep the talks going as it attempts to leverage its current diplomatic advantage over Kosovo.

Serbia above all is seeking concessions on territory and economic assets, especially the Trepca mine in northern Kosovo. Those ambitions lie far from its citizens primary concerns about democratic rights, economic progress, and faster European Union accession. Protests in Belgrade yesterday show that the Serbian public is concerned with its government’s COVID response and backsliding in the country’s democracy. Rather than pressing his diplomatic advantage, President Vucic should be using his strong position to ensure a fair compromise with Prime Minister Hoti.

The process needs improvement

The only way to strike such a deal is for Kosovo and Serbia to be treated as equal negotiating parties coming together to improve their bilateral relations. For years the EU has affixed all kinds of asterisks and footnotes on Kosovo’s status to appease Serbia and its own non-recognizers. That won’t work if Kosovo and Serbia are to enter a process intended to achieve a sustainable, mutually beneficial deal.

An equal process needs high-level support, but more importantly requires that US and EU facilitators spell out the main framework of a deal before it is negotiated. There has been little transparency about what Brussels and Washington are seeking, and even less about what Pristina and Belgrade want. It is time for the negotiating process to open up to public scrutiny.

*Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He has spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.