Tag: United States
Bravo
Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti today presented his plans for dialogue with Belgrade at the Academy of Arts and Sciences in Pristina. I’ve been skeptical about the strength of his government due to its narrow majority and the process that led to its formation. But I’m prepared to welcome warmly what he said today:
The first principle is that the territorial integrity of the Republic of Kosovo is non-negotiable. The second principle is that the constitutional and state organization of Kosovo is non-negotiable. The third principle is that the agreement to be reached should comply with the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo….The dialogue process is aimed at mutual recognition…any agreement not ensuring the mutual recognition is non-sense. Not provisional mutual recognition resembling the models of East Germany and West Germany or other international models mentioned in various roundtables, but mutual recognition that immediately provides us a seat in UN and also recognition from five EU countries that have not recognized Kosovo yet.
The new prime minister also commented on the process, in particular who will lead the dialogue on behalf of Kosovo.
Dialogue will be chaired by the Prime Minister of the country. There have been various discussions in the recent weeks and months. I will not compete with other persons responsible at the institutional level, because my constitutional competencies are clear as to all issues, including the dialogue process, but in particular my competencies in the dialogue process have been confirmed in the judgment of the Constitutional Court.
The previous prime minister had wrestled with President Thaci on the issue of who would lead the dialogue, so this is a welcome clarification, assuming the President agrees.
The questions are whether Thaci will really step back from his long engagement with President Vucic in the dialogue, which has been mostly unproductive since 2013, and whether an agreement along the lines Hoti outlined is possible.
The proof will be in the pudding, but it is encouraging that Hoti is reaching out to political parties that are not part of his coalition as well as to civil society. With a margin of just one vote in parliament, he will need support from more or less an additional 20 parliamentarians to ensure 2/3 support of whatever comes out of the talks with Belgrade. That is the kind of margin he will need, along with support from a similar percentage of the population.
On the substance of an agreement with Belgrade, I am not seeing in President Vucic’s current stance any reason for hope. He told RFE/RL recently:
…if it’s just – let’s Serbs recognize the independence of Kosovo, let’s finish with that story, it will certainly not go that way.
But he is in a pre-electoral period. Things may change after the June 21 parliamentary election, though his Russian and Chinese friends will try to stiffen his resolve against recognizing Kosovo, each for their own reasons.
In the end, the biggest obstacle to agreement may be relations between the United States and the European Union. They are in a tug-of-war over which should convene the dialogue. The right solution is for them to do it as a cooperative enterprise, but the American negotiator is a notorious critic of the EU in general and Germany in particular while the Europeans have fielded two negotiators from countries that don’t recognize Kosovo. It doesn’t on the face of it look like a winning combination, but maybe President Trump’s hope for a Rose Garden ceremony before the November 3 American election will generate some momentum.
There is always the possibility of an agreement to agree in the future–something to give Trump bragging rights, which is all he really wants. That could be dressed up with a few economic bells and whistles as well an agreement not to prosecute war crimes–which is something on which Belgrade and Pristina sadly seem to agree. The Rose Garden has been used for unworthy announcements, including in the recent past.
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Ill-fated
As parliament approved a new Kosovo government today, here are a few thoughts on its fate. It will be led by the LDK and command a narrow majority based on several minority parties as well as several smaller parties that have been in the opposition during the short life of the VV/LDK coalition.
The main purposes of this government are necessarily
- Get the country as safely as possible through the Covid-19 epidemic;
- Deal with the negative economic fallout;
- Respond to the Americans and Europeans, who are demanding re-initiation of the stalled dialogue with Belgrade.
This is a formidable agenda, though Kosovo appears to have escaped the worst of Covid-19. Even a strong, single-party, majority government (with the required minority participation) would have a difficult time meeting the requirements. A multi-party coalition with a thin majority led by the second-place* finisher in the last election is going to have a much harder time. VV (Self-Determination) in opposition will redouble the difficulties again, both in parliament and in the streets.
What this does is to empower the President relative to the government. His machinations with the Americans led to the vote of no-confidence in Albin Kurti’s short-lived rule. The President will now claim the lead role in the talks with Belgrade that Kurti tried to deny him–Thaci surely has no interest in leading on Covid-19 or the economy. The LDK will have promised they will not contest his leadership in the talks with Belgrade, as the price of their getting the prime ministry. The Americans will support him, because they have him over a barrel and willing to do just about anything to avoid indictment by the Special Tribunal in The Hague. Never mind that both the Constitutional Court and the parliament have said that talks with Belgrade should be the responsibility of the government, not the President.
Richard Grenell, the US envoy for the Serbia/Kosovo talks, claims he is only interested in improving economic relations between Belgrade and Pristina, not land swaps as I and others have claimed. That is not a credible smokescreen. Already slated for a role in the campaign, he wants to deliver a Rose Garden ceremony for President Trump in the runup to America’s November 3 election. No economic agreement would make the grade. He needs a land swap not only for its own sake, as it reaffirms the ethnic nationalist principles of the Trump Administration, but also because he thinks it can be sold as a big plus for peace and stability in the Balkans, settling an issue neither Clinton could resolve.
That is not true: it will settle nothing. A land swap will sooner or later result in instability in Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and possibly Macedonia. It will also strengthen Russian President Putin’s hand in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. But whatever is agreed in the Rose Garden need not last long–just until November 3. The civil aviation agreement Grenell claims to have negotiated has already evaporated, without anyone noticing. The likelihood that neither the Serbian nor the Kosovo parliament will approve a land swap, or that it will be accepted in referenda in either country, won’t matter after the US election. The damage will have been done: wherever the new borders are to be drawn, people will be moving–some voluntarily and some involuntarily–to the “right” side for their own ethnic group. Those who don’t move will be chased out.
So I see this new government–with apologies to Avdullah Hoti–as ill-fated. It will try to open the way to a deal that Kosovans, Americans, and Europeans will regret. The only winners will be Putin and his minions, as well as Serbian President Vucic. By now, even President Thaci should be having his doubts.
Here is the interview I did yesterday with RTK, before parliament approved the new government:
*This originally read “third”-place finisher. That was wrong. LDK came in second. My error. Always check should be my motto!
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Stevenson’s army, June 2
– The US Constitution and existing laws place enormous limits on the federal government’s use of force. There is supposed to be civilian control, under the president. In the District of Columbia the president is in direct control of the national guard. That probably explains why guard forces aggressively dispersed protestors even before the DC Mayor’s 7pm curfew last night.
Earlier, in a call to governors, the president said CJCS General Milley was”in charge.” By law, of course, the Chairman is not in the chain of command over the armed forces, only over the Joint Staff. He cannot give combat orders. The White House press secretary said that there would be a “central command center” to deal with the riots nationwide. But the US military can’t be part of that without presidential invocation of the Insurrection Act. Contrary to the press secretary, the Justice Department told FP that it would be in charge, which is consistent with what Attorney General Barr told the governors, that the issue would be handled by the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
BTW, his ignorance of the law also explains the president’s talk of declaring “antifa” a terrorist organization.
I’m troubled by several things: the president’s glorification of military force as the first response to civil protests; his disregard of the laws and norms by urging federal military intervention nationwide; the apparent complicity of the SecDef and CJCS in this situation. I agree with Kevin Baron of Defense One that “Trump now has the war he wanted.” And that’s bad for civilian control and order in law.
-How timely, Former SecDef Gates warns about the “overmilitarization” of American foreign policy.
-A Columbia prof confirms my concerns that US cyber programs are overwhelmingly focused on offense rather than defense and resilience.
– Time and the UN report the Taliban are colluding with al Qaeda again.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No law, no order
President Trump is trying to claim the mantle of law and order: he has urged governors to crack down on demonstrators and threatened to mobilize military forces, not to mention boasting of the ferocity of his White House guards and their willingness to rough up a crowd. Just one little problem with all this: he is trying to impose order without respecting the law. Remember when he urged police not to be too gentle when arresting people? That’s essentially what he is urging now, on a grand scale.
The law does not allow the use of American military forces for domestic law enforcement, with the exception of the National Guard when mobilized not by the President but rather by governors. The law requires police to respect the right to life, not to suffocate a handcuffed prisoner with a knee on his neck. The law does not allow the President’s guards to mistreat demonstrators. Nor will doing any of those things bring order.
Of course his 40% of America understands that Trump’s crackdown will not be on them. The Trumpians are almost entirely white and mostly male. They will continue to carry their guns into state capitals to intimidate legislators. They will continue to act as agents provocateurs attracting demonstrators into violent acts. Trump’s targets will be his political opponents: Antifa is his convenient smear for them. And he has claimed, with no evidence whatsoever, that they are acting on behalf of his political opponent, Joe Biden.
This is not law and order. It is no law and no order. It is intended to provoke a violent reaction, which then helps to justify the escalation of the violent crackdown. Trump’s autocratic impulses have long been apparent. The current disorder in American cities provides him with the perfect excuse for acting on those impulses. The order he wants is a diktat: freedom for his supporters, imposed discipline for everyone else.
That is not the only reason the violence is unwise. It will also limit participation in the protests and lessen the political pressure to undertaken the difficult law enforcement reforms required. It is all too obvious that America’s police need retraining to “serve and protect.” Instead, police departments will feel justified in continuing to acquire the vast arsenal of military equipment the Federal government makes available to them. That, in turn, isolates the police from citizens and provokes hot heads to raise the ante with even more violence.
This kind of violent spiral is a losing proposition for both the protesters and the police. The protesters end up with less support. A lot of people aren’t going to join the protests if there is a risk of violence. The police have to use more and more violence to impose their will. That puts them at risk too. The best policing is community policing that is in close touch with the citizens. It requires dialogue and understanding, not tear gas and flash/bangs. Order prevails when communities feel the police are on the citizens’ side. That’s what we teach abroad. That’s what we should do at home.
Here is the no law and no order President posing awkwardly yesterday with a Bible he all too clearly finds an alien object in front a Church opposite the White House. He had peaceful protesters teargassed so he could do it, without asking the church’s permission:
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After Suleimani
“How is the killing of Suleimani likely to change Iran’s grand strategy and Quds Force operations in Iraq and beyond? Who is Ismail Qaani, the new commander of the Quds Force, and how is he likely to approach these challenges and adapt his organization to the changed circumstances?” On May 26, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a virtual panel discussion examining the new Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leadership. The discussion examined how the killing of Suleimani is likely to change Iran’s Quds Force operations. The discussion was moderated by Hussein Ibish and featured three guest speakers:
Ali Alfoneh: Senior Fellow, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kori Schake: Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Joseph L. Votel: General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Hussein Ibish (Moderator): Senior Resident Scholar, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Structural Changes in the IRGC
Alfoneh outlined various transformations in Iranian foreign policy that Suleimani instituted during his command of the IRGC.
- He was able to establish a multinational Shi’a army spanning the Middle East and parts of southern Asia. This includes militias within Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
- He transformed the IRGC to a large expeditionary force. Before the ongoing wars in Syria, only a small portion of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard was deployed beyond its borders.
- Because of his personal charisma, he managed to transform clandestine operation groups within the IRGC into popular mobilization forces. In Syria, he was able to mobilize both Iranians and non-Iranians to participate in the conflict.
Alfoneh predicts that:
- Iran will continue to utilize its multinational Shi’a army because of the many successes under Suleimani. One success in particular was ensuring the survival of the Assad regime in Syria–an expressed and defined mission of the Quds Force.
- Iran will engage in a much more aggressive national security strategy. This will result in the IRGC participating in more acts of expeditionary warfare.
- It remains unlikely that a personality cult will develop around Suleimani’s successor, Ismail Qaani. He lacks Suleimani’s personal charisma.
Strategic Impact in Iraq
As the commander of the Quds Force, Suleimani led Iranian extraterritorial military and clandestine operations. Votel believes that the killing of General Suleimani is a defining moment in the US relationship with Iraq in particular. Going forward, the United States must clearly communicate its regional strategy and create better diplomatic channels to counter Iranian influence in Iraq.
Schake stressed that Iranian success in Iraq can be attributed to both Suleimani and Iran’s ability to mobilize its militias. She believes that the United States cannot be seen as a trustworthy partner for Iraq because of its on again, off again support for the Iraqi government. This indecisiveness has led to unsuccessful American foreign policy and increased space for Iranian influence. Iran’s regional campaigns have proven to be quite successful because of Tehran’s ability to nurture long term relationships.
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Kosovo’s decisive summer
These were my remarks to a Columbia University panel on “The Future of Kosovo” held via Zoom today.
Let me start by saying how much I appreciate David Phillips having put this panel together. It isn’t easy to wrangle such illustrious participants, even to a remote meeting. Thank you, David.
My job today is to try to frame the issues in a broader context and from a Washington perspective.
The key thing to understand is that the Americans have abandoned their well-established policy on the Balkans and on Kosovo in particular.
That well-established Balkans policy, part of the broader 1990s effort to establish “Europe whole and free,” had three pillars:
• Protection of Kosovo’s population and sympathy for Kosovo’s independence aspirations as well as commitment to Bosnian sovereignty.
• Support for liberal democracy throughout the Balkans.
• Commitment to acting in tandem with the Europeans, especially with Germany and the United Kingdom.
My message is just this: things have changed. The Trump Administration has equivocated on all three of these pillars. Let me take them in reverse order.
I see no real effort in this Administration to cooperate with Europe. It has put the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue in the hands of an American Ambassador in Berlin who has offended the German government and spoken against the EU. Professional diplomats who know the Balkans well are now sidelined.
Washington now favors border changes to accommodate ethnic differences, even though they would signify inability to treat all people equally, which is the liberal democratic ideal. Regrettably, Europe’s High Representative Borell has gone along, as did his predecessor.
Finally, it is all too clear that Belgrade, not Sarajevo or Pristina, is today Washington’s preferred Balkan partner.
These changes signify a major shift in U.S. policy. How did it happen?
The Trump Administration is ethnic nationalist. It sympathizes when it hears from Serbia’s government and lobbyists that Serbs should govern Serbs and Albanians should govern Albanians. President Trump is trying to appeal almost exclusively to whites and to limit minority voting. Why wouldn’t it listen to Balkan ethnic nationalists?
Moreover, Republicans know that Serb Americans in a potential swing state like Ohio are an electoral bonanza far more valuable than the Albanian Americans in New York, which is a lock for the Democrats.
The Trump Administration has failed so far in all its major foreign policy initiatives. Ric Grenell is trying to give the President a good headline before November 3. All the better if it is one that kills two Clinton achievements, Bosnia and Kosovo.
So U.S. government support for Kosovo’s aspirations has weakened: you see it in the cut off of funding and the threat to withdraw U.S. troops. These are irresponsible moves.
You see the weakening of U.S. support also in the lack of concern in the Administration about the impact of a Kosovo land swap on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
So, you may ask, what is to be done? I’ll leave it to the panel participants to address the issues. My views on some of them are well-known: I support reciprocity between Pristina and Belgrade, I oppose partition, and I think a deal on tariffs and non-tariff barriers is doable.
Three further options for Kosovo need to be considered. I’ll call them the 3Ds:
• Diversify
• Deter
• Delay
Let me take each of these in turn.
How can Kosovo diversify its support beyond the U.S.? Germany first and foremost: Kosovo needs to ensure that opposition to land swaps is sustained not only in the Chancellor’s office but also in the Bundestag. Berlin must continue to make it clear that it will not accept changes in borders to accommodate ethnic differences. It needs to reign in Borrell.
Switzerland, the UK, and Ukraine are other countries that have their own powerful reasons for opposing land swaps. Even for non-recognizing Spain, the idea should be anathema.
How can Kosovo deter land swaps? The key here is reciprocity.
In all future discussions, Kosovo should seek the equivalent of whatever Serbia seeks: the same acreage, the same powers for an Albanian municipal association in Serbia as for a Serb one in Kosovo, the same representation in Belgrade for Albanians that Serbia has in Pristina, equivalent removal of non-tariff barriers in exchange for removal of tariffs.
And above all, mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadorial-level representatives, with an unequivocal and verifiable commitment not to block Kosovo entry into the UN or other international organizations.
Sadly, deterrence is unlikely to work perfectly, because of the strong American lean towards Belgrade. Delay is also vital.
Vucic has made it clear he will wait until after the Serbian election and government formation in late June for any deal with Pristina. The Trump Administration will then press for land swaps before the fall. So July and August, when Europe is asleep, may be crucial months.
A Kosovo Constitutional Court decision to disallow formation of a new government without new elections could cause a further, welcome delay.
By October 1, Kosovo will be safe from partition if it hasn’t been done yet.
What, you will ask, about the American elections?
If I were a Kosovo patriot, I wouldn’t bank on a Biden victory in November, but I would hope for one. Joe Biden knows the Balkans well and would return to the well-established policy of support for Kosovo and Bosnia and cooperation with Europe. A Biden Administration should close the door on land swaps, loudly.
If Trump wins a second term, the electoral pressure for a quick deal will fade but I would still expect Grenell and others to pursue land swaps, if only to feather their nests for their next jobs.
And the President himself will feel completely uninhibited: expect wild moves, not only in the Balkans.
So the next few months are vital for Kosovo’s future. I am hoping to hear from the other panelists how they think its statehood, territorial integrity, and sovereignty can be ensured.
P.S. Here is the full video of the Columbia event:
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