Tag: United States
A really bad deal
Kosovo caretaker Prime Minister Kurti in a Zoom press conference this morning confirmed a lot of suspicions:
- The United States, in particular Special Envoy and Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell, has played an important role in unseating Kurti, who has been defeated in a confidence vote the US welcomed.
- Grenell has opposed Kurti’s efforts to get reciprocity for Kosovo and instead insists on unilateral and complete abolition of the tariffs Kurti’s predecessor imposed on Serbian goods, without any quid pro quo from Serbia.
- The dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade should be held under the auspices of both the EU and the US, not one or the other but both acting together.
- Kurti said he was not invited to such a dialogue but only to an opportunity to sign up for the land (and people) swap Presidents Vucic and Thaci have been discussing.
- It would send three majority-Serb municipalities (but not North Mitrovica) to Serbia and provide for both extraterritoriality for Serbian sites south of the Ibar river as well as a Serb Association of Municipalities, with only part of the majority-Albanian Serbian municipality of Presevo in return.
- Kosovo would not even get Serbian recognition, but rather a kind of acceptance of the status quo, like West and East Germany.
- NATO would still protect Kosovo’s main water supply, Gazivoda.
- Kurti believes Thaci is doing this to protect himself from indictment by the Special Tribunal in The Hague but does not see how such a deal could be approved in Kosovo’s parliament, much less by the electorate.
Albin is proving strikingly popular in recent polling, not least due to his insistence on reciprocity with Serbia and his opposition to his President’s land/people swap plans. He made it clear in his remarks that he anticipates instability if he is removed from office (and implied he wouldn’t do anything to discourage it). What he wants is early elections, which he anticipates winning, perhaps even with an absolute majority in parliament.
This is all happening in the midst of the corona virus epidemic, which remains a big challenge for a poor country that has a weak health care system and has lost many medical personnel to emigration. For now, a new election is out of the question. More likely is that President Thaci will find an alternative majority in parliament that will name a new prime minister and grant him the emergency powers he has sought. They will be used not only to fight Covid-19 but also to try to proceed with the land swap deal, under pressure from the Americans to give President Trump something he can boast about during the US election campaign.
This is an ugly situation, with much wider implications in the Balkans and beyond. The land swap would validate an ethno-territorial concept Moscow has pursued not only in the Balkans, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Russian President Putin would enjoy the consequences no end, a result the ethno-nationalist Trump Administration would welcome.
Ironically, President Vucic may right now be the biggest obstacle to a quick deal. He has made it clear he will not proceed until after the Serbian elections, which have been postponed from April due to Covid-19. That said, the kind of deal Kurti outlined today should be more than satisfactory to Belgrade, which is required to do little but give up part of a municipality whose population it finds troublesome. By the same token, it is hard to fathom how anyone in Pristina would even consider it.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Pause and reset
Drilon Gashi writes:
Stops and starts have riddled the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. Right now, the US Administration is showing great interest and the European Union has renewed its commitment, but Washington and Brussels disagree on the content, leadership, and approach of the talks. There is also disagreement among Kosovo’s leaders. Ironically, the otherwise devastating coronavirus pandemic may offer just the pause and reset opportunity all the parties need.
A Brief History
Having started out as an EU initiative in 2011, the dialogue has had mixed results. There were early positive signals that EU mediation helped overcome a previous zero-sum logic, and that conditionality tied to EU accession would bring the sides closer. However, many of the 23 agreements achieved as of 2018 have only been partially implemented. Presidential talks in the past few years between Kosovo’s Hashim Thaci and Serbia’s Alexander Vucic have added the wrinkle of “border correction,” a euphemism for a land swap. While statements from the presidents are contradictory, they have discussed some sort of territorial swap, with Kosovo ceding part of its north to Serbia, which would cede a lesser par of its southwest to Kosovo.
The Debate on the Deal’s Content
The land swap has become contentious.
First the con: such ethno-national solutions often produce more problems than they solve and may embolden others in the region, namely Republika Srpska, to separate from Bosnia or join Serbia. A departure from the Ahtisaari Plan—the internationally sponsored agreement endorsing Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity—could bring Kosovo’s independence into question, rather than help make it a universally accepted fact.
Second the pro: former US diplomat James Hooper argues that Kosovo will not be able to “fulfill its maximalist stance.” He claims that all solutions to conflict include “territorial components,” so Kosovo should be prepared to accept one that provides full normalization, including Serbian recognition and security guarantees, an end to the conflict, admission to the UN, and advancement in EU and NATO integration.
Kosovo gets little
Little of what Hooper suggests is proximate or achievable.
Serbia continues to refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence and actively campaigns against it. It interprets the dialogue as a negotiation over Kosovo’s status, rather than normalizing relations. It has never said it would recognize Kosovo, but rather that it may accept its existence. That’s not normalization but a continuation of the status quo.
Kosovo cannot alone balance the military threat Serbia poses and thus it relies on the presence of US and European troops as part of the NATO-led forces in the country. The troop presence and the promise of NATO membership are firmer security guarantees than anything Belgrade will be willing to offer.
Serbia does not control Kosovo’s admission to the UN. The five veto-wielding members of the Security Council do. Two of them, Russia and China, have not warmed to Kosovo’s independence, and thus it is not clear how Serbian recognition—without Russia’s or China’s endorsement—will lead to Kosovo’s UN membership.
Serbia says it aims for a “face-saving compromise,” in which both it and Kosovo give something up. However, a primary Serb concern—the rights of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo’s Serbian Orthodox Church—is already enshrined in Kosovo’s constitution and laws. Serbia seeks more: extraterritoriality for both Kosovo’s Serbs and Serb Orthodox Churches. That is not compromise.
It is not clear what Kosovo gains in a land swap of this sort.
A Reset and New Momentum
Besides the content of the deal, there are other challenges. The EU has appointed a Special Envoy on Kosovo-Serbia normalization, Slovakian diplomat Miroslav Lajcak. The US also has its own Special Envoy on the talks, Richard Grenell, who is also Acting Director of US National Intelligence and Ambassador to Germany. It is not clear who is in charge. Past EU-US cooperation has been key to lasting progress in the region, but for now it is lacking.
Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti currently leads a caretaker government. He is a rival of President Hashim Thaci. The two rarely see eye-to-eye, especially on the talks with Serbia. Kosovo needs a new, fully empowered, government before it can re-engage in normalization with Serbia. The Constitutional Court and Assembly have both determined the government, not the President, should lead talks with Serbia.
The Constitutional Court may also need to decide whether a new government should be chosen through new elections or a new coalition agreement based on the October 2019 election. Kurti wants new elections, since his party’s popularity has grown. That would enable him to avoid a deal neither he nor the general public is privy to. Thaci prefers a new government based on the current parliament, which he hopes will back the kind of deal he wants.
Kosovo needs time to reconcile its government and president and to achieve the unity needed for normalization with Serbia. The EU and US need time to strengthen their collaboration. Serbia needs time not only to conduct its elections delayed due to the Covid-19, but also to come to terms with the need to acknowledge Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The corona virus provides the pause and reset everyone needs.
Drilon S. Gashi is an international development specialist based in Washington, D.C. He has spent three years working in Kosovo’s public and non-for-profit sectors, and holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks| April 11- April 18
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live-streaming.
Unpacking the Covid-19 Crisis in Africa | April 13, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | CSIS | Register Here
The confirmed cases and fatalities from the novel coronavirus (Covid-19) continue to rise in sub-Saharan Africa, creating dire economic and political challenges. As governments in the region scramble to implement containment strategies, manage the economic fallout, and work through a busy election calendar, how can they minimize long-term negative impacts? The CSIS Africa Program invites you to virtually attend the first event in a series of partnerships with premier research institutions across Africa. Experts from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) and the University of Pretoria join CSIS Africa Program Director, Judd Devermont to discuss the political, economic, and health implications of the coronavirus pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Additional information on speakers will be added closer to the event date.
Speakers:
Dr. Jakkie Cilliers: Chairman of the Board of Trustees and Head of the African Futures and Innovations, Institute for Security Studies
Marius Oosthuizen: Faculty at the Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria
Wafaa El-Sadr: University Professor and Dr. Mathilde Krim-amfAR Chair of Global Health, Columbia University
Judd Devermont: Director, Africa Program
Israeli Democracy at a Crossroads | April 13, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
After a record-breaking three elections in the span of just one year and several weeks of political maneuvering and intrigue, including a constitutional crisis prompted by an unprecedented suspension of the Knesset, the announcement of a new unity deal between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud and opposition figure Benny Gantz appears to have put an end to Israel’s longstanding political stalemate. In doing so however it has also gutted Gantz’s opposition Blue and White faction and alienated the Arab-dominated Joint List while ensuring Netanyahu’s premiership until at least September 2021. Any hope of a return to something resembling normalcy meanwhile remains elusive as Israelis continue to grapple with a ballooning public health crisis sparked by the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), which has brought social, economic, and political life in Israel to a virtual standstill.
Given these varying challenges, what are the prospects for the new “emergency” government in Israel? What will this new arrangement mean for the political opposition in general and for the Joint List in particular? Moreover, what do these developments mean for the future of Israeli democracy and for Israel’s broader role in the Middle East?
Speakers:
Ari Heistein: Researcher and Chief of Staff to the Director, INSS
Dahlia Scheindlin: Co-founder and columnist, +972 Magazine
The Honorable Aida Touma-Sliman: Member, Knesset (Joint List)
Khaled Elgindy (Moderator): Senior fellow and director of the Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs, MEI
Oil Market Mayhem Redux: The market and geopolitical implications of the OPEC+ and G20 negotiations | April 13, 2020 | 1:00 PM | Atlantic Council | Register Here
An unprecedented crisis in the oil market is looming. With demand in free-fall, a price war bringing oil prices to multi-decade lows, and a flood of oil supplies overwhelming available storage, a consensus to take action is emerging – but the parties have struggled to agree about what type of action and by whom. As OPEC concludes an extraordinary meeting of OPEC and non-OPEC members and Saudi Arabia hosts an emergency meeting of the G20, the intersection of energy markets and geopolitics is shaping how the global community responds to the oil market crisis (and whether it is enough). What emerges from these four days will have a transformative effect on the market long after the coronavirus passes.
As markets digest these moves on Monday, please join the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center for an expert briefing on the details of the OPEC meeting and G20 summit and what those decisions mean for the market, geopolitics, and the future of the oil industry.
Speakers:
Anders Aslund: Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Helima Croft: Managing Director and Global Head of Commodity Strategy, RBC Capital Markets
Kristen Fontenrose: Director, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Atlantic Council
David Goldwyn: Chair, Energy Advisory Group, Atlantic Council
Randolph Bell (Moderator): Director, Global Energy Center and Richard Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security, Atlantic Council
Egypt’s Economy, Citizens, and the Pandemic | April 14, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
As the Middle East’s most populous country, Egypt’s domestic issues will invariably have significant regional ramifications as the country weathers the COVID-19 pandemic. Both domestic and international trade are likely to suffer, and international supply chains are already being disrupted. The international reverberations will hit some of Egypt’s main revenue streams hard, particularly trade via the Suez Canal, remittances from Egyptians working abroad, and the tourism sector.
While the economy is taking major hits at the macro level, things are likely to be as bad at the micro-level. The government appears to be trying hard to get a handle on both the spread of the virus through mitigation efforts such as early school closures, curfews, and other measures. It has also implemented a raft of economic relief measures in order to reduce pressure both on the market and on individuals, all while pressing as many people to work remotely as possible. However, millions cannot afford to work remotely; over 11 million people work in Egypt’s informal economy, without pensions or contracts and limited access to the country’s overburdened health system.
Given these vast and converging challenges, what does Egypt’s economic future hold?
Speakers:
Angus Blair: CIB Professor of Practice, School of Business, American University in Cairo
Laila Iskandar: Former Minister for Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements, Egypt
Yasser El-Naggar: CEO, EN Investment
Mirette F. Mabrouk (Moderator): Director of Egypt Program, MEI
The GCC’s double dilemma: Tackling COVID-19 and falling oil prices| April 14, 2020 | 4:00 PM – 5:00 PM | CSIS | Register Here
The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are confronting a sharp downturn in economic activity due to the coronavirus outbreak, as the pandemic wreaks havoc across the global economy. However, unlike in other regions of the world, where the economic downturn is expected to be transient, the corresponding sharp fall in global oil prices presents a longer-term challenge to GCC member states.
GCC governments have announced economic stimulus packages totaling $97 billion to help the private sector absorb the shock of the crisis. They now must ensure that this stimulus is applied effectively to meeting the short-term demands of the coronavirus crisis, while tempering the long-term fallout of the drop in oil prices. GCC countries must also redouble their efforts to diversify their economies and set aside petty political differences and work together to mitigate the societal impact of the dual challenges.
The Brookings Doha Center is pleased to invite you to a webinar discussion on the economic challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic poses for the GCC. The discussion will address the following questions: What are the short- and long-term economic implications of the pandemic for GCC economies? How should GCC governments apply their stimulus packages to counter the adverse impacts of the pandemic and the drop in oil prices? What other policy priorities should GCC governments pursue to ameliorate the societal impact of the COVID-19 crisis?
Speakers:
Samantha Gross: Fellow, Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative
Hatim Al Shanfari: Professor of Economics and Finance, Sultan Qaboos University
Nasser Saidi: Founder and President, Nasser Saidi & Associates, Former Lebanese Minister of Economy
Nader Kabbani (Moderator): Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center; Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Navigating Iraq’s Political and Economic Turbulence amid Pandemic | April 15, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
A perfect storm has hit Iraq: the Covid-19 virus is spreading throughout the country and overwhelming its healthcare system, a precipitous decline in oil prices is threatening the livelihoods of millions of Iraqis, increasing U.S.-Iran tensions are playing out on Iraqi territory, and a political crisis has stalled the process of government formation for months. On top of all that, millions of Iraqis remain displaced, ISIS still constitutes a major security threat, and pro-Iran militias are increasingly fragmenting, as different groups outbid each other over their loyalty to Tehran and their ability to target the U.S. presence in Iraq. On April 9, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi was named as prime minister designate, the third person to be appointed to the job since Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s resignation last November. He now has 30 days to form a government, a task his two predecessors failed to complete, although he appears to have more support across the Iraqi political spectrum and better chances at success than they did. Faced with these myriad socioeconomic, political, and security challenges, can Iraq maintain its tenuous balance? Will Mr. Al Kadhimi succeed in forming a government? What are the potential short- and medium-term economic scenarios for Iraq in light of the oil price war and decreasing global demand? What is the future of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship?
Speakers:
Farhad Alaaldin: Chairman, Iraq Advisory Council (IAC)
Hafsa Halawa: Non-resident scholar, MEI
Yesar Al-Maleki: Non-resident scholar, MEI
Mohammad Radhi Al-Shummary: Professor, Al-Nahrain University
Randa Slim (Moderator): Senior fellow and director, Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program, MEI
On the Front Lines: How Public Health Systems are Confronting the Covid 19 Crisis in the Middle East | April 16, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
COVID-19 has the potential to push public healthcare systems in the Middle East past their current capabilities.The number of coronavirus cases in the Middle East has risen to nearly 60,000, double the amount only a week ago. How will this current pandemic impact the region’s health care systems and preparedness for future crises? The Middle East Institute (MEI) will bring together a panel of experts to look beyond the immediate impact of COVID-19 on public healthcare systems in the Middle East. This group of experts will discuss the long term effects on the region’s public health systems and if this will cause them to become more resilient in the face of future threats.
What will this current crisis mean for the future of the region’s health care systems? What steps should public health services be taking now to ensure they will be better prepared for the next pandemic? What is the role of international organizations like the World Health Organization to help regional public health services build resilience into their systems?
Speakers:
Amir Afkhami: Associate professor, George Washington University
Amira Roses: Professor of global health and epidemiology, George Mason University
Ross Harrison (Moderator): Senior fellow, MEI
COVID-19 and Conflicts in the Arab World: A Closer Look at Libya, Syria, and Yemen during the Coronavirus Pandemic| April 16, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM | Arab Center Washington DC | Register Here
Arab Center Washington DC is organizing a webinar to discuss the impact of COVID-19 in areas of conflict and war-affected and refugee populations in the Arab world, specifically focusing on Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Speakers:
Noha Aboueldahab: Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Yara M. Asi: Lecturer of Health Management and Informatics, University of Central Florida
Joost Hiltermann: Program Director, Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group
Afrah Nasser: Yemen Researcher, Human Rights Watch
Tamara Kharroub (Moderator): Assistant Executive Director and Senior Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC
The Middle East in an Era of Great Power Competition: A Conversation with Barry Posen and Stephen Walt | April 16, 2020 | 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Of all the internal obstacles and external challenges the United States is likely to face in its pursuit of its new foreign policy priority of great power competition, the Middle East might prove to be the biggest. If the region continues to command U.S. attention and resources, Washington will struggle in its efforts to effectively pivot and counter Chinese and Russian ambitions in Asia and Europe, respectively.
How does or should the Middle East fit in America’s new grand strategy? Does the great power competition necessitate an entirely new U.S. approach toward the Middle East? Which U.S. approach best serves Washington’s new global plans?
To answer these questions and many others, the Middle East Institute (MEI) is honored to host a conversation with Professor Barry Posen from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Professor Stephen Walt from Harvard University.
Speakers:
Barry Posen: Ford international professor of political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Stephen M. Walt: Professor of international affairs, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government
Bilal Saab (Moderator): Senior fellow and director, defense and security program, MEI
Displacement During COVID-19: an Urgent Humanitarian Imperative | April 17, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
As COVID-19 continues to devastate global economies and health systems with no end in sight, refugees and IDPs are among the world’s most vulnerable communities. Already facing tremendous challenges including loss of livelihoods, lack of citizenship, psychological trauma, and discrimination, displaced people in the Middle East must now contend with the pandemic and its devastation on the already-strained healthcare systems and economies of their host countries. Refugees are particularly susceptible to illnesses like COVID due to overcrowding in refugee camps, lack of proper sanitation, food, and water resources, and unprotected movement across borders. Meanwhile, the region’s conflicts, outbreaks of violence, and occupation continue, providing little relief in the most fragile environments.
How are refugees in the Middle East withstanding the virus in countries such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan? How does the impact of the virus expose existing fragilities in and create new challenges for the region’s healthcare services, particularly for refugee camps, which suffer from overcrowding and lack of proper sanitation? What are the new imperatives for governments and international organizations to provide assistance where it is needed most?
Speakers:
Kieren Barnes: Syrian Country Director, Mercy Corps
Aya Majzoub: Lebanon and Bahrain researcher, Human Rights Watch
Dr. Zaher Sahloul: President and founder, MedGlobal
Randa Slim (Moderator): Senior fellow and director, Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues program, MEI
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Taiwan has met the Covid-19 challenge
Despite a 24 million population, Taiwan’s share in the global caseload remains low with 300 cases and 5 fatalities. How did Taiwan respond to COVID-19? What are the implications of its response? On April 9, the Hudson Institute hosted a panel discussion on “Taiwan’s Strong COVID-19 Response: Remarks by Foreign Minister Joseph Wu.” The discussion featured four speakers:
Vincent Chao: Director of the Political Division, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States
Patrick Cronin: Senior Fellow and Asia-Pacific Security Chair, Hudson Institute
Rob Spalding: Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Joseph Wu: Foreign Minister of Taiwan
Seth Cropsey: Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for American Seapower, Hudson Institute, moderated
The Taiwan model
Wu stated that Taiwan is vulnerable due to its proximity to China, lack of access to the WHO, thousands of Taiwanese living and working in Wuhan, and three million visitors from China annually. The pandemic, however, has had only a minor impact on Taiwan. Wu listed steps that Taiwan has done in this crisis taken:
- Quick response: Taiwan’s first response to this pandemic was as early as December 31.
- Early deployment: When the first case showed up on January 21, Taiwan set up CECC (the Central Epidemic Command Center) to authorize border control, body temperature testing, quarantine, and a tracking program.
- Transparency: CECC hosts daily press conference to brief the public domestic and international information.
- Export ban, rationing, and rapid increase of production on critical supplies: Taiwan issued an export ban when the government detected a wave of Chinese procurement.
- Whole-of-government approach: Ministries cooperated to make joint decisions under CECC’s command.
- Rearrangement of the medical institutions to meet the emergency requirements: Taiwan has designated over 160 testing facilities.
- Preventive measures against in-hospital outbreaks
- Contact tracing: Identifying potential cases by tracing contacts.
Wu thinks that Beijing is misleading the public by using conspiracy theories about the origins of the coronavirus and fabricated government proclamations. Taiwan attempts to show that authoritarian regimes are not the only ones that possess resources and capabilities to combat the crisis. A free and open, democratic Taiwan can deal with the problem as well. Taiwan is seeking participation in the WHO since its absence leaves a gap in the global health system and undermines WHO.
Implications
Cronin indicated that the world cannot exclude Taiwan in fighting this pandemic crisis. China should not politicize public health. Taiwan needs a higher status on the global stage to close down flights, tackle the economic crisis, ensure maritime safety, and protect intellectual property.
Chao believes that precaution and overreactions are necessary in this crisis. Taiwan’s national health insurance plays an important role in integrating and visualizing medical records, which gives medical authorities more data about the situation. Chao pointed that the passing of Taipei Act in 2019 was good timing as China was engaging in an aggressive campaign in the South China Sea against Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. This law gives Taiwan a signal that the US can counterbalance pressure that China exerts around the world.
Troops
Cronin emphasized that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might have suffered some readiness problems. It is impossible for the PLA to remain unaffected in this pandemic crisis since it was deployed in the epicenter of the COVID-19. China, nevertheless, might have covered this up because it doesn’t want to undermine the PLA’s deterrence nor tarnish its reputation.
Spalding demonstrated that US Department of Defense has ensured that troops on mission duties are sequestered and kept safe from the pandemic. COVID-19 could be a chance for China, which was pressuring Taiwan, the East China Sea and the South China Sea even before the COVID-19 crisis, to make gains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Defense Department, he said, is ready to deter China’s activities in Western Pacific and defend US allies.
Here’s the video for this panel discussion:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
He can’t talk himself out of it
Anthony Fauci is trolling Donald Trump. The President is ordering up plans to reopen businesses next month. Fauci is saying the virus will make that decision. Who is right?
Fauci is. Any decision to send people back to work before the virus is under good control will generate a giant second wave of infection and extend in both time and space the economic damage due to Covid-19. While there are some indications that infection may be beginning to peak in New York City and other hot spots, much of the country has yet to see its first wave of infection. All the states that have hesitated and resisted social distancing measures are bound to suffer next.
The one thing that could accelerate the reopening of the economy is testing. If I can be sure everyone I am working close to has been tested and found negative for the virus, then of course I’d be happy to go back to work, to movie theaters, and to school. But the Federal government has failed from the first to make enough testing available. Are you really going to go to a restaurant where someone who has not been tested is coughing at the next table? Are you going to sit in a movie theater or classroom with people who have not been tested?
A premature return to work will vastly increase the economic damage, not decrease it. Trump should be worried about that, since his prospects in the November 3 election depend heavily on the state of the economy. But this is a president who thinks he can talk himself out of trouble. The opposite is more the case. His daily press briefings are hurting his popularity, even while attracting lots of viewers. They are reminders that he and his Administration are supposed to be in charge and are therefore responsible for the disastrous impact of the epidemic in the United States.
Trump’s mendacity, ignorance and egotism are the culprits. He tried for weeks to play down the threat, then shifted to placing blame on Obama, the Chinese, WHO, and Democratic governors. His minions have followed wherever he goes, echoing his latest efforts to shirk responsibility. Fox News tries to portray him as having been right all along, despite the obvious change in his line from it’s-not-worse-than-the-flu to no-one-has-ever-seen-anything-like-this. Read David Frum’s account if have doubts.
At this point, maybe we can hope to get to the far side of this epidemic by July, but it will leave a wake of devastation that will last much longer. Lots of businesses in the US will go under. Growth may perk up before the end of 2020, but it will take years to recover fully and decades to pay off the vast increase in the public debt. The United States will lose ground economically and politically relative to other countries that have dealt more effectively with the virus, including China and Germany. Who would want to follow the leadership of a country that reacted so ineffectively to the virus as the US?
Outside the US, the big impact will be on poorer countries, where testing and treatment will be in even shorter supply. Many countries in Africa and the Middle East were already facing giant youth bulges before the virus hit. If their older and poorer populations are culled, which is what we should expect, they will be left with slowed growth and an even greater youth bulge. The consequences for stability in already unstable areas will be disastrous. Trump, who has ignored this international dimension of Covid-19’s impact, will find again that he can’t talk himself out of it.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
It’s misjudgment, not messaging
The media this morning is marveling at Donald Trump’s changed messaging. After months of downplaying the threat of Covid-19, he is saying he takes it seriously and always did. That is a lie: he has consistently opposed taking vigorous action against the virus fearing the impact on the US economy.
What allegedly changed his mind are the projections of deaths: somewhere between 100,000 and 240,000 in the best of cases, which is unlikely to materialize because many states have still not taken vigorous action to limit exposures and the projections are based on keeping vigorous measures in place until June 1. They are currently scheduled to expire at the end of April.
The issue here isn’t messaging. It is misjudgment. Trump thought the virus was going to disappear with the spring and told the country so. He also thought it wasn’t worse than the flu. And he thought blocking travel from China would protect the United States. All of these assumptions were false: it is not disappearing with warmer weather, it is far more transmissible than the flu apparently during a period when infected people show no symptoms, and the virus appeared quickly in the US even after travel from China was blocked.
Trump thought acknowledging the facts would hurt his re-election prospects. That may be true.
Let’s assume the strict “social distancing” measures last until June 15 or so, which is not an unreasonable time frame. Even then, few–including me–are going to want to go back to work unless others there are tested for Covid-19 on an almost daily basis. Tests will need to be cheap, fast, and universally available. They are nowhere near that now. But let’s say that problem is solved by the end of June.
This would mean the Conference Board’s “May reboot” of the economy is already overtaken by events. We’d be looking at either a summer rebound or a fall recovery, more than likely the latter. Either would mean 6% or so shrinkage of the economy in 2020 relative to 2019, and unemployment up to 15% in the third quarter of 2020. No president should want to compete for re-election with unemployment at that rate, especially if he is personally responsible for making it so.
Trump inherited an economy that was in good shape: it had grown about 2.4% per year under Obama since the recovery from the recession began in mid-2009. The growth rate in Trump’s first three years was about the same (2.5%), but the deficit was worsening rapidly due to the giant tax cut the Republicans gave corporations and the wealthy in his first year. Now the deficit is exploding due to new spending to meet the corona virus challenge, but interest rates are low so the full impact of the borrowing is not being felt.
Former Vice President Biden has the advantage of the Obama recovery to brag about, and Trump’s ineptitude in meeting the challenge of Covid-19 to criticize. But the Democrats haven’t been very successful yet in pinning the tail on the elephant. Polls show an uptick in Trump’s approval rating, up to 46%. That is low for an incumbent president, but high for Trump. Rallying around the flag may be the reason, but that is unlikely to persist through hundreds of thousands of deaths, continuing personal confinement, and a 15% unemployment rate.
We can be pretty much certain that Trump will lose the popular vote by even more than the 2.8 million or so votes in 2016. He has treated California, New York, New Jersey and other more populated Democratic-majority states with disdain before and throughout the epidemic. They will vote overwhelmingly against him. His base is concentrated in more rural, less populated states overweighted in the Electoral College. Covid-19 has not yet hit many of those states hard. What will happen to his votes then is anyone’s guess, as his base has remained intensely loyal so far.
An epidemic doesn’t lend itself to messaging. It’s all about getting it right. Trump got it wrong. I find it hard to imagine that there will be no punishment for that.
RSS - Posts
