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Requiem for Syria, but some hope for US diplomacy

Pro-democracy protests began in Syria nearly 10 years ago. In response, the government escalated violence, which sparked the Syrian civil war. The subsequent humanitarian catastrophe has killed almost half a million people and displaced an estimated 12 million others.

On February 4, Brookings Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi, research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, discussed their new book, Syrian Requiem, which details the long-developing divisions in Syrian politics, surveys the various actors who fought in Syria directly or through proxies, and examines the policy choices that the conflict currently presents to the United States and others. The speakers at the event are listed below:

Speakers:

Susan Maloney: Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy

Steven Heydemann (moderator): Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy

Itamar Rabinovich: Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy

Carmit Valensi: Research Fellow and Syria Program Manager, Institute for National Security Studies

Origins of the Crisis

Both structural and proximate factors have contributed to the ongoing crisis in Syria. Rabinovich identified flaws in US foreign policy under both Obama and Trump as some of the key proximate causes for the depth of the crisis in Syria. In particular, he argued that Obama’s refusal to arm the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2012 and 2013 severely hampered the opposition’s ability to combat the regime. Jouejati similarly identified the failure to arm the FSA as a critical mistake, while also arguing that Obama should have responded more forcefully when Assad crossed his infamous red line regarding the use of chemical weapons. Jouejati pointed to this sign of weakness as a clear signal to Russia that the US would allow Moscow free reign in Syria to dictate the outcome of events.

Rabinovich also noted several structural factors that he believes will continue to generate instability in Syria. First, the artificial borders originating from the notorious Sykes-Picot agreement have created an inherently flawed state. Second, the autocratic nature of the Syrian state under Assad will continue to foster reciprocal resistance and violence. Valensi pointed to Assad’s continued use of violence and repression in reclaimed territory, as well as his focus on strengthening the state security apparatus prior to reconstruction, as evidence that the Assad regime will continue to engender opposition.

Assad’s Prospects

With substantial support from Russia and Iran, Assad has made significant military advances since 2015. However, all of the panelists believe that Assad’s prospects for consolidating control over the country remain dim. Valensi points to three key signs that Assad will struggle to bring the entire country back into the fold. First, even after the military successes of the past few years, Assad still only controls 60% of the territory. Second, both his military success and his ability to maintain control over conquered territory is largely predicated on either physical or monetary support from Russia and Iran. Should that support begin to wane, Assad’s ability to control territory will diminish. Finally, Assad does not have the resources to reconstruct the country, and both Russia and Iran are unlikely to have the necessary capacity or willingness to provide enough financial support.

Jouejati added another critical sign of Assad’s long-term instability. The COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse of the Lebanese economy have severely exacerbated the economic crisis in Syria. Even in the heart of regime-controlled territory, state subsidies for bread have decreased and people complain of long lines for fuel. As a result, Assad is currently witnessing a worrying decline in support from even his most loyal followers.

Paths Forward

The multitude of stressors on the Assad regime suggests that the US may have some leverage to promote an end to the Syrian civil war. However, while all of the panelists believed that the US has more leverage in Syria than has commonly been acknowledged, they differed on precisely where the US should apply pressure. In particular, the panelists debated which actor is the most promising for asserting influence on the Assad regime. Valensi argued that the new Biden administration should attempt to boost the UN diplomatic process through UN Resolution 2254, despite Heydemann’s critique of the UN process as the example of “zombie diplomacy” par excellence. Jouejati favored US support of a Russian-led diplomatic process, arguing that Russia has indicated a softening of its support for Assad. Heydemann, however, expressed concern that Russia has sent these signals before without ever in fact wavering in its support for the Assad regime.

However, the panelists did agree that the limited US military presence remaining in Syria provides significantly more leverage than many people have recognized. However, they did not advocate for a more expansive military presence, instead arguing that even limited presence and military action can be used strategically. Valensi pointed to Trump’s limited strikes in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons as evidence that limited engagement need not necessarily be a prelude to full intervention.

To watch the event in full, please click here.