Tag: Venezuela
Trump’s radical foreign policy fails
Time for a roundup on where President Trump stands on his promise to deliver great deals for America. Spoiler alert: there are no surprises and only one modest success.
Every administration chooses its priorities. Trump has chosen Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, Venezuela, NAFTA, and immigration.
The “maximum pressure” program on Iran has caused economic distress but no willingness to renegotiate the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA), from which the United States withdrew. Iran is back to enriching uranium and accumulating quantities above the JCPOA limits, but Tehran is still hoping Europe, Russia, and China will find ways to import its oil. Iran is also flexing its muscles in the strait of Hormuz, signaling its ability to cause an oil supply disruption that would hike oil prices globally.
North Korea is thumbing its nose at Trump’s effort to portray Kim Jong-un as his best friend. His short-range missile launches are a clear signal of defiance. There is no progress to report in the nuclear negotiations, and it is increasingly clear that the US will need to settle for an agreement that falls way short of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization it has sought. Some sort of freeze is the best that can be hoped for.
The trade war with China is going badly: it is costing both Americans and Chinese a lot, slowing economic growth worldwide, and undermining global norms for trade and investment that the Trump Administration claims to be defending. There is little hope it will end soon. Trump seems to be committed to making the tariffs permanent, but it is hard to picture how he can face the electorate in 2020 if the tariffs have led the world and the US into recession.
Trump promised improved relations with Russia, and he has not retreated from his effort to befriend President Putin and hold him blameless. But Moscow has made life difficult: its documented interference in the 2016 election, its continued efforts worldwide to counter US interests, its occupation of part of Ukraine, its repression of domestic dissent, and a Congress determined to hold Putin accountable has forced Trump to tighten and expand sanctions. Relations with Russia are not improving (and shouldn’t).
Trump is ratcheting up sanctions on Venezuela, trying to force out President Maduro. But so far shock and awe has not shocked or awed the Venezuelans, as Harold Trinkunas put it in today’s New York Times. President Maduro is still in power. Juan Guaidó and his supporters are still in the streets, where enthusiasm has flagged. Most of Latin America would like a negotiated settlement, but John Bolton is not up for that. He wants Maduro to flee.
The NAFTA renegotiation was an apparent success so far, as it generated a new US-Mexico-Canada Agreement with modest updating and improvements. But the negotiation with Ottawa and Mexico City was only half the challenge. The new agreement faces serious challenges to its approval in September in a Democratic-controlled House of Representatives that President Trump has done little or nothing to court. Will the House really approve NAFTA 2.0 while it is conducting investigations that could lead to impeachment?
Immigration is the one area of actual success for Trump, if you buy into the need to reduce it: illegal entries and asylum seekers are said to be down. Refugee entries are definitely down. But the price has been astronomical: separating children from parents, inhumane and even deadly conditions in detention facilities, denial of refugee resettlement to people in danger of their lives, and inspiration to white supremacists to commit violence. And for those who think the wall is important: little of it is being built.
The Trump Administration is a radical one: it has tried in all these areas to achieve goals that are extreme. The failures are obvious. The question is whether enough Americans will care. Certainly people worldwide do: America is not popular these days, especially but not only with its European allies. Trump is a white supremacist, but the Nordics he so much admires don’t like him.
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Silly and sad
Jared Kushner’s much-hyped Peace to Prosperity economic proposal for Palestine, published over the weekend by the White House, is like a three-legged stool that is missing two legs. It can serve little purpose without two others: a Palestinian state with the sovereign authority required to implement the plan and an Israeli state ready to cooperate with its Palestinian neighbors in that process.
Both are absent from Kushner’s $50-billion proposition. He manages to discuss empowering Palestinians and Palestinian governance without mentioning Israeli checkpoints and other security controls, the split between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and Israeli settlements and territorial control in the West Bank as well as Israel’s continuing embargo of Gaza. Kushner wishes away all the driving forces of the conflict in order to wave a shiny future that has no practical means of implementation. This is the real estate prospectus version of international politics: show them what it might look like and investors will flock.
Only they won’t, because Arabs and Jews are not dumb. Both know this is silly. No money will flow until the other two legs of the stool are put in place. Palestine needs a secure, unified, and democratic political future before it will get the public and private investment and enhanced trade of the sort Kushner imagines. I’ve been to Rawabi, the truly magnificent Palestinian showcase town built with Qatari funding. It will remain a showcase, not a prototype, so long as the Palestinian state remains weak and Israeli cooperation weaker.
Many peace negotiators try Kushner’s gimmick: a fat economic proposal to sweeten the bitter political and security pills that have to be swallowed. As a State Department official in 1995, I wrote the one-page, three-year, $3 billion proposal that Dick Holbrooke carried into Sarajevo to sweeten the pot. Admittedly it wasn’t as glossy as Kushner’s. It got precious little attention, because it didn’t address the issues that caused Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 3.5-year war. I hasten to add that it is about how much we spent, but to little avail, because the underlying causes of the conflict were not resolved in the Dayton peace agreement.
Erratic though he is, Trump is a one-trick pony. He maximizes pressure, flashes an attractive but entirely imaginary future, and then either caves himself or moves on to his next self-generated crisis. Cases in point: North Korea, Venezuela, Israel/Palestine, and now Iran. The Palestinians are not going to buy a one-legged stool. Imagining they will is silly. But it is also sad. It reduces America to the international equivalent of a real estate huckster.
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Russia’s Venezuela Gamble
On June 20 the Atlantic Council hosted an event on “Russian Influence in Venezuela: What Should the United States Do?” with an introductory speech by Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) followed by a panel discussion. The panel featured Ambassador John Herbst, Director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council, Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky, Senior Fellow at the Harvard University Belfer Center and former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Francisco Monaldi, Director of the Latin America Initiative and fellow on Latin American Energy Policy, Evelyn N. Farkas, Resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, Mark D. Simakovsky, Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, and Konstantin Eggert, a columnist for Deutsche Welle and former vice-president for public and government affairs for ExxonMobil Russia Inc. Jason Marczak, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, moderated.
Senator Scott painted a picture of the situation in Venezuela, describing the hunger and poverty that has driven thousands to flee into neighboring countries. Scott said Maduro’s regime is intentionally starving parts of the population, calling it a genocide. Russia is propping up Maduro and Scott believes the house of cards will fall if Russia pulls its support. Russia has sent nuclear capable bombers to Venezuela and reports of mercenaries from Russia’s “Wagner Group” are abundant. Scott called Russia’s support for Venezuela “the most aggressive Russian threat since the Cuban Missile crisis,” saying the US needs to act now to prevent a Syria in our hemisphere.
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky explained that Russia’s behavior can be explained by four principles.
- Russia’s goal is to marginalize, minimize and eradicate US power abroad.
- Putin’s statement at the 2007 Munich Security Conference that Russia doesn’t support the institutions and values that promote peace.
- The desire to reconstitute the Soviet Union or Russia’s sphere of influence and make Russia a visible global actor once more.
- The importance for Russia to find and align itself with like-minded actors, in part due to its economic troubles.
Taking these principles into account Dobriansky says Russia’s investment in Venezuela ($17 billion since 2005) is important, but its behavior is driven by the political investment: Chavez and now Maduro’s alignment with Russia and Putin. Monaldi agrees but adds that economically the collapse of Venezuelan oil production is good for Russia. Herbst added that Russia doesn’t want dictators to fall to protesters in the street, partially out of fear that such a situation could arise in Russia.
Farkas concurred. Putin needs the kleptocracy in Russia to keep himself afloat. She compares Venezuela to Syria: Russia is playing a high stakes political game at low cost, but avoids direct conflict with the US. The only way Russia would step away from Venezuela is if the US “gave them” the Ukraine. Herbst says such a notion is pure fantasy and commends American patience since Russia is bound to lose in both places in the long-term. However, Farkas warns the longer the stalemate drags on the more refugees flee Venezuela and destabilize neighboring countries, potentially forcing the US to act.
Eggert agreed but says there are limits to what Putin can do. Five years of falling take-home pay have angered the population and the expense of Crimea is vastly unpopular. Putin cannot pull of an economic miracle again to appease the Russian population. Syria is cheaper and logistically easier for Russia to deal with than Crimea. An agreement for Maduro to leave Venezuela the regime will be good for Russia down the line. Maduro knows that Russia is the only country that can exfiltrate him out of Venezuela if necessary. Dobriansky adds that while Russia wants to prevent regime change it cares more about its political investment in Venezuela and not who is in charge, which could mean the Kremlin pulling support for Maduro’s regime if it is no longer politically feasible.
Simakovsky analyzed the economics of the situation. Sanctions seem to have worked and Russia hasn’t made any significant investments in terms of arms deals or loan guarantees as a result. Russia realizes its limits but also realizes US limits and the stalemate at hand. Simakovsky warns that Washington has to be careful with its sanctions so as not to alienate allies in Venezuela and push them towards Russia.
Eggert and Farkas agreed everything in Russia’s foreign policy since 2014 leads back to Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was the first forcible border change in Europe since WWII and represented an attempt by Russia to regain its place as a status-quo power. All panelists brought up the Wagner group as an important foreign policy tool for Russia, but Eggert mentioned how things can go wrong. This was the case in Syria when an estimated 200 Wagner mercenaries were killed attacking a coalition base. Incidents like these worry Farkas, who says they pose a greater risk of escalating into unwanted conflict than strategic nuclear bombers deployed to Venezuela. Eggert concurred. Russian posturing isn’t of concern, but a situation in which Russia feels forced to show strength in order to save face poses a real threat.
Asked what a redline in Venezuela would be for the US, Simakovksy referred to the Monroe Doctrine. If Russia pursues a Ukraine-like scenario in Venezuela the US would have to pushback. Washington wasn’t successful in preventing Russia from invading Georgia in 2008 or annexing Crimea in 2014 but it has to be clear on Venezuela. Dobriansky said the best way to keep pressure on Russia is through sanctions on Rosneft in particular, as well as calling Russia out directly for keeping Maduro in power.
The full video of the event is available on the Atlantic Council’s Youtube channel here.
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Peace Picks June 17-23
1. Transatlantic Cooperation in an Era of Crisis and Competition|June 17|3:15pm-5:00pm|Hudson Institute|1201 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20004|Register Here
Hudson Institute will host distinguished scholars from France’s Institut Montaigne for a discussion on transatlantic relations. Founded in 2000, Institut Montaigne is a pioneering independent think tank dedicated to public policy in France and Europe. Panelists will include Michel Duclos, special advisor on Geopolitics at Institut Montaigne and former French Ambassador to Syria and Switzerland; and François Godement, senior advisor for Asia at Institut Montaigne.
Against a backdrop of surging populism in democracies and rising authoritarianism worldwide, Europe finds itself at the center of a return to great power rivalry between China and the United States. Disputes over trade and security are straining longstanding areas of cooperation even as global power centers shift and new partnerships beckon. How should policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and capitals across Europe respond to these challenges? What is the future of the transatlantic relationship in a rapidly changing world?
Speakers:
Michel Duclos, Special Advisor, Geopolitics, Institut Montaigne and former French Ambassador to Syria and Switzerland
François Godement, Senior Advisor for Asia, Institut Montaigne
Ben Judah, Research Fellow, Hudson Institute
Peter Rough, Fellow, Hudson Institute
Ken Weinstein, President and CEO, Hudson Institute
2. South Sudan’s Stalled Path to Peace|June 18|9:30am-11:30am|United States Institute of Peace|2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here
In early May, South Sudan’s ruling and opposition parties agreed to extend the pre-transitional period of the South Sudan peace agreement leading to the formation of a unified Government for an additional six months. The extension of this period presents an opportunity to reflect on the progress and challenges to establishing a just peace in the country. South Sudanese citizens are desperate for peace, but many are asking what channels exist to support a meaningful reduction of violence. Between January and March alone, 25,000 people fled the country, adding to the already two million South Sudanese refugees worldwide. Without full implementation of the peace process, national- and local-level conflicts will continue to threaten hard-won development gains and require greater investments in lifesaving humanitarian aid.
Please join USIP for a look at South Sudan’s peace agreement and the measures required to build peace in the young nation. In this live-streamed discussion, experts from USIP, the Enough Project, and Democracy International will offer concrete, evidence-based recommendations for how to mitigate conflict, promote peace and advance accountability.
Speakers
David Acuoth, Founder, Council on South Sudanese-American Relations
Brian Adeba, Deputy Director of Policy, Enough Project, @kalamashaka
Mark Ferullo, Senior Advisor, The Sentry
Morgan Simpson, Deputy Director of Programs, Democracy International
Susan Stigant, Director of Africa Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace, @SusanStigant
3. Is the US Decoupling from Asia’s Economic Architecture|June 19|9:00am-1:30pm|Center for Strategic and International Studies|1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
The CSIS Japan Chair, the CSIS Simon Chair, and JETRO cordially invite you to join us for the annual CSIS-JETRO conference.
9:00-9:05 Welcoming Remarks
John J. Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS
9:05-9:35 Opening Remarks (TBD)
9:35-10:00 Keynote Address
Nobuhiko Sasaki, Chairman and CEO, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)
10:00-11:15 Regional Perspectives on Indo-Pacific Economic Integration
China:
Xinquan Tu, Dean and Professor, Center for WTO Studies, University of
International Business & Economics, Beijing
Japan:
Yasuyuki Todo, Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Waseda, University
ASEAN:
Deborah Elms, Founder and Executive Director, Asian Trade Centre,Singapore
Moderator: Matthew P. Goodman, Senior Vice President; William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy and Senior Adviser for Asian Economics, CSIS
11:15-11:30 Break
11:30-12:30 Status and Impact of U.S. Trade Policy
Charles Freeman, Senior Vice President for Asia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Lorraine Hawley, Senior Director, International Government Relations,Archer Daniels Midland Company
Aaron Cooper, Vice President, Global Policy, BSA | The Software Alliance
Moderator:
Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS;Director of Asian Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,Georgetown University
12:30-13:30 Luncheon Address (TBD)
13:30 Adjourn
4. 2019 Atlantic Council-East Asia Foundation Strategic Dialogue|June 19|9:30am|Atlantic Council|1030 15thSt NW, 12thFloor, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Asia Security Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, for the 2019 Atlantic Council-East Asia Foundation Strategic Dialogue. This day-long conference will explore the current state of the United States and Republic of Korea’s ongoing negotiations with North Korea and the broader strategic picture developing in the Indo-Pacific. The Strategic Dialogue will feature keynote addresses by US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun and ROK Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Do-hoon Lee. This will be H.E. Lee’s first public address in the United States, as well as the first time both Special Representatives will speak on the same stage.
One year ago, President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un met in Singapore for an unprecedented, historic summit that concluded with a promise to deliver lasting peace to a denuclearized Korean peninsula. Today, the question remains: will this promised future become a reality? Will the coming months see a continued stalemate in negotiations, a major crisis, or a dramatic breakthrough? Ultimately, how will developments on the peninsula shape the Republic of Korea’s role in the broader Indo-Pacific under intensifying US-China strategic competition?
Breakfast and lunch will be provided.
Agenda:
WELCOME REMARKS (9:30 a.m. – 9:50 a.m.)
Mr. Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director,Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Minister Sung-hwan Kim, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea; Board Member, East Asia Foundation
KEYNOTE REMARKS (9:50 a.m. – 10:50 a.m.)
The Hon. Stephen Biegun, US Special Representative for North Korea,US Department of State
H.E. Do-hoon Lee, ROK Special Representative for Korean PeninsulaPeace and Security Affairs,ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PANEL DISCUSSION: SEEKING A POST-HANOI BREAKTHROUGH ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA(11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.)
Dr. Toby Dalton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
H.E. Jong-dae Kim, Member, 20th National Assembly; Head of the Foreign Affairs and Security Division;Member of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee;Head of the Foreign Affairs and Security Division; Member, Justice Party
H.E. Jae-jung Lee, Member, 20th National Assembly; Spokesperson, Democratic Party of Korea
Amb. Joseph Yun, Former US Special Representative for North Korea Policy, US Department of State; Senior Adviser, Asia Program, United States Institute of Peace
Mr. Barry Pavel (Moderator), Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director,Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
LUNCH CONVERSATION (1:00 p.m. – 1:45 p.m.)
Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Former US Under Secretary of State; Senior Fellow, The Future of Diplomacy Project, JFK Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Dr. Chung-in Moon, Special Adviser to the President for Unification, Foreign, and National Security Affairs, Republic of Korea
PANEL DISCUSSION: CHARTING KOREA’S ROLE IN US-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC(2:00 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.)
The Hon. Ami Bera, US House of Representatives (D-CA); Chair, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Co-Chair, Congressional Caucus on Korea
H.E. Ihk-pyo Hong, Member, 20th National Assembly; Vice Chairman of the National Assembly’s Public Administration and Security Committee; Chief Spokesman, Democratic Party of Korea
Prof. Jaeho Hwang, Director of Global Security Cooperation Center, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
H.E. Sun-suk Park, Member, 20th National Assembly; Member, National Assembly’s Science, ICT, Future Planning, and Communications Committee,Member, Bareunmirae Party
The Hon. Ted S. Yoho DVM, US House of Representatives (R-FL), Lead Republican, Subcommittee on Asia, The Pacific, and Nonproliferation; Member, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Dr. Miyeon Oh (Moderator), Director and Senior Fellow, Asia Security Initiative,Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
CLOSING REMARKS (3:30 p.m. – 3:45 p.m.)
Mr. Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
5. Sixth Annual Building a Competitive U.S.-Mexico Border Conference|June 20|8:30am-4:30pm|Woodrow Wilson Center|1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20004|Register Here
The Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute and the Border Trade Alliance invite you to save the date for our sixth annual high-level “Building a Competitive U.S.-Mexico Border” conference, which will focus on improving border management in order to strengthen the competitiveness of both the United States and Mexico. Topics covered at the conference will include the USMCA (the renegotiated NAFTA), strengthening security and efficiency at border ports of entry, the impact of tariffs and reduced staffing on trade, and growing crossborder cooperation for regional economic development.
Confirmed Speakers*
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX)
Congressman Will Hurd (R-TX 23)
Ambassador Martha Bárcena, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States
C.J. Mahoney, Deputy United States Trade Representative
John Sanders, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Gustavo de la Fuente, Executive Director, Smart Border Coalition
Lance Jungmeyer, President, Fresh Produce Association of the Americas
Mario Lozoya, Executive Director, Greater Brownsville Incentives Corporation
Federico Schaffler, Director, Texas Center for Border Economic Enterprise Development, Texas A&M International University
Christopher Wilson, Deputy Director, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
Britton Clarke, President, Border Trade Alliance
6. Russian Influence in Venezuela: What Should the United States Do?|June 20|9:00am|Atlantic Council|1030 15thSt NW, 12thFloor, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here
As a wave of public support for democratic transition is sweeping Venezuela and the international community, Moscow continues to stand by Nicolás Maduro. Displays of military force, Rosneft’s ownership of 49.9 percent of CITGO shares, and billions in loans to Maduro, showcase Russia’s rooted geopolitical and economic interests in Venezuela and the hemisphere.
What drives Russian support for Maduro? What is its role in the unfolding humanitarian, economic, and political crisis? How can the United States counter Russian involvement in Venezuela?
Join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Eurasia Center on Thursday, June 20, 2019 from 9:00 to 10:30 a.m. for a public event that will discuss the extent of Russian involvement in Venezuela, Moscow’s motivations and possible next moves, and how the United States should react.
Breakfast will be provided.
Speakers to be announced.
7. The Global Peace Index 2019 Launch|June 20|9:00am-10:30am|Center for Strategic and International Studies|1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
The Human Rights Initiative of CSIS invites you to a public launch event of the 2019 Global Peace Index (GPI). The Global Peace Index is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness, ranking 163 countries and territories according to their level of relative peacefulness. Created by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace and its economic value.
The report findings will be followed by a panel discussion considering the implications of closing civic space and inequality for peace. It will look particularly at the factors that IEP has found to be necessary preconditions for peace in its Positive Peace Report, many of which rely on an active civil society and limits on inequality.
This event is made possible by the Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP).
Featuring:
Stephen Lennon, Senior Policy Adviser to USAID’s bureau of Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs (DCHA)
Shannon Green,Senior Director of Programs at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)
Jonathan Drimmer, Senior Adviser at Business for Social Responsibility (BSR)
Laurie Smolenski, Outreach and Development Officer, Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
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Flim Flam 101
President Trump’s threat of tariffs on Mexican imports to the US was never credible, as it would have devastated the US auto industry and American agriculture. It was a transparent bluff intended to raise the President’s personal visibility, as Senate minority leader Schumer said. Trump got nothing new in the one-page joint statement that resolved the “crisis.” The Mexicans had agreed months ago to the main provisions of the agreement he greeted as a “great deal.”
This is now a boringly familiar pattern. It was what Trump did with Canada and Mexico in renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement, which produced a “United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement” (USMCA). Aside from being the worst acronym in the lexicon, USMCA is no more than NAFTA 2.0, a much-needed update of a decades-old agreement. No big triumph, and the Administration is having a hard time getting it approved in Congress.
Bluff is also what Trump with North Korea when he threatened military action and settled instead for a one-page “best efforts” pledge that fell short of previous Pyongyang commitments to denuclearize. There has been no significant progress since, despite a second failed summit in Hanoi, as Kim Jong-un has moved to shore up relations with Russia and China, neither of which has much reason to do favors for Trump. North Korea remains as much, if not more, of a threat to the US as in did in January 2017 at Trump’s inauguration.
The pattern was similar in soon forgotten Venezuela. Trump’s threats against President Maduro caused a temporary “crisis” but led nowhere. Maduro is still in power in Caracas while the American-backed interim president has failed to gain significant support in Venezuela’s armed forces. With no possibility of even a vague one-page statement in sight, Trump has moved on to other targets.
Iran is getting the typical Trump treatment. While deploying military assets to the Gulf and allowing National Security Adviser Bolton to talk tough, President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo have been begging for talks with Tehran. Pompeo has dropped his 12 preconditions. The President had never endorsed them. What the Administration wants now seems to be nothing more than an opportunity to sit at a table and berate Iran for building missiles and using proxies to project power in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Any statement from such “talks” would be no more substantive than Trump got out of Mexico.
The Iranians are no fools and could teach a Flim Flam 101 of their own. All their threats to close the Strait of Hormuz fall in this category, as their own ships pass there, as well as those of other nations delivering Iranian oil. The Iranians no doubt know that the Trump Administration is incapable of negotiating anything like the 159 pages of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), aka Iran nuclear deal. If ever they agree to talk about missiles and the use of proxies, Tehran will no doubt ask for reciprocity: removal of US weapons from the Gulf and an end to US military support to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.
Tehran knows those will be non-starters for the US. The only likely outcome of talks with the US would be an exchange of prisoners: Iranians held on criminal charges in the US for Americans (including Iranian Americans) held in Iran. Trump may decide that would be worth his while, as it would give him a much-needed boost on the international stage, where he is more pariah than hero. But I have my doubts he’ll be willing to pay the price for even that small gain: the Iranians will want relief from at least some of the sanctions that are tanking their economy.
Trump is a bad negotiator who follows a transparent pattern: threaten, cause crisis, settle for little, declare victory, take personal credit. It isn’t working. He has been unable to negotiate a single agreement worthy of presidential attention, and his threats are making other countries hedge their bets. The bullying with sanctions and tariffs is gaining nothing. It is instead undermining international confidence in the US and making other countries look elsewhere for leadership. Would you do business with a flim flam man who bullies?
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Overload
The Trump Administration has taken on a lot of foreign policy burdens:
- Replacing Venezuelan President Maduro with opposition interim President Guaido.
- Ending North Korea’s nuclear program.
- Solving the Israel/Palestine conflict.
- Getting Mexico to end transit of asylum-seekers headed for the US.
- Negotiating a trade deal with China.
- Initiating talks on nuclear, missile, and regional issues with Iran.
Right now, President Trump is in London taking on still a few more burdens: encouraging Brexit, negotiating a trade deal with whatever remains of the UK thereafter, and pushing Boris Johnson as the next Prime Minister. So far, he is failing at all these things.
That is not surprising. The US government finds it hard to do two things at once, much less six high priorities and dozens of others lower down the totem pole. It is hard even to talk about priorities when there are so many. And some interact: you can’t impose tariffs on China without weakening Beijing’s commitment to sanctions on North Korea. Nor can you get Europe to support Jared Kushner’s cockamamie Middle East peace plan while dissing the Union’s interest in maintaining the nuclear agreement with Iran.
Any serious president would be re-examining and resetting priorities, with a view to accomplishing something substantial before the November 2020 election, less than 18 months off. Trump isn’t going to do that, because he believes he can create reality by what he says rather than what he accomplishes. Today in London he said the protests were negligible and the crowds adoring. He was booed pretty much everywhere he went in public. The photos with the Queen (courtesy of @Weinsteinlaw) couldn’t be more telling:
But no doubt Trump and his loyal press will portray the state visit as a great triumph.
That however does not change the reality. Trump has bitten off far more than he can chew. American prestige almost everywhere is at a nadir. Only in countries where ethnic nationalism or autocracy or both are in vogue does Trump enjoy some support: Hungary, Poland, Brazil, the Philippines, and Israel. Making America great again is admired only by those who have similar ambitions.
Without wider international support, there is little prospect that Trump can deliver on more than one or two of his foreign policy priorities before the next election. Failure to cut back on the multiple, sometimes contradictory, efforts makes it less likely that any will succeed. The Administration is overloaded and doomed to failure.
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