Tag: Venezuela
Peace Picks May 20-24
1. #CyberspaceIRL: Rule of Law Approaches to Virtual Threats|Tuesday, May 21st|9am-5:30pm|United States Institute of Peace|2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here
A $600 billion black market, cybercrime has transformed the digital world into a sophisticated platform to steal and profit from personal data, undermine civil rights, manipulate elections, disseminate anti-democratic propaganda, and steal intelligence. Yet, cyberspaces remain largely unregulated. This lack of governance is a major challenge and concern for legal practitioners, human rights champions, and policymakers. To properly address the complex world of cybercrimes, these key players must work together to prioritize targeted strategies encompassing cross-jurisdictional cooperation, both locally and globally.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace as we co-host the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative’s 2019 Annual Conference. Bringing together representatives from academia, national security, and the private and public sectors, this conference will identify rule of law strategies to more effectively address this ever-changing landscape.
#CyberspaceIRL will assess whether current approaches are sufficient in addressing the complexity of issues such as money laundering, trafficking, election security, and internet freedom, and identify the breadth of actors who must be part of devising and implementing effective strategies and solutions.
Agenda:
8:30am – 9:00am – Registration (coffee/pastries)
9:00 – 9:15 – Welcome and Introductions
David Yang, Vice President, Applied Conflict Transformation, U.S. Institute of Peace
Alberto Mora, Director, American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative
Judge Margaret McKeown, Board Chair, American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative
9:20am – 9:50am – Keynote: “Setting the Stage for the Clash of Norms in Cyberspace”
Sujit Raman, Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
10:00am – 11:15am – Breakout Sessions
Legal Frameworks and Regional Initiatives
Rob Leventhal, moderator, Deputy Office Director, Office of Anticrime Programs, U.S. Department of State
Manuel de Almeida Pereira, Senior Legal Officer, Programme Manager, Council of Europe
Kenn Kern, Chief Information Officer, Special Assistant, International Relations, New York County District Attorney’s Office
Election Security and the Erosion of Trust in Democratic Institutions
Jonas Claes, moderator, Preventing Election Violence Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
Katherine Ellena, Legal Advisor, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Harvey Rishikof, Visiting Professor, Temple Law, former senior policy advisor to the director of national counterintelligence at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Saleela Salahuddin, Cybersecurity Policy Lead, Facebook
11:25am – 12:15pm – Plenary: The Tipping Point: When is Cyber Incitement Responsible for Violence? (the case of Burma/Myanmar)
Lata Nott, moderator, Executive Director of the First Amendment Center at the Newseum
Molly Land, Associate Director of the University of Connecticut’s Human Rights Institute and Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Finance and Economics Expert Panel of Experts Established pursuant to UNSCR 1874
Richard Ashby Wilson, Gladstein Distinguished Chair of Human Rights and Professor of Law and Anthropology, University of Connecticut School of Law
12:15pm – 1:00pm – Lunch
1:00pm – 2:15pm – Breakout Sessions
Cybercrime Enforcement: Deterring State and Non-State Actors through Criminal Prosecutions
Steven M. Kelly, moderator, Chief of Cyber Policy of the Cyber Division at the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Luke Dembosky, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton
Michael J. Stawasz, Deputy Chief for Computer Crime, U.S. Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
Sean Newell, Deputy Chief for Cyber, U.S. Department of Justice, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section
William Lyne, Liaison Officer, National Crime Agency, British Embassy to the United States
When Bitcoin Goes Bad: How Virtual Currencies Challenge the Rule of Law
Adam Zarazinski, moderator, CEO, Inca Digital Securities
Elisabeth Poteat, Attorney, Department of Justice, National Security Division
Michael Sachs, Chief, Investigative Division, New York County District Attorney’s Office
Yaya J. Fanusie, Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
2:30pm – 3:45pm – Breakout Sessions
Internet Freedom: Protecting the Good Guys while Catching the Bad Guys
Heather West, moderator, Senior Policy Manager at Mozilla
Andrea Little Limbago, Chief Social Scientist of Virtru
Bill Marczak, Research Fellow at Citizen Lab, and a Postdoctoral Researcher at UC Berkeley
Robyn Greene, Privacy Policy Manager, Facebook
Trafficking in the Digital Age
Jessie Tannenbaum, moderator, Legal Advisor, Research, Evaluation, and Learning Division, ABA ROLI
Danielle Kessler, Senior Policy and Outreach Manager, International Fund for Animal Welfare
Evan Ratliff, Journalist and author of The Mastermind: Drugs, Empire, Murder, Betrayal
Robert E. Bornstein, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Division, Branch 1 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Washington Field Office
3:45pm – 4:30pm – Closing Keynote Session: “Shaping the Future of the Cyber Landscape”
Glenn S. Gerstell, General Counsel, National Security Agency
Judge James E. Baker, ROLI Board & Syracuse University
4:30pm – 5:30pm – Reception
2. Visegrad Countries in the Transatlantic Alliance – Common Security, Shared Challenges|Tuesday, May 21st|10:30pm-12:00pm|Heritage Foundation|Lehrman Auditorium, 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, DC 20002| Register Here
The event cohosted by the Heritage Foundation and the Antall József Knowledge Center in Budapest, Hungary, will explore the diplomatic, economic, military and political importance of the V4. A special focus of the event will be relations between the Visegrád and the United States, how the region can one day develop into an anchor of U.S. engagement in Europe and continue contributing to robust transatlantic cooperation.
Panel:
Dušan Fischer, Project Manager, Air Force and Counter-Air Defense Projects Unit, Modernization Department, Ministry of Defence, Slovak Republic
Dominik P. Jankowski, Political Advisor & Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO
Hynek Kmoníček, Ambassador of the Czech Republic to the United States
László Szabó, Ambassador of Hungary to the United States
Moderated by:
Péter Stepper, Research Fellow, Editor, Antall József Knowledge Center
Hosted by:
James Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President and E.W. Richardson Fellow, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
Veronika Antall-Horváth, Deputy Director Antall József Knowledge Center
3. Violence Prevention in Southern Somalia|Tuesday, May 21st| 1pm-2:30pm|New America|740 15thSt NW #900, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here
New America’s International Security Program and Peace Direct invite you to join them for a lunchtime panel discussion on violence prevention in southern Somalia. In March 2019, the capital city of Mogadishu saw seven terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab in a single week. That, coupled with a recent uptick in counterterrorism ground, air, and drone strikes by the United States in cooperation with the government of Somalia, has called into question what it will take to establish peace in the southern part of the country.Peace Direct’s partner organization in Somalia, Social-Life and Agricultural Development Organization(SADO), has been working in the region for over two decades, looking at sustainable, people and community-centered development.
Topics that will be covered during the session include:
- What are the current obstacles and opportunities for peace in Somalia?
- Perspectives and recommendations from local peacebuilders on advancing peace in Somalia.
- What does practical violence prevention work in Somalia look like?
- What is the role of women in violence prevention?
- What is the role of U.S. policy in Somalia and what are recommendations for improving U.S. engagement?
Introductory Remarks:
Bridget Moix, U.S. Senior Representative and Head of Advocacy, Peace Direct
Panelists:
Isse Abdullahi, Director, Social-Life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO)
Pauline Muchina, Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for the American Friends Service Committee’s Africa region
Moderator:
Melissa Salyk-Virk, Policy Analyst, New America’s International Security Program
4. Is the Venezuela Crisis Becoming a Proxy Conflict?|Tuesday, May 21st|3:30pm-5pm|Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|1779 Massachusetts Ave NW|Register Here
Join Carnegie and the Inter-American Dialogue for a timely conversation about the geopolitical implications of the Venezuela crisis. Top Trump administration officials have repeatedly criticized Cuban, Russian, and Chinese backing for the Maduro regime, but they are struggling to change the situation on the ground. What is the strategic calculus propelling outside powers’ involvement in Venezuela? What risks does deeper foreign intervention in the crisis pose for the fate of the Venezuelan opposition led by interim President Juan Guaidó and the region as a whole?
Speakers:
Rebecca Bill Chavez, nonresident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Western Hemisphere affairs
Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center
Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue
Francisco Toro, founder of Caracas Chronicles and opinion columnist for the Washington Post
5. Europe after the European Election|Wednesday, May 22nd|1pm-2:30pm|American Enterprise Institute|Auditorium, 1789 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
While populism continues to be a dominant factor shaping Europe’s politics, the simplistic overuse of the label often obfuscates Europe’s actual political dynamics. Rather than populism, what makes the 2019 European election so significant is the degree of political fragmentation that will likely characterize the results. In all likelihood, power will continue to shift away from the once-dominant political families on the center right and the center left. How will that affect the composition of the future European Commission? Will it make the EU more difficult to govern? And why should Americans care?
Join Amb. Santiago Cabanas, Ben Judah, and Yascha Mounk— alongside AEI’s Dalibor Rohac and Stan Veuger— as they discuss Europe’s challenges and the way forward.
Agenda:
12:45 PM
Registration
1:00 PM
Welcome:
Dalibor Rohac, AEI
1:05 PM
Panel discussion
Panelists:
Santiago Cabanas, Ambassador of Spain
Ben Judah, Hudson Institute
Yascha Mounk, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Dalibor Rohac, AEI
Moderator:
Stan Veuger, AEI
2:10 PM
Q&A
2:30 PM
Adjournment
6. Managing Forced Displacement in Africa: How Collective Efforts Can More Effectively Address the Surge of Refugees and Displaced Persons|Thursday, May 23rd|9am-11am|United States Institute for Peace|2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here
Africa hosts more than one-third of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). This growing phenomenon impacts not only those fleeing conflict, but also the host communities and countries who now face complex logistical and humanitarian challenges. A comprehensive response to this problem must seek to address root causes, thereby preventing further displacement, and also find durable solutions for the many millions already displaced.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace, the African Ambassadors Group, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for a discussion on forced displacement in Africa. The panel conversation will highlight African policy responses to displacement at the national, regional, and continental level, discuss current and anticipated challenges, and brainstorm innovative approaches. Follow the conversation with #AfricaDayUSIP.
Light refreshments will be provided.
Speakers:
H.E. Soorooj Phokeer, opening and closing remarks, Ambassador of the Republic of Mauritius
Carol Thompson O’Connell, opening remarks, Acting Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State
Ger Duany, Regional Goodwill Ambassador for the East and Horn of Africa, UNHCR
H.E. Wilson Mutagaywa Kajumula Masilingi , Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania
H.E Mull Ssebujja Katende, Ambassador of the Republic of Uganda
Nancy Lindborg, moderator, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
7. Powering the US-Japan Alliance| Thursday, May 23rd|11:30-1pm|Atlantic Council|1030 15thSt NW, 12thFloor, Washington, DC 20005|Register Here
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Asia Security Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and the Global Energy Center for a discussion of how energy dependence on the Middle East is shaping Japan’s quest for energy security, prospects for US-Japan strategic cooperation, and the future of energy security in Asia.
Japan’s newest strategic energy plan promises to address domestic structural energy issues in the context of broader shifts in global energy trends. If successful, the new strategy will deliver significant improvements in efficiency, emissions, cost, and self-sufficiency by 2030, and again by 2050. At the same time, Japan, like much of Asia, continues to depend heavily on the Middle East for hydrocarbon imports. How is energy dependence on the Middle East shaping Asian geopolitics and strategic prospects for the US-Japan alliance? How feasible are Japan’s efforts to reduce its dependence on energy imports, and what does it mean for Japan’s relationships with the Middle East? How are infrastructure projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy re-shaping energy geopolitics between both regions? Ultimately, what can the US-Japan alliance do to ensure energy security in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific?
Lunch will be provided.
Featuring:
Prof. Koichiro Tanaka, Keio University and President of the Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern Economies
Ms. Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Mikkal E. Herberg, Senior Advisor National Bureau of Asian Research
Dr. Miyeon Oh, Director and Senior Fellow of the Asia Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
8. Negotiating with China during Peacetime, Crisis and Conflict|Thursday, May 23rd|2:30pm-4pm|American Enterprise Institute|Auditorium, 1789 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
While there is no shortage of discussion about how war between the US and China could break out, few have asked how such a war might end. During crisis or conflict, how can we draw China to the negotiating table? How has China historically ended its wars, and how might this inform how the US approaches China diplomatically in peacetime, crisis, and war?
In her new book, “The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime” (Cornell University Press, 2019), Oriana Skylar Mastro asks: How can we get from fighting to talking? Join Dr. Mastro, Susan Thornton and Tom as they discuss US diplomacy with China in an era of great-power competition.
Agenda:
2:15 PM
Registration
2:30 PM
Welcome and summary of the book:
Oriana Skylar Mastro, AEI
2:45 PM
Panel discussion
Participants:
Thomas J. Christensen, Columbia University
Susan A. Thornton, Yale University
Moderator:
Oriana Skylar Mastro, AEI
3:30 PM
Q&A
4:00 PM
Adjournment
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Confusion and distrust
The Trump Administration is in a remarkable period of serial failures. Denuclearization of North Korea is going nowhere. Displacement of Venezuelan President Maduro has stalled. The tariff contest with China is escalating. Even the President’s sudden shift to backing Libyan strongman Haftar’s assault on Tripoli seems to have fizzled.
The domestic front is no better: Trump is stonewalling the House of Representatives but must know that eventually the courts will order most of what the Democratic majority is requesting be done. Special Counsel Mueller himself will eventually testify and be asked whether his documentation of obstruction of justice by the President would have led to indictment for any other perpetrator. A dozen or so other investigations continue, both by prosecutors and the House. These will include counter-intelligence investigations, which Mueller did not pursue, with enormous potential to embarrass the President and his close advisers.
The result is utter confusion in US foreign policy. Secretary of State Pompeo today postponed a meeting with President Putin and is stopping instead in Brussels to crash a meeting the UK, Germany, and France had convened to talk about how to preserve the Iran nuclear deal. This is happening on the same day that President Trump is meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, whose anti-democratic maneuvers have made him unwelcome in London, Berlin, and Paris.
Pompeo will be pitching hostility to Iran, based on the presumption that it is responsible for attacks on tankers over the weekend off the coast of Fujairah, one of the (United Arab) Emirates located outside the Gulf of Hormuz. Tehran has denounced the attacks, which may or may not indicate something. The perpetrators are unknown. While concerned about the attacks, the Europeans will want the US to tone down the hostility towards Iran, with which they want to maintain the nuclear deal from which the US has withdrawn.
Germany is likely to be particularly annoyed with the Americans, not least because Pompeo last week canceled at the last minute a scheduled meeting with Chancellor Merkel in order to go to Iraq, where he failed to convince Baghdad to join the sanctions against Iran. She has become the strongest defender of liberal democracy and the rules-based international order that President Trump has so noisily and carelessly abandoned, while at the same time displeasing the US Administration by continuing the Nord Stream 2 natural gas deal with Russia.
In diplomacy, holding on to your friends is important. Washington under Trump has elected not to accommodate the more powerful Europeans and Iraq but rather to support the would-be autocrats in Hungary and Poland, as well as the Brexiteers in the UK and the Greater Israel campaigners who also advocate war with Iran. All of this was completely unnecessary, since it would have been possible to pursue additional agreements with Iran on regional and other issues without exiting the nuclear deal.
The Administration has thrown away the friends it needs and acquired a few it does not. It has lost the key Europeans and has nothing whatsoever to show for it. It has gotten nowhere with Putin, despite the President’s obsequious fawning. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are both crying foul about the tanker attacks, are unreliable. They have been known to purvey fake news in the past (especially in initiating their conflict with Qatar), so might they be doing so again?
The result is monumental confusion and distrust. America’s friends are offended. Her enemies are encouraged. Elections have consequences.
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It’s all about him
Rarely has an Administration compiled a clearer record of losing than this one is doing right now:
- President Trump’s best friend Kim Jong-un is busily launching short-range missiles while the US holds the door open for negotiations.
- The push to replace Venezuelan President Maduro with Interim President Guaido has stalled after several attempts.
- The “maximum pressure” policy on Iran is pushing Tehran towards restarting part of its nuclear program while alienating America’s European allies.
- The “Deal of the Century” between Palestinians and Israelis is stillborn.
- The tariff war with China is escalating.
The Administration knows only one negotiating tactic: squeezing hard to cause pain, while offering economic benefits if only the adversary will give in. Other peoples’ national pride, interests, and values are not taken into account. It is just assumed that “they” are just like us and want all the same things, mainly nice hotels.
That’s not how diplomacy works. To change an adversary’s behavior, you have to consider not your own value function but theirs. Kim Jong-un doesn’t want foreign investment or economic benefits he cannot control. Maduro isn’t interested in leaving Venezuela, even if the Americans leave him an escape route to Cuba. Iran has withstood sanctions before and will do so again. The Palestinians won’t take money instead of a state. Chinese President Xi Jinping isn’t going to weaken the Communist Party’s grip on the economy to please Donald Trump.
Of course Donald Trump will never admit defeat on any of these issues. Whatever happens, he’ll announce victory, exaggerating his own prowess and role. It really doesn’t matter what the truth of the matter is. After lots of sound and fury, Trump readily settles for half a loaf or less, as he did on the “renegotiation” of the North American Free Trade Agreement. His primary concern is not getting a good deal for America but rather ensuring that he looks strong to his domestic constituency and can count on them to go to the polls. It’s not about America. It’s all about him.
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Over the edge
Early in the Trump administration I recognized it as a radical one. By now, we can all see that there is little conservative about Trump: he has exploded the Federal deficit, attacked Federal law enforcement, appointed judges who want to reverse the decision that allowed legal abortion in the US, and avoided criticism of right-wing and racist hate groups.
In foreign policy the Trump Administration has also been radical: it supported an attempted seizure of power (I won’t call it a coup because it is arguable that Guaido is the legitimate president) in Venezuela, it has unilaterally reimposed sanctions on Iran without enlisting the support of European or Asian allies, it has supported Israel’s rejection of the two-state solution with the Palestinians, and the President himself has supported a military assault on Tripoli by a Benghazi-based warlord.
But there is another radical edge of this Administration: willingness to skirt the law. That is the main conclusion of Special Counsel Mueller’s report. He found no evidence of active cooperation between the Trump campaign and Russia, but lots of evidence that the campaign welcomed Russian interference in favor of candidate Trump. He also found lots of evidence of obstruction of justice, but declined to make a formal finding against a sitting president. Well before Mueller’s report we knew that the President was at or beyond the edge on accepting payments from foreign governments, not to mention the manifold charges of corrupt behavior against his cabinet officials, several of whom have resigned as a result.
The aborted nominations of Herman Cain and Stephen Moore to the Federal Reserve tell us more about this radical edge. Neither is even remotely qualified for the position. Both had a graveyard’s worth of skeletons in their closets. That is the sort of person Trump likes. These are people who can be relied upon to be 100% loyal and not to make noise about the Administration malfeasance. They can be blackmailed and won’t rebel. Both proved to be beyond the pale for Republicans in the Senate, but Trump had no problem with proposing such radically unqualified candidates.
Now, as I was writing this post, Trump called Russian President Putin, did not object to Russian interference in the 2016 election, and agreed with Putin that the whole thing was a hoax, contradicting both the Mueller report and the consensus of US intelligence agencies. Trump also believed Putin when he denied being interested in doing anything but positive things in Venezuela, where Russia has been backing President Maduro to the hilt while the US is trying to oust him. Trump’s refusal to back American government intelligence and policy is as close to disloyalty to the United States as was Trump’s appearance with Putin in Helsinki. Judge for yourself:
It’s over the edge for me.
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Venezuela is no Grenada
One thing seems clear: it’s not over yet in Venezuela. The Americans appear to have anticipated that the military would break with Nicolás Maduro and support Juan Guaidó’s claim to the presidency. That didn’t happen yesterday, when it was supposed to. Nor did Maduro leave the country, as Secretary of State Pompeo thought he would. John Bolton this morning is claiming that Maduro surrounded “by scorpions in a bottle,” but they haven’t bitten yet.
In the meanwhile, yesterday’s demonstrations departed at least in part from non-violence. This is both comprehensible and mistaken. Comprehensible because the police, army, and paramilitaries used violence against the demonstrators. Responding in self-defense is certainly justifiable. But it is also mistaken because violence will limit the number of people who take to the street today and also make it more difficult for the security forces to come over to the side of the demonstrators. If attacked, they will defend themselves.
The Trump Administration meanwhile is still threatening a military intervention as well as sanctions against Cuba for its support of Maduro. A military intervention would be nuts. There are no signs of preparation for it. Venezuela is a country of about 30 million people even after a couple of million have fled. A significant percentage of those are loyal to Maduro, in addition to at least part of the 2.8-million man army. Even in its current dilapidated state, that army would not welcome the US Marines with open arms. The Cubans and Russians would also be a problem. Venezuela is no Grenada, which wasn’t entirely a picnic.
A coup is of course still possible, but that won’t solve Caracas’ problems. The Venezuelan army leadership is deeply corrupted, including with drug trafficking and other organized crime activities. Armies don’t seize power in order to hand it to civilian leaders, but rather to protect themselves. A chat with Egypt’s President Sisi should be enough to convince anyone of that. The Americans will figure military rule is better than Maduro, but
Guaidó should be thinking twice before collaborating in a military takeover. He needs to the military to support him, not to seize power for itself.
The next 48 hours or so may be decisive. If Maduro can survive for that long, he has a chance of re-consolidating power. If he trembles even slightly, he could end up history. He has far more at stake than the Americans, which means he is likely to hold on tight, using brutal force if need be to show his determination. But the army has a lot at stake too. As in Algeria and Sudan, there are really three contenders for power, not just two. And Guaidó doesn’t look like the strongest of them today.
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Pompeo midway to failure
Secretary Pompeo in testimony todaycited the Administration’s foreign policy priorities:
- Countering Russia and China,
- Denuclearization of North Korea,
- Venezuela,
- Iran,
- and supporting allies and partners.
So how are they doing?
The only serious effort to counter Russia has come from the Congress, which has levied several layers of sanctions on Moscow for interference in the 2016 US election, and from the State Department, for Moscow’s murder of a defector in the United Kingdom. President Trump has still not said an unkind word about President Putin and continues to cite him as more reliable than the American intelligence community, without acknowledging Russian electoral interference.
On China, the Administration has been walking on eggshells, since it needs Beijing’s cooperation both on North Korea and on trade. There is little to no sign of a serious strategy to contain or compete with China (in anything but trade). China continues its buildup of military bases in the South China Sea, where it has also escalated its challenges to US naval vessels.
The North Korea talks are at a standstill after the failure in February of the second Kim/Trump summit in Vietnam. Trump is demanding immediate denuclearization in one step while the Pyongyang has maintained its vague commitment to a phased process whose endpoint is unclear. All those promises of Trump-like hotels are not going to convince Kim Jong-un that he should abandon his regime’s only real guarantee: its nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles.
Venezuela is grinding to a stalemate, with the Russians deploying troops there and no sign of the military defections required to seat President Guaido’ in President Maduro’s chair. A US military intervention would have to be massive and long-term. Nothing short of that seems to be working. Venezuelans are voting with their feet by leaving the country, but that does not help bring down Maduro.
Sanctions on Iran have so far had little visible impact, other than giving the Europeans an incentive to find a way to continue to expand trade with Tehran. China and Russia will also find the ways and means. The Iranian economy is a mess, not only because of sanctions. The Administration hopes to compel the Iranians back to the negotiating table or to precipitate regime change. Neither outcome is visible on the horizon. In the meanwhile, hardliners have gained strength and continue to pursue regional interventions.
Support for allies and partners is a lot easier than dealing with adversaries, but the Trump Administration has been selective about it. The ultranationalists who govern Hungary and Poland and the Brexiteers in the UK get Trump’s blessing. France, Germany and the European Union get kicked hard. Israel gets endorsement of whatever it wants (so far, recognition of Jerusalem as its capital and of the annexation of the Golan Heights, not to mention a green light for killing Gaza demonstrators), leaving crumbs for the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia gets American top cover for Mohammed bin Salman against charges that he was implicated in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
To add insult to injury, Pompeo said this about the State Department, whose budget the President has proposed to cut back by 23%:
And I take it as a personal mission to make sure that our world-class diplomatic personnel have the resources they need to execute America’s diplomacy in the 21st century.
Trump’s cuts target especially the State Department’s cooperation with the military in stabilizing conflict situations like Syria and Afghanistan, which is a required prelude to the withdrawals he has rashly announced.
I suppose I need to give Pompeo an incomplete rather than an F, since it is possible the next 22 months will provide better results than the last 26. Real diplomacy does take time. But there is precious little sign of real diplomacy on the priorities Pompeo identifies.
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