Tag: Venezuela
Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
Stevenson’s army, June 19
Politico says WH froze aid to Ukraine just before the summit. WH denies story. You decide.
WSJ says US is withdrawing significant military assets from Middle East. No denials yet.
Iranian ships no longer heading to Venezuela.
Hard-liner wins Iran presidency.
FP says France & US differ over Sahel policy.
Lawfare writer discusses legal aspects of US China sanctions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, June 11
– Russia is providing Iran with an advanced satellite.
– US is lifting some Iran sanctions, says not related to stalled negotiations.
– FP notes international law prohibits US interference with Iranian ships going to Venezuela
– House also has a compete with China bill.
-SAIS prof Mark Cancian notes surprises in Biden defense budget.
– In FT, Gillian Tett has insightful piece on the“Cornwall Consensus” on politics and economics.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, May 30
We really need to be careful about distinguishing between cyber thefts and cyber attacks as well as between criminal and governmental cyber attacks. NYT makes clear that ransomware is a criminal enterprise.
Politico says US is monitoring Iranian ships heading toward Venezuela.
Matt Yglesias has good explanation of how the Wuhan lab culpability got caught up in the media’s search for a Vovid narrative and blinded reporters to important questions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Watch this space: 10 challenges Biden wishes he didn’t have
President Biden is preoccupied with domestic issues: the economy, COVID-19, race and inequality. But of course foreign policy waits for no president.
The current picture is gloomy:
- Russia has been threatening renewed hostilities against Ukraine. Moscow is claiming it is all Kiev’s faulty, but I suspect Putin is getting nervous about improved performance of the Ukrainian Army. Perhaps he thinks it will be easier and less costly to up the ante now. Besides a new offensive would distract from his domestic problems, including that pesky political prisoner and hunger striker Alexei Navalny.
- Iran and Israel are making it difficult for the US to get back into the nuclear deal. Israel has somehow crashed the electrical supply to Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Tehran has amped up the IRGC/Supeme Leader criticism of President Rouhani, making it harder for him to ease conditions for Washington’s return to the nuclear deal. A vigorous Iranian reaction to the Israeli sabotage would make the Americans hesitate.
- Peace talks between Afghanistan and the Taliban for a transitional power-sharing government are not going well. How could they? The Taliban want an Afghanistan in which President Ghani would have no place. Ghani wants an Afghanistan in which the Taliban would have no place. Powersharing requires a minimum of mutual tolerance that appears lacking.
- North Korea is renewing its missile and nuclear threats. President Trump pretty much poisoned the diplomatic well with Pyongyang by meeting three times with Kim Jong-un without reaching a serious agreement. Kim seems to have decided he can manage without one, so long as his nuclear weapons and missiles threaten South Korea, Japan, and even the continental United States.
- China is menacing Taiwan. I doubt Beijing wants to face the kind of military defense and popular resistance an invasion would entail, but ratcheting up the threat forces Taipei to divert resources and puts an additional issue on the negotiating table with Washington, which doesn’t want to have to come to Taipei’s defense.
- Syria’s Assad is consolidating control and preparing for further pushes into Idlib or the northeast. While unquestionably stretched thin militarily and economically, Damascus no longer faces any clear and present threat to Assad’s hold on power. He hasn’t really won, but the relatively liberal opposition has definitely lost, both to him and to Islamist extremists.
- Central Americans are challenging American capacity to manage its southern border. The increase of asylum seekers, especially children, presents a quandary to the Biden Administration: shut them out as President Trump did, or let them in and suffer the domestic political consequences. Biden has put Vice President Harris in charge, but it will be some time before she can resurrect processing of asylum seekers in their home countries and also get the kind of aid flowing to them that will cut back on the economic motives for migration.
- The Houthis aren’t playing nice. America’s cut in military and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE is giving their Yemeni adversaries a chance to advance on the last remaining major population center in the north still nominally held by President Hadi’s shambolic government. If the Houthis take Marib, the consequences will be catastrophic.
- Addis Ababa isn’t either. Africa’s second most populous country, Ethiopia, has gone to war against its own Tigray region, which had defied Addis’ authority on control of the military and holding elections. The Americans want Addis to ease up and allow humanitarian assistance and media in. Ethiopia’s reforming Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy is playing rope-a-dope with the Americans and keeping up the pressure on the Tigrayans.
- You haven’t heard much about it lately, but nothing good is happening in Venezuela, where President Maduro has survived efforts to oust him and now is enjoying one of what must be at least 9 lives.
Biden deserves a lot of credit for what he is doing domestically, and he is the best versed president on foreign affairs in decades. But the international pressures are building. It is only a matter of time before one or more of these ten issues, or a half dozen others, climb to the top of his to-do list. None of them are going to be easy to handle. Watch this space.
Stevenson’s army, December 23
Today the president must veto the NDAA or it will become law without his signature. WIll he carry through on his threat? [He is supposed to fly to Florida at 4pm.]
Trump surprised his own staff by disparaging the omnibus bill and hinting at a veto, though his complaints were more about the foreign aid in the appropriations measures combined with covid relief. If he vetoes that, government will have to shut down next week.
Among his pardons, Trump included the 4 Blackwater contractors convicted of killing Iraqi civilians.
The Senate can’t organize itself and begin nomination hearings until the Georgia results are clear.
AP has numbers for the Trump legacy.
David Ignatius also believes that the Russia hack was espionage, not an act of war. Fred Kaplan has more background.
NYT says US Navy has a secret mission against Venezuela but off the coast of Africa.
Sweden considers joining NATO.
Trump wants to politicize 88% of OMB personnel.
FP details how China used stolen data to catch US spies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).