Tag: Yemen
Marching towards different wars
Both Iran and the United States are signaling escalation in the wake of the assassination of Quds force commander Qasem Soleimani. Tehran said it had identified 35 targets. President Trump responded with a tweet threat against 52:
Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats!
Both have the capability, and perhaps the will. It all sounds strikingly symmetrical.
But there the parallel ends. The wars they are contemplating are different. Iran can hit 35 US targets, but only using proxy forces in other countries or cyber attacks. The US can hit 52 sites, but only with stand-off weapons like drones and cruise missiles, in addition to cyber attacks. That I suspect makes cyber attacks less likely: the Americans presumably have the greater capability in that domain, but they also have far more to lose if the Iranians prove even marginally competent. Will Tehran care much if its citizens don’t have internet access?
Neither the US nor Iran wants a traditional ground war. The Iranians because they would lose, should the Americans deploy the kind of force they did in attacking Iraq in 2003. But that isn’t happening. The American electorate is not prepared to support that kind of effort, and the Administration has done nothing to try to mobilize it. President Trump can deploy a few thousand additional troops to the Middle East to protect American embassies and other facilities, but hundreds of thousands are not in the cards.
Trump is hoping his threats of escalation will bring Iran to the negotiating table, where he hopes to get a “better” agreement than President Obama’s nuclear deal. It’s the North Korea gambit: loud threats, some action, then hugs and kisses. If that fails, he will try a stand-off and cyber attack. If he has a game plan beyond that, he has kept it a good secret. He has so far been unwilling to loosen sanctions, which is what the Iranians want.
The Iranians are fighting on different battlefields. They may threaten proxy and cyber attacks, and even indulge in some, but their better bets are forcing the US troops out of Iraq (there is an advisory vote tomorrow on that in the Iraqi parliament) and acquiring all the material and technology they need to build nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-un got respect once he had nukes. Why shouldn’t the Supreme Leader expect the same?
Nothing about American intervention in the Middle East in the past two decades has brought much more than grief to the United States. Trillions of dollars and thousands of American deaths later, we have accomplished little. Iran has gained from the removal of arch-rival Saddam Hussein, protected its ally Bashar al Assad from insurgency, strengthened its position on Israel’s northern borders, and helped the Houthis in Yemen to harass Saudi Arabia.
President Trump had it right when he ran in 2016 on avoiding new Middle East wars and bringing American troops home. But that requires a serious strategy and commitment to diplomacy and alliances that he has been unwilling to make. Now he risks getting the Americans sent home and confronting an Iran that has nuclear capabilities. You tell me who is fighting on the right battlefield.
Peace Picks | October 21 – October 25
U.S. Policy Priorities for Afghanistan: A Conversation with U.S. Representative Mike Waltz | October 21, 2019 | 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM | Middle East Institute, 1763 N Street NW, Washington, District of Columbia 2003 | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host U.S. Representative (FL) Michael Waltz to address U.S. policy priorities for Afghanistan. In conversation with Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies at MEI, Rep. Waltz will discuss the many complicated challenges facing Afghanistan, key regional challenges to consider, and policy prescriptions given the fallout of the deal with the Taliban.
Yemen and International Humanitarian Law: Briefing from UN Experts | October 21, 2019 | 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036-2103 | Register Here
The conflict in Yemen has killed more than 90,000 Yemenis and put more than 20 million in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen (GEE) have just released a new report describing a “pervasive lack of accountability” for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. How will the latest developments in the conflict, including the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, affect the dire conditions in the country and the prospects for accountability?
Please join the Carnegie Middle East Program and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies for a briefing by the experts on their recent report. Chair Kamel Jendoubi as well as members Melissa Parke and Charles Garraway will present their findings. Yemeni human rights defender Radhya al-Mutawakel will add her perspective. Carnegie’s Michele Dunne will moderate the conversation.
This event is co-sponsored by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.
More in the Med: Revitalizing NATO’s Southern Strategy for an Era of Great Power Competition | October 22, 2019 | 3:00 PM – 4:30 PM | Atlantic Council Headquarters, 1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
Over the last 5 years, NATO has made huge strides to defend and deter against Russia in Europe’s northeast – what NATO does best. But its work in Europe’s south – in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa – continues to fall short. This is not only a missed opportunity to mitigate the real, and growing, challenges along NATO’s Mediterranean and Black Sea frontiers, such as instability, terrorism, and uncontrolled migration, together with a more aggressive Russia and rising China; neglecting the threats closest to home for southern allies also threatens the solidarity and cohesion among allies that are essential to transatlantic security in an era of intensifying great power competition.
To help reinvigorate NATO’s southern strategy for today’s environment, the Transatlantic Security Initiative is launching a new report, co-authored by Ambassador Alexander Vershbow and Lauren Speranza. The paper argues that NATO’s south is not just about projecting stability, but also defense, deterrence, and containment. It outlines specific recommendations for how to project stability better, make the south ‘the new east’ through an enhanced Southern presence, and bolster regional leadership – particularly from Italy, a key ally at the heart of NATO’s south.
Opening Remarks
Damon Wilson
Executive Vice President
Atlantic Council
Alessandro Profumo
Chief Executive Officer
Leonardo S.p.A.
Keynote Address
General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
Executive Chairman Emeritus
Atlantic Council
Discussion
Ambassador Philip Reeker
Acting Assistant Secretary of European and Eurasian Affairs
US Department of State
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
Distinguished Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Atlantic Council
Ambassador Armando Varicchio
Ambassador
Embassy of Italy to the United States
Kirsten Fontenrose
Director, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative
Atlantic Council
Moderator
Lauren Speranza
Deputy Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Atlantic Council
Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela? | October 23, 2019 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM | CSIS Headquarters | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
As the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela continues to deteriorate, a debate has risen among policymakers as to whether or not sanctions may be worsening conditions for Venezuelan citizens.
While the United States, the Lima Group, the European Union, and other like-minded nations continue to increase pressure on the regime of Nicolás Maduro with diplomatic measures such as challenging his government’s legitimacy, the question remains as to whether sanctions are an effective measure for changing the behavior of the Venezuelan regime and pushing Maduro to step down. Despite external support by Russia, Cuba, China, and a few other countries, Maduro is more alienated on the world stage than ever before. However, stiff sanctions and diplomatic isolation have not yet convinced Maduro to negotiate his exit, as his regime has proven to be resilient and adaptable.
The expert panel will assess the efficacy
of sanctions, including what is and is not working, as well as implications for
U.S. foreign policy, the energy sector, and the impact on Venezuela’s
humanitarian crisis and its struggle for democracy.
Panel Discussion Featuring:
Eric B. Lorber, Director, Financial Integrity
Network
Elizabeth
Rosenberg, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics,
and Security Program, Center for a New American Security
David
Smolansky, Coordinator of the OAS Working Group on Venezuelan
Migrants and Refugees; Former Mayor of El Hatillo, Venezuela
Francisco J.
Monaldi, Fellow, Latin American Energy Policy, Rice University
Moderated by:
Moises Rendon, Director, The Future of Venezuela Initiative; Fellow, CSIS Americas Program
The Navy in an era of great power competition | October 23, 2019 | 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM | Brookings Institution, Saul/Zilkha Room, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
America’s maritime forces are undergoing significant changes to address the realities of great power competition. Evolving technology, ongoing uncertainty about the budgetary and fiscal climate, and accelerating innovation by America’s competitors have forced the Navy and Marine Corps to adapt quickly and comprehensively to fulfill the vision laid out for them in the National Defense Strategy. Much work, though, remains to be done.
On October 23, the Brookings Institution will host Richard Spencer, the 76th secretary of the Navy, to discuss naval modernization, the budgetary environment, and the challenges posed by America’s great power rivals to America’s maritime forces. The keynote address will be followed by a discussion between Secretary Spencer and Michael E. O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy.
Partners against crime: Fighting cartels and corruption in the Americas | October 25, 2019 | 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM | AEI, 1789 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Transnational organized crime is a threat that reaches throughout the Western Hemisphere in the form of drug cartels, gangs, guerrilla groups, and crooked officials. These groups destabilize governments, spread violence, and undermine economic development. The United States relies on vital regional cooperation and partnerships to combat this threat, yet these partnerships can be disrupted by political shifts, corruption, and a lack of institutional capacity.
Please join AEI for a conversation on transnational organized crime, corruption, and the importance of regional partnerships. Attorney General of El Salvador Raúl Melara will deliver opening remarks, followed by a panel discussion with leading experts.
Panelists:
Ryan Berg, AEI
Roberto Gil Zuarth, President of the Senate of Mexico (2015–16)
Celina Realuyo, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University
Moderator:
Juan José Daboub, AEI
Stevenson’s army, September 21
Some things are clear and indisputable:
– President Trump spoke by phone with incoming Ukrainian President Zelensky on July 25.
– His private lawyer Rudy Giuliani has long been pressing Ukrainian officials to investigate activities of Joe Biden and his son Hunter in 2016.
– Someone submitted a whistleblower complaint to the Intelligence Community Inspector General on August12.
– US aid to Ukraine was not released until Sept 12, despite bipartisan pressure from Congress.
– Despite legal requirements for complaints to be shared with the intelligence committees, the administration has so far declined to do so.- It’s also worth noting that, despite Justice dept guidelines forbidding charging a sitting president with a crime, the Constitution lists “Bribery” as one of the justifications for impeachment.
What is unclear includes:
– What was said in the presidential phone conversation. Two unnamed sources are cited by the key media. WSJ, which says that Trump in that phone call said eight times that Zelensky should work with Giuliani on investigating Biden,also says Mr. Trump in the call didn’t mention a provision of U.S. aid to Ukraine, said this person, who didn’t believe Mr. Trump offered the Ukrainian president any quid pro quo for his cooperation on any investigation.
– How Congress can obtain the whistleblower complaint. Not all lawyers agree with Chairman Schiff.
While I deplore the administration’s stonewalling of this and many other requests for information, and I’m disgusted at the effort to use presidential national security authority for personal political gain, I doubt that the evidence of actual bribery will be clear and compelling, either on legal or political grounds.
In other news, the administration announced plans to send a fairly small contingent of military personnel to Saudi Arabia and UAE in response to the bombing of oil facilities. Trump called China “a threat to the world,” but labeled his trade war “a little spat” as he suggested no big deal would be made before the 2020 elections. Chinese officials also canceled their planned meetings with US farmers.
– CRS has an updated version of its report on Congress and Yemen.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Peace Picks September 16-22
1.Israeli Elections and Minority Communities|September 17, 2019|10:00 AM-11:30AM|Middle East Institute|1763 N Street NW, Washington District of Columbia 20036|Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to present a panel hosted in partnership with the Foundation for Middle East Peace and the New Israel Fund to discuss how minority rights have factored into Israeli parliamentary elections in 2019, both the first election in April and the snap elections taking place on September 17th. Like the first election, this second round of votes again systematically ignored issues facing Israel’s minority communities, including Palestinian citizens of Israel and Bedouin communities living in the Negev. This panel will discuss those issues and examine how Israel’s major political parties and its leaders have treated minority communities on the campaign trail.
This event is part of the George and Rhonda Salem Family Foundation Lecture Series.
Co-sponsor:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to sponsor this event in conjunction with the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP).
Featuring:
Ayesha Ziadna is the Director of Sabeel Leadership Institute of the Arab-Jewish Center for Empowerment, Equality, and Cooperation Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Economic Development (AJEEC NISPED)
Tal Avrech joined the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality (NCF) in 2018 and is currently responsible for international relations and NCF’s head researcher
Harry Reis is the Director for Policy and Strategy at the New Israel Fund
Lara Friedman (moderator) is the President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP)
2.Future Projections for the Middle East: Game Changers for 2030 and Beyond|September 19, 2019|9:00 AM-2:15 PM|Middle East Institute|1763 N Street NW, Washington District of Columbia 20036|Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a conference on future projections for the Middle East, assessing projected trends, drives, policy responses, and future challenges for the MENA region in 2030 and beyond.
Agenda
9:00–9:15 AM | Welcoming Remarks and Overview of the Day
Paul Salem President, MEI
Amb. Gerald Feierstein Senior vice president, MEI
9:15-9:45AM | Keynote Address: Trends in Tech, Cyber, Security and their Repercussions in the Middle East
Richard A. Clarke Chairman, MEI Board of Governors
9:45AM-10:55AM | Panel I: The MENA Region in 2030: Trends and Trajectories
This interactive panel will examine the forces over the next 10-15 years that will cause/drive the greatest change in the region. How do we foresee some of these forces influencing each other, accelerating, slowing, and shaping change? What projections can we make of things likely to be significantly different in the region in 2030?
Elhum Haghighat Professor and chair, Department of Political Science, City University of New York
Amal Kandeel Director, Climate Change and Environment Program, MEI
Josh Kerbel Research faculty, National Intelligence University
Paul Salem President, MEI
Steven Kenney (moderator) Founder and principal, Foresight Vector LLC
10:55AM-11:15AM | Coffee Break
11:15AM-11:45AM | Remarks:
His Excellency Dr. Thani Ahmed Al Zeyoudi Minister of Climate Change and Environment, United Arab Emirates
11:45AM-12:55PM | Panel II: Policy Responses to Future Challenges
This discussion will focus on policy areas that will reflect the greatest change in 2030 relative to today. What social-cultural, technological, or other forces will force enable major changes in policies affecting/governing the region? How will policymaking/policymakers address the interrelationships between issue areas?
Ferid Belhaj Vice president, Middle East and North Africa, World Bank
Laila Iskandar Former Minister of Environment, Egypt
Ruba Husari Scholar, MEI
Michael Nagata Former director of Strategic Operational Planning, National Counterterrorism Center
Ambassador (ret.) Gerald Feierstein Senior Vice President, MEI
Patrick Tucker (moderator) Technology editor, Defense One
12:55-1:30 | Lunch Buffet
3.Washington Humanitarian Forum|September 19, 2019|8:30 AM-3:30 PM|Center for Strategic and International Studies| 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
The CSIS Humanitarian Agenda is hosting the first annual Washington Humanitarian Forum on September 19th, 2019. This full-day conference will focus on humanitarian challenges that sit at the intersection of United States national security and foreign policy priorities. This year’s theme is Unlocking Humanitarian Access – Opportunities for U.S. Leadership.
The Washington Humanitarian Forum will include the launch of a report produced by the CSIS Task Force on Humanitarian Access. The Task Force, co-chaired by Senator Todd Young (R-IN) and Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ), looked at ways in which denial, delay, and diversion prevents humanitarian assistance from reaching the most vulnerable populations, and vice versa, in conflict-affected areas. The Task Force report analyzes challenges in priority countries for the United States and includes recommendations for how United States leadership can mitigate the most pressing access challenges.
AGENDA
8:00 a.m. – 8:30 a.m. | Check-in and Coffee Networking
8:30 a.m. – 9:15 a.m. | Opening Plenary
- Video Address: Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Senator Todd Young (R-IN)
- Introductions: J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center, CSIS
- Opening Keynote: Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- Moderator: Kimberly Flowers, Director, Humanitarian Agenda & Global Food Security Projects, CSIS
9:15 a.m. – 10:15 a.m. | Task Force Report Launch
- Ambassador Ertharin Cousin, former Executive Director, UN World Food Programme
- Patricia McIlreavy, Vice President for Policy and Practice, InterAction
- Dr. Paul B. Spiegel, Director, Center for Humanitarian Health, Johns Hopkins University
- Anne Witkowsky, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense
- Moderator: Kimberly Flowers, Director, Humanitarian Agenda and Global Food Security Project, CSIS
10:15 a.m. – 10:30 a.m. | Networking Coffee Break
10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. | Morning Breakout Panels
The Humanitarian Implications of Cyber Conflict
- Colonel Gary Corn, Director and Adjunct Professor, Washington College of Law, American University
- Shanthi Kalathil, Senior Director, International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy
- Moderator: James Andrew Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Technology Policy Program, CSIS
- Dr. Aisha Jumaan, Founder and President, Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation
- Peter Salisbury, Consulting Senior Analyst on Yemen, International Crisis Group
- Sheba Crocker, Vice President for Humanitarian Policy and Practice, CARE
- Moderator: Jon Alterman, Senior Vice President, Zbiegniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program, CSIS
Access in the Hot Zone: Navigating the DRC Ebola Outbreak
- Admiral Tim Ziemer, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID
- Ella Watson-Stryker, Humanitarian Representative, Médecins Sans Frontières
- Jeremy Konyndyk, Senior Policy Fellow, Center for Global Development
- Moderator: J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center, CSIS
12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. | Lunch
1:00 p.m. – 2:30 p.m. | Afternoon Breakout Panels
The Growing Humanitarian Access Challenge in Eastern Ukraine
- Alexander Hug, Former Deputy Chief Monitor, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- Melinda Haring, Editor, UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council
- Margot Ellis, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Europe and Eurasia, USAID
- Moderator: Heather Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, CSIS
Rethinking Nigeria’s Response to the Boko Haram Crisis
- Brandon Kendhammer, Associate Professor of Political Science, Ohio University
- Fati Abubakar, Documentary photographer and Public Health Worker
- Ambassador Alex Laskaris, former Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Engagement, U.S. Africa Command
- Dafna Hochman Rand, Vice President for Policy and Research, Mercy Corps
- Moderator: Judd Devermont, Director, Africa Program, CSIS
A New Age of Humanitarian Reporting?
- Heba Aly, Director, The New Humanitarian
- Arwa Damon, Senior International Correspondent, CNN
- Sherine Tadros, Head of New York Office & UN Representative, Amnesty International
- Moderator: Jacob Kurtzer, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Humanitarian Agenda, CSIS
2:30 p.m. – 2:45 p.m. | Networking Coffee Break
2:45 p.m. – 3:30 p.m. | Closing Remarks
- Closing Keynote: Jan Egeland, Secretary General, Norwegian Refugee Council
- Moderator: Kimberly Flowers, Director, Humanitarian Agenda & Global Food Security Project, CSIS
4. Competitive Security Dynamics in Southern Asia: Conflicts, Challenges, and Choices|September 19, 2019|9:00AM-11:30AM| The Stimson Center|1211 Connecticut Ave, NW, 8th Floor Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
The past six months have seen major disruptions in stability across southern Asia. As tensions in Kashmir continue to simmer, a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan is up for debate, and nationalist discourses gain traction in the region, all eyes are on the strategic dynamics in Southern Asia. This year–the 20th anniversary of the Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan–provides a natural point for reflection, particularly in light of the ripple effects of the February 2019 Balakot airstrikes. What lessons can we learn from the history of southern Asian crises and how are emerging regional dynamics likely to shape future scenarios going forward?
Featuring:
Lt. General (ret.) Waheed Arshad, Former Chief of General Staff, Pakistan Army
Suhasini Haidar, Diplomatic Editor, The Hindu Newspaper
Nasim Zehra, author of From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan
Vice Admiral (ret.) Vijay Shankar, Distinguished Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
Rabia Akhtar, Assistant Professor and Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, University of Lahore
5. What’s Next for Libya|September 19, 2019 9:00AM-10:30AM|Brookings Institution|Falk Auditorium, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20036|Register Here
The past year has seen no end to the turbulence plaguing Libya since the ouster of Moammar al-Gadhafi in 2011, with armed factions vying for control of the country’s strategic assets and United Nations-facilitated negotiations leading nowhere. While the self-styled Libyan National Army of General Khalifa Haftar continues, unsuccessfully, to try to take over the country militarily, the internationally-recognized government of Prime Minister Fayez Serraj in Tripoli, propped up by militias opposed to Haftar, retains control over major institutions and sources of national wealth. Weapons of increasing sophistication and lethality are flowing to the opposing sides, in violation of U.N. sanctions and pitting foreign powers against each other, with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt (with French support) backing Haftar, and Turkey and Qatar backing Serraj.
Meanwhile, facing a stagnant economy and constant threats to infrastructure, the Libyan people are caught in the crossfire of this protracted jockeying. Unchecked migration and the threat of extremist groups taking hold in the country’s contested spaces likewise make Libya’s internal situation a security concern for Europe and the United States. Solving the civil war in Libya would restore needed stability to a strategically vital part of northern Africa while laying the groundwork for the prosperity of the Libyan people.
On September 19, the Brookings Institution will hold an event on the state of affairs in Libya. Questions from the audience will follow the panelists’ conversation.
Featuring
- Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy
- Jeffrey Feltman, Brookings John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy
- Frederic Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
- Giovanna de Maio, Center on the United States and Europe Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy
- Karim Mezran, The Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
6. Red Sea Rivalries: Middle East Competition in the Horn of Africa|September 20, 2019|10:30AM-12:00PM|United States Institute of Peace|2301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20037|Register Here
A new geopolitical paradigm is emerging in the Horn of Africa: Middle Eastern states are playing an increasingly assertive role throughout the region. As Sudan and Ethiopia undergo their most significant political transitions since the Cold War—affecting the future of nearly 150 million people—the jostling for dominance among the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Turkey and Qatar, on the other, is fueling instability and insecurity in an already fractious region.
As part of the U.S. Institute of Peace’s ongoing “Red Sea Rising” multi-track initiative, please join us for the release of the International Crisis Group’s forthcoming report unpacking the regional goals, motivations, and often conflicting aims of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.
The report, based on conversations with senior officials on both sides of the Red Sea, examines how outside forces are jockeying to build political influence and carve out pivotal positions in the Horn of Africa’s emerging economy. At this historic juncture for the region, Crisis Group researchers will present the report’s main findings, followed by a panel discussion with experts from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Join the conversation with #RedSeaRisingUSIP.
Speakers
Amb. Johnnie Carson, opening remarks, Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace
Robert Malley, opening remarks, President and CEO, International Crisis Group
Elizabeth Dickinson, presenter, Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula, International Crisis Group
Dino Mahtani, presenter, Deputy Director, Africa Program, International Crisis Group
Payton Knopf, moderator, Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace
The time is ripe
When adversaries square off, as the US and Iran have done in recent weeks, they sometimes reach a point at which they think escalating to violence can get them no more than what they hope to get at the negotiating table. If both reach that point within the same time frame, talking becomes a serious alternative to escalating. That is the “ripe” moment at which it is worth considering whether there is a “way out” that will do better for both than resorting to violence.
President Trump has reached his ripe moment. He is saying he is ready to meet with Iran to discuss one subject: nuclear weapons. He has dropped Secretary of State Pompeo’s 12 preconditions, he has forgotten about Iran’s missiles as well as its involvement in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Iraq, and he called off military retaliation against Iran for its shoot-down of an American drone. He even tried to given Tehran an “out” by suggesting the downing of the drone was not properly authorized. The man is begging for negotiations with Iran.
The Iranians are hesitating, for several reasons. They want the US back in the nuclear deal and the associated relief from sanctions before talking to Washington. Tehran knows that Trump is erratic and doesn’t want to be the next victim of his decisionmaking. The Iranians may also believe that they can continue to “bleed” the Americans with little risk of retaliation, because they know neither the US public nor the Congress is prepared to sustain a new war in the Middle East. There will also be some in Tehran, especially the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, that want to continue expanding the nuclear program, with a view to eviscerating the nuclear agreement even if Iran doesn’t formally withdraw from it.
My sense though is that the time is ripe for at least clandestine talks between Iran and the US, likely focused initially not on the nuclear deal but rather on release of prisoners. That accomplished, with more or less simultaneous but unilateral releases, the adversaries could proceed on to other matters, including some relief from sanctions while talks continue. That will be a requirement for the Iranians. The Europeans would certainly appreciate loosening of sanctions, as would the Chinese, Turks, Iraqis and many others. Getting them to support Washington in any future nuclear negotiation should be a high priority for Trump. They won’t do it while the sanctions continue to make their trade and investment impossible.
The Iranians will fear that any negotiation will have to tighten the nuclear agreement, or extend it. But they have surely seen how incapable of negotiating any serious agreement the Trump administration is. The renegotiation of the South Korea free trade pact generated little. The NAFTA negotiation produced a modest update. The North Korea negotiations have produced nothing. President Obama had as one of his chief negotiators a Nobel-prize winning physicist who was then Secretary of Energy. Trump’s Secretary of Energy wouldn’t know a nuclear reactor from a coal-burning plant.
Tehran should also understand that there are only a very few serious US objections the the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). First is that it didn’t cover missiles or Iran’s regional interventions. Those issues are going to require a long conversation, and President Trump has dropped them from the agenda, at least for now. Even if started tomorrow, talks on missile and regional issues are unlikely to be completed before the next US election, when Tehran certainly hopes to see elected a more reliable, even if no more friendly, president.
Second is that the JCPOA “sunset,” or ended, at various times in the next decade or more. That too is a conversation that could drag on, but there may be some relatively easy pickings in that department. Iran has good reason to make it clear to Israel and Europe, its two most concerned neighbors, that nuclear weapons are not its objective, even in the long term. Israel has first strike capabilities that make a nuclear Iran a dangerous place to live. Europe is an important trade and investment partner with potential to enormously ease Iran’s desperate economic situation.
All that Trump really needs from Iran in the short term is to rename and extend the JCPOA so that he can claim proprietary rights. The technical aspects are likely to remain unrevised. As Evelyn Farkas suggests, the Trump/Iran Nuclear Adjustment (TINA) need be no more than a JCPOA 2.0. US sanctions might stay in place during talks, but their application to third countries would have to be at least suspended. The Iranians are serious people and will understandably hesitate to be sucked in to an agreement with a notoriously unreliable negotiating partner. But when the moment is ripe and the way out is better than war, it is a mistake to pass up the opportunity.
The Yemeni quagmire
Hudson Institute held a panel discussion April 18 about the crisis in Yemen and its strategic threat to US interests and allies. The panel included Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, Fatima Abo Alasrar, Senior Analyst at Arabia Foundation, Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.
Haykel gave an overview about the Houthis (who call themselves Ansar Allah), a group belonging to a particular caste of Yemeni society who ruled the country for a thousand years. Before rising again in 2000, They were marginalized since the late 1960s and displaced in 1992 with the revolution. Hussein El Houthi, founder of the group is influenced by Iranian ideology and draws inspiration from Ayatollah Khomeini. El Houthi and the Supreme Leader share the view that the US and Israel are enemies of Yemen, the Arabs, and Islam. This ideological connection was cemented from the middle of 1990s between the Zaydis (a Shia sect which the Houthis belong to) and Lebanese Hezbollah, which provided military, ideological and media training.
Although a small group in Yemen, the Houthis are the most disciplined, best trained and most ideologically motivated group. They are unlikely to be defeated military. Haykel urges that other ways of dealing with Houthis be conceived. Yemen, a poor country, has never been integrated into the labor market of the Gulf. A broad strategy that encompasses development and socioeconomic elements is needed. But Riyadh is not going to be easily convinced to end the war because the Saudis see the Houthis as a Hezbollah-like force on their southern border.
Alasrar argues that neither a military solution nor a political one has worked so far in Yemen. Incentives for the Houthis to come to the table are insufficient. Even when they do negotiate, they are not sincere, due in large part to the ideological alignment with Hezbollah and Iran. The Houthis are likely to remain the de facto authority on the ground given the reluctance of the international community to solve this issue military or politically. The Houthi’s core belief is legitimacy through force. Yemen’s future is therefore bleak. ,
But Alasrar also argues that many in Yemen recognize that the state marginalized the Houthis. Younger Yemenis would like to see a political reconciliation process to help the Houthis become a legitimate political actor. The Houthis did not subscribe to the national reconciliation process conducted in the aftermath of Yemen’s “Arab Spring.” They seized power easily at a vulnerable time when the transitional government after had no army. Weapons and ballistic misled smuggled to Houthis created a means for Iran to attack Saudi Arabia.
Doran stated that the US as a super power has to create a stable regional order in the Middle East. The Khashoggi murder was immoral and ugly, but the campaign to shift US policy on Saudi Arabia is wrong. Its roots lie in President Obama’s outreach to Iran, which he hoped would become a partner in establishing regional stability, which meant down-grading US relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. There are only two American allies who are contesting Iranians on the ground: Israelis in Syria and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The argument that Mohammed bin Salman is unacceptable morally does not mean US should end its support for the Yemen war, which would weaken Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis Iran and leave a Hizbollah-like force on the Red Sea threatening shipping and hitting Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles. Ending support to Saudi Arabia is not going to improve the Yemen situation or get the Iranians out.