Tag: Yemen
Don’t forget Hezbollah
Here is the draft of the State Department dissent message on Syria, on which the New York Times based its coverage yesterday. So far as I can tell the final version is not publicly available, but this draft is polished. The argument is basically that the US has sufficient moral and strategic reason to attack Syrian government forces with stand-off weapons with the goal of getting President Asad to abide by the internationally mandated cessation of hostilities and initiate serious negotiations on a political transition, as required by the Geneva I communique and numerous subsequent international decisions. The dissent memo admits some downsides: a deterioration of relations with Russia and possible “second order” effects.
Those downsides require more consideration. There is no international mandate to attack Syrian government forces. Intervention in this case would in that sense have even less multilateral sanction than the NATO attack on Qaddafi’s forces in Libya, where there was a UN Security Council mandate, albeit one that authorized “all necessary means” to save civilians rather than to change the regime. Asad has not directly attacked the US, even if his reaction to Syria’s internal rebellion has created conditions that are inimical to US interests by attracting extremists and undermining stability in neighboring countries.
The Russia angle is also daunting. Moscow may well react by intensifying its attacks on the opposition forces the US supports, who are already targeted by Russian warplanes. Unilateral US intervention against Syrian government forces would also help Moscow to argue it is doing no worse in Ukraine, where it supports opposition forces behind a thin veil of denials that its forces are directly involved. The US is not ready to respond in kind to Russian escalation in Ukraine, if only because the European allies would not want it. Kiev might be the unintended victim of US escalation in Syria.
Second order effects could also include loss of European, Turkish and Jordanian support, because of an increased refugee flow out of Syria, as well as increased Iranian support for the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, destabilization of Bahrain and Shia militias in Iraq. Greater chaos in Syria could also help ISIS to revive its flagging fortunes and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra to pursue its fight against the Syrian government.
These downsides are all too real, but so is the current situation: Russia, the Syrian government, Iran and Hezbollah are making mincemeat of the US-supported Syrian opposition while more extremist forces are gaining momentum. President Obama is reluctant to attack sovereign states that have not attacked the US directly without an international mandate of some sort. That is understandable. But doing nothing military to respond to a deteriorating situation is a decision too, one with real and unfortunately burgeoning negative consequences for US interests.
Hezbollah is the way out of this quandary. It is not a state. It is a designated terrorist group that has killed hundreds of Americans, and many others as well. The Americans say they are fighting terrorist groups in Syria. Why not Hezbollah? Its ground forces there have become increasingly important to the Syrian government’s cause. Getting Hezbollah out of the fight would arguably have as much impact on the military balance as strikes on the Syrian army, which is already a declining and demoralized force.
Washington need not start with military action. It could lead with diplomacy, telling Moscow and Tehran that we want Hezbollah to leave Syria tout de suite. If it fails to leave by a date certain, we could then strip it of its immunity and treat it like the other terrorist groups in Syria. Moscow might even welcome such a move, since Hezbollah efforts in Syria strengthen Iran’s hold, not Russia’s.
Tehran would be furious, claiming Hezbollah is in Syria at the request of its legitimate government. Hezbollah would likely try to strike US, Israeli or even Jewish targets in the region or beyond. It has managed in the past to murder Jews as far away as Argentina. Doing so would confirm the thesis that Hezbollah is a terrorist group and redouble the need to act decisively against it.
No suggestions for what to do or not do in Syria are simple. The situation has gotten so fraught that any proposition will have complicated and unpredictable consequences. But the State Department dissenters missed an opportunity to duck some of the President’s objections and strengthen their own argument by focusing on a terrorist group, rather than the regime’s own forces. Don’t forget Hezbollah.
Fight and muddle
It took longer than anticipated, but it appears now that the cessation of hostilities in Syria is ending, mainly due to regime attacks on relatively moderate opposition forces in the center of the country. Fighting has also erupted in the far northeast, where Kurdish and regime forces had long divided the turf between them but are now going after each other.
The opposition’s High Negotiation Council has been leaving the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva, disappointed that in the minimal progress on humanitarian access and release of detainees, as well as the regime’s refusal to discuss political transition. I suspect they stayed long enough to avoid any American backlash, but we’ll have to wait and see. Technical level talks on some issues are said to be proceeding.
On the regime side, President Assad is feeling strong in the aftermath of Russia’s fall offensive, which succeeded in preventing the opposition from reaching the Alawite heartland it was aiming for. Both Moscow and Tehran have now doubled down on their support for Assad. No matter how often they deny being wedded to him, neither Russia nor Iran can hope for a successor regime even half as friendly to their interests as he has been. They know they are cooked in the long term if Syria becomes even remotely democratic, as the substantial Sunni majority will no doubt remember what they’ve done and seek eventually to exclude them from any substantial influence in the country.
What this amounts to for the US is a short term loss even if it can hope for a long term gain. The cessation of hostilities worked mainly by reducing Russian and regime attacks, which this fall were responsible for most of the violence, and freed the relatively moderate opposition to do what the Americans have long wanted them to do: attack the Islamic State (ISIS). They were somewhat successful, especially in northern Syria but also in the south. That was good news for Washington. So too were the demonstrations that broke out in some cities against Jabhat al Nusra, Syria’s Qaeda affiliate.
Now the big question is whether the Americans have done what is normally done during a cessation of hostilities: prepared its Syrian allies for the renewal of violence. If the relatively moderate opposition has been strengthened, it will be difficult for the regime to make further progress or even hold the territory the Russian offensive helped it to gain. Particularly important is whether the opposition has acquired antiaircraft weapons, which could tilt the military balance against the regime even if the still active Russians remain relatively unscathed. The regime uses vulnerable helicopters to drop so-called “barrel bombs,” which devastate civilian areas.
The situation in the region remains tense and confused. Turkey continues to be more concerned with countering the Syrian Kurds (as well as their own) than with fighting the Islamic State. Saudi Arabia still seems more focused on its support for what it considers the legitimate government in Yemen rather than support for the Syrian opposition or the fight against ISIS. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu took the opportunity of a cabinet meeting held on the Golan Heights to declare that they would never be returned to Syria, thus undermining the rapprochement between Israel and the Sunni Arab states even more than Israel’s growing cooperation with Russia.
President Obama remains determined to minimize American exposure in Syria and the Middle East generally, even as he beefs up aid and advising to both Baghdad’s security forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Iraq, where the jabber about an impending assault on Mosul belies the shortcomings of the Iraqi army. If his meeting with Gulf states this week produced a new approach in Syria or Iraq, it has not yet become apparent. Washington seems resigned to muddling through until the January end of this administration, when more likely than not Hillary Clinton will begin to serve Obama’s third term. She will then have to decide whether to follow through on her pledges to take greater risks in Syria not only against ISIS but also against Assad by imposing a no-fly zone over part of the country.
Syria frays, Libya wobbles, Yemen improves
The Middle East and North Africa have become difficult to follow without a scorecard. Here is a quick update:
In Syria, the ceasefire appears to be unraveling. The rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra made gains this week in ceasefire territory. This opposition group extended their territorial holds in Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia provinces. This new offensive, though limited in extent, takes back some of the territory the Syrian regime grabbed during the Russian airstrike campaign in early 2016. Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliated group, was not a part of the ceasefire agreement, but other rebel groups, such as Jaish al-Islam, have collaborated with them. This poses a threat to the ceasefire holding and the next round of peace talks, planned for April 13.
Even though the opposition has taken back some territory, the regime still holds the upper hand at the negotiating table. The Russian-backed offensive and support allows Assad to keep his seat as the head of the regime. Russia does appear to want a peaceful solution to the crisis and proved so with the partial withdrawal of troops in Syria. The opposition says it wants a compromise, but they are not willing to compromise with their demand that Assad should be removed from power. The regime has spoken of a more inclusive government, but only with Assad as the leader. How successful this next round of peace talks will be is questionable. Neither side wants to compromise Assad’s position. His position is integral to both sides’ approach in achieving a peaceful solution.
The situation in Libya seemed to improve last week and the beginning of this week as the new unity government arrived in Tripoli. The UN-backed government faced competition from rivals in Tripoli and Tobruk. It seemed that the government in Tripoli was prepared to step down until Prime Minister Khalifa Ghweil declared otherwise. The eastern Tobruk government has not voted to formally recognize the unity government. This recognition is essential in order to “establish legitimacy.”
The new unity government will have to face the challenge of garnering support from the militias that backed the rival Tripoli government in the past. Though unity government Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj does not want to suggest that he needs this militia support, in fact it is imperative to gain the backing of these groups in order to implement real change and lessen the violence in Libya.
In Yemen, Saudi-led airstrikes on civilians continued in March. The Mastaba market incident left 120 dead on March 15. Peace talks on Yemen have been agreed upon, though, and this will hopefully lessen the impact of violence against civilians. The Houthis and President Hadi’s delegation will meet in Kuwait on April 18.
Recently President Hadi fired and appointed a new vice president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and prime minister, Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, to his government. The new vice president is a key army general. The Hadi camp thinks this move will strengthen it at the peace talks. Defrocked Vice President Khaled Bahah thinks the move will be detrimental and detract from Hadi’s legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the situation in Yemen looks more positive, as both sides have agreed on a ceasefire, implemented on April 10. The city of Taiz, home to 200,000 civilians, will be the key testing ground.
The Syrian ceasefire agreement is fraying, the new unity government in Libya is wobbling, and Yemen’s situation going into peace talks looks a bit better.
The Yemen quagmire
Christina Ma, a SAIS student, reports:
The panelists of the MEI- and SAIS- sponsored “Yemen Quagmire,” held Friday, featured Charles Schmitz (Middle East Institute), Amat Alsoswa (former Yemeni Cabinet Member), Leslie Campbell (National Democratic Institute), and Andrew Plitt (USAID). Kate Seelye (Middle East Institute) moderated the discussion on the conflict in Yemen, the humanitarian crisis, and prospects for peace talks.
Schmitz underlined that the grievances generating the conflict are not just between the Houthis and the state, but more broadly between the Northerners and the central government. No political force on either side of the conflict has a coherent vision or ability to settle the war. Yemen may be in for a “long, slow grind.” Poverty is a huge issue; the groups that can pay their forces will be more likely to attract supporters.
Regarding international involvement, Schmitz said the Saudi air campaign has been a disaster. The blockade has also greatly affected the population. Insurgent forces are still capturing strategic cities and becoming involved with oil smuggling, despite efforts by the Coalition. The role of Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda could further complicate the conflict.
Alsoswa described the escalation of the conflict since “Operation Restoring Hope” began ten months ago in April 2015. She illustrated the gravity of the humanitarian crisis using recent UN statistics. For example, 82% of the population is estimated to seek aid, there is an absence of medical and other basic necessities, and 33% of people have not been able to receive any aid. Humanitarian actors on the ground (for example, MSF) have been limited in their ability to serve the population due to the insecure environment, in some cases, even being targets of violence. Many southerners have been fleeing to the north, especially Sana’a. In addition, there are threats from Islamist groups such as Daesh and Al-Qaeda seeking inroads, as well as the threat of spillover to nearby countries Saudi Arabia and Oman.
The first and most immediate challenge to peace is overcoming the humanitarian crisis, Alsoswa said. Poverty has been exacerbated, governance has collapsed, private economic activity has broken down due to the insecure environment and the blockade, and oil production has halted. In Sana’a, looting and destruction of cultural heritage sites is increasingly problematic.
Plitt described the Yemeni humanitarian crisis as one of the more dire that has flown under the radar. Many parts of the country were already food insecure before the war. After the conflict escalated, the south and west have entered emergency states and are one step away from famine. The economic outlook is grim. The government is facing a budget crisis—foreign reserves are nearly depleted. Government salaries and social service payments have not been dispersed. One relatively positive note is that around 70% of schools in areas less affected by the conflict have been able to remain open. A major impediment to peace is that even if a ceasefire is achieved, can it be enforced on the ground?
Campbell said that many of the political fault lines and competitions for power prior to the conflict remain the same. The Iranian and Saudi interference masks the pressures driving the conflict, but they should not be overlooked. Northerners have historically tried to win more autonomy, power-sharing, and resource sharing. The center opposes these demands. The South also has had secession movements and critically possesses the country’s oil resources.
Alluding to a “fatal flaw” in the 2013 National Dialogue, Campbell noted that the conference discussed many of the simpler issues but the bigger issues that underlay the conflict, such as federalism, were evaded. The President picked the southern delegates, who did not truly represent the interests of the South. While the outcome suited the agenda of the people in the center, groups vying for devolution, such as the Houthis, were dissatisfied with the outcome and furthermore perceived that the agreement would be imposed on them by the international community. Former President Saleh remains a troublemaker and spoiler.
Campbell recommends that dialogues and negotiations must be broader and keep the core issues are on the table. Otherwise, the groups have no incentive to negotiate and will continue fighting. Alsoswa adds that one cannot just rely on the parties of war to create peace. Third parties play an important role by enforcing peace on the ground.
In the Q&A, Campbell noted that Saleh is a skilled politician but escaped punishment. The international community has not yet found a way to deal with impunity. Schmitz suggested that the comparison of the Houthis to Hezbollah is inaccurate because Iran has less control over the Houthis, who presented an opportunity for Iran to play on the regional narrative of “oppressed Shiites.” But Iran does not direct their actions.
On the role of the US, the panelists noted that Washington has been reluctant to get involved because of its alliance with Riyadh, but recently has strengthened messages. Saudi and US interests are not necessarily aligned. Refugees are a big issue because Yemenis cannot seek refuge in neighboring countries. Businesses could potentially play a critical role in post-conflict reconstruction by helping revive the economy.
The underlying issues related to economic, resource, and political inequality that are not being resolved. The economic and humanitarian situation in Yemen is dire. Overall, the outlook on Yemen remains grim.
Peace picks February 8-12
- The Syrian refugee crisis and the United States | Monday, February 8th | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino have stoked fears among some Americans regarding the possible entry of Syrian refugees into the United States. Concerns exist that, along with refugees, members of the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations might enter the country and carry out attacks against the U.S. homeland. These fears, coupled with often vitriolic political rhetoric, have alarmed American Muslims. What is the true level of danger refugees pose? How can the United States best contribute to managing the Syrian refugee problem? Given the 2016 presidential elections, what options are politically viable? On February 8, the Center for Middle East Policy and the Governance Studies program at Brookings will host a discussion on the U.S. role in addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. The panel will include Elizabeth Ferris and William Galston of Brookings, experts on refugee resettlement and U.S. politics respectively, as well as Robert McKenzie, a new Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World visiting fellow whose research focuses on Muslim communities in the West. Daniel Byman, Senior Fellow and Research Director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the panel. Following the discussion, the panelists will take audience questions. This discussion is part of a series of Foreign Policy at Brookings events focusing on the refugee crisis and the U.S. and international community’s response.
- Cross-Straits Series: Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? | Tuesday, February 9th | 12:30-2:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Taiwan’s elections on January 16 resulted in both its new president and, for the first time, a majority of legislators being from pro-independence parties. This has raised concerns about how Beijing will react. The official China Daily stated after the election that if president-elect Tsai Ing-wen does not accept that Taiwan is part of China, she will be leading Taiwan in the direction of “conflicts and tension.” Underscoring the point, the mainland military recently conducted amphibious landing exercises along its coast opposite Taiwan. Would China actually use force against Taiwan? And under what circumstances? What are the current capabilities of China’s military? Does it have the ability to force Taiwan to unify with the mainland? This Atlantic Council event is part of the Cross-Straits Series of the Brent Scowcroft Center’s Asia Security Initiative, which examines strategic and current affairs surrounding cross-straits relations. Speakers include Roger Cliff, Atlantic Council Nonresident Senior Fellow, Tiffany Ma, Director of Political and Security Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research, and Thomas L. McNaugher, professor at Georgetown University. The moderator is Shannon Tiezzi, Managing Editor of The Diplomat.
- Inside the Iran Negotiations: A Conversation with Chief Negotiator Wendy Sherman | Tuesday, February 9th | 4:00-5:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | What was it like to be inside the room during the roller coaster saga of the historic nuclear deal with Iran? What role did personal relationships and domestic politics play in this landmark accord? What were the key moments that made success possible or could have threatened the deal? And what lessons can be learned from U.S.-Iranian negotiations? Join us for an extraordinary event as Chief U.S. Negotiator Ambassador Wendy Sherman takes us inside the room for an intimate look at the personalities, politics and negotiating dynamics that defined the nuclear agreement. Wendy Sherman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, and Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic Relations at the Wilson Center, will also speak.
- Inside the Sieges: The Scope and Implications of Besieged Syria | Wednesday, February 10th | 11:30-1:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The images of emaciated children in the besieged Syrian town of Madaya drew international attention in January 2016. Meanwhile, the opposition Syrian High Negotiations Committee’s unanswered demand for lifting of sieges, as stipulated in UN Security Council resolution 2254, threatens to derail Syria peace talks in Geneva. Key international leaders’ calls for implementation of the resolution, aimed at ending the violence, have not resulted in access to besieged areas. On February 10, 2016, please join the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East for a discussion on the scope, scale, and policy implications of the ongoing siege crisis. Mohamed Katoub will share his experiences as a dentist and medical worker from the besieged Damascus suburb of Douma. Valerie Szybala will present the findings of the newly released Siege Watch report that indicates there are well over 1 million Syrians under siege in Syria, and that the Syrian government and its allies are the main parties besieging civilian populations. Jan Jaap van Oosterzee will examine the implications of the sieges, and Faysal Itani will moderate the discussion. Dr. Mohamed Katoub is the Public Relations Director for the United Medical Office of Eastern Ghouta. Valerie Szybala is the author of several influential reports including Slow Death: Life and Death in Syrian Communities under Siege and Assad Strikes Damascus. Jan Jaap van Oosterzee has been working on Middle East programs in various capacities with PAX, an international peace organization based in the Netherlands. Faysal Itani focuses on the war in Syria and its regional impact. Ambassador Frederic Hof specializes in the conflict in Syria.
- The future of securing global cities | Wednesday, February 10th | 2:00-3:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On February 10, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will convene a panel discussion to introduce Securing Global Cities, a new project based in Foreign Policy’s Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. Securing Global Cities will be co-chaired by Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and General Ray Odierno, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and JP Morgan Chase Senior Advisor. It is part of the Global Cities Initiative, a joint project of the Brookings Institution and JP Morgan Chase. The goal of the project is to help cities around the world improve the physical safety of their citizens from various forms of violence. The overarching motivation of the project is the belief that cities have much to learn from each other by analyzing systematically and sharing best practices that strengthen their roles in a globalized world, bolster their economies, and protect their communities and citizens. The project will identify different types of threats–from terrorists to narcotraffickers and other international criminal networks, gangs, insurgents, and abusive security forces–and examine the various tools that governments can deploy to address these diverse and complex problems. The tools will include reformed and strengthened police forces, justice systems, paramilitary and military institutions, intelligence capabilities, and a range of other instruments. The discussion will be moderated by Martin Indyk, executive vice president of Brookings. Following the discussion, the panelists will take audience questions. JP Morgan Chase is a donor to the Brookings Institution. Brookings recognizes the value it provides is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment. This event will be live webcast. Join the conversation on Twitter at #GlobalCities.
- Five Years In: The Legacy of the Arab Spring | Wednesday, February 10th | 2:15-5:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | During the past five years the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has seen dictators toppled, new terrorist movements seize large swaths of territory, civil wars waged, and the regional order recast. Amidst a region awash in this protracted turbulence that shows no signs of soon abating, this event will explore the lasting legacy of the Arab Spring as we approach its five-year anniversary. Please join us as we discuss the ways in which the fateful events of 2011 irreversibly changed the MENA region. This event is composed of two panels. The first panel is called The Makeup of Post-Arab Spring Politics. It will take place from 2:15 to 3:45. This panel will explore the most notable effects of the Arab Spring on political and governance issues in the MENA region. Panelists will seek to differentiate between developments that are passing phenomena and those that will have a lasting impact on the region’s political fabric. Speakers include Shadi Hamid, Senior Fellow for the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Amy Hawthorne, Deputy Director for Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy, Paul Salem, Vice President for Policy and Research at the Middle East Institute, and Robin Wright, Wilson Center-USIP Distinguished Fellow. The moderator will be Marina Ottaway, Middle East Fellow at the Wilson Center. The second panel is called Physical Destruction and Prospects for Reconstruction. It will take place from 4:00 to 5:30. This panel will analyze the physical toll incurred by five plus years of violent turmoil and will discuss the scale of damage sustained across the region and will evaluate the range of effects such damages will have on regional affairs during the years to come. Speakers include Richard Cincotta, Global Fellow at the Wilson Center and Director of the Global Political Demography Program at the Stimson Center, Marwa Daoudy, Assistant Professor in International Relations at Georgetown University, Nadim Khouri, Independent Researcher at the World Bank, and Erika Weinthal, Lee Hill Snowdon Professor of Environmental Policy and Associate Dean for International Programs at Duke University. The moderator will be Henri Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center.
- DHS: Progress in 2015, Goals for 2016—A Conversation with Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh J. Johnson | Thursday, February 11th | 10:00-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Wilson Center as Secretary Jeh C. Johnson, the fourth Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, delivers his final State of Homeland Security address, entitled “DHS: Progress in 2015, Goals for 2016.” Secretary Johnson oversees the United States’ third largest Cabinet department and leads the nation’s efforts to counter a broad range of threats, from terrorism to natural disasters. Secretary Johnson’s remarks will be followed by a question & answer session with the Center’s Director, President & CEO Jane Harman.
- HFAC Subcommittee Hearing—Jordan: A Key U.S. Partner | Thursday, February 11th | 2:00-5:00 | Rayburn House Office Building | This hearing will be held by the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. Witnesses include the Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department, Paige Alexander, Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for the Middle East at the U.S. Agency for International Development, and Fatema Z. Sumar, Regional Deputy Vice President of the Department of Compact Operations at the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
- Arab Voices on the Challenges of the New Middle East | Friday, February 12th | 9:00-10:15 | Carnegie Endowment | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is pleased to host a review of its first Arab Experts Survey. The results of the survey, conducted in English and Arabic, represent the views of more than one hundred accomplished political thinkers representing almost every Arab country and answer broad questions around terrorism and extremism, civil war and foreign intervention, sectarianism, corruption, and governance. The survey is part of Carnegie’s Arab World Horizons project, an effort to examine the social, political, and economic forces shaping the Arab world. Marwan Muasher, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Perry Cammack, Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, and Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, will discuss the findings of the survey, and Joyce Karam, Washington Bureau Chief for Al-Hayat, will moderate. Join the conversation on Twitter with #ArabWorldHorizons. Registration will begin at 8:30 a.m. A light breakfast will be served. The discussion will begin promptly at 9:00 a.m.
- The Yemen Quagmire | Friday, February 12th | 12:00-1:30 | Johns Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a discussion with Amat Alsoswa, former Yemeni Cabinet Member, Leslie Campbell, NDI, Andrew Plitt, USAID, and Charles Schmitz, MEI, who will discuss the deepening complexity of the conflict, the growing humanitarian crisis, the challenges of delivering aid to a suffering population, and prospects for peace talks and an end to the fighting. Daniel Serwer, Senior Research Professor of Conflict Management at Johns Hopkins SAIS will moderate.
What to do when peace talks stall
The Syria peace talks stalled even faster than I might have predicted, though I wasn’t sanguine about their success. The reason for the suspension is all too clear: the Syrian army is making headway in north Latakia, around Aleppo and elsewhere, with vigorous support from Russian air strikes as well as Hizbollah ground forces and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps “advisors” (more like commanders). President Assad and his allies see no reason to halt the offensive. The Syrian opposition, which had asked at the talks for an end to air strikes and opening up of humanitarian access, sees no reason to talk while its people are getting slaughtered. Those of us who said this conflict was not “ripe” for peace talks, which includes almost everyone knowledgeable about the situation, were right.
That is little comfort. Nor does it mean the UN was wrong to try.
It is the UN’s role in today’s world order to take on cases no one else wants touch. That’s how it ended up with Libya, Yemen and Syria. The Americans and Europeans left Libya to its own devices, which sufficed for a while but then proved unequal to the state-building challenge. Now there is an agreement of sorts, but no implementation. The Houthis and Saudis wrecked a four-year peace process in Yemen, based on a Gulf Cooperation Council agreement and UN mediation, with military action. A recent effort to reinitiate talks has been postponed until at least late this month. Syria has already seen two failed UN efforts to end the war–Geneva I and II they are called–to no avail. Geneva III looks likely to fail too. Let’s hope they don’t catch up with the Superbowl numbering.
These stalled peace processes are bad for Libyans, Yemenis and Syrians, but they don’t have much say in the matter. Civilians are today the most frequent victims of war, as the contestants are so often vying for power within a state rather than trying to defeat the regular military forces of another state. Moving civilians, or persuading them to accept your rule, is therefore the objective, not an unintended consequence. It is far less perilous to guys with guns (yes most of them are guys, though not always all) to go after unarmed civilians, or even armed insurgents, than to contest another state’s armed forces.
The only real beneficiaries of continued fighting in Libya, Yemen and Syria are likely to be the extremist forces affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. They thrive on disorder–areas that have witnessed chaos are more likely to accept their draconian rule–and the extremists often fill the vacuum as states concentrate their efforts against less extreme insurgents. The one thing we can be pretty sure of from the experience of fighting extremists since 9/11 is that attacking them from the air without establishing order on the ground thereafter ensures that we will have to roll Sisyphus’ rock up the hill once again. And with each iteration the extremists get bolder, smarter and more lethal.
We are all too clearly losing the war against violent extremism. We should be thinking hard about whether the means we are using are appropriate to the task. Washington’s purpose should be to eliminate safe havens for extremists who might strike Americans. Drones have dinstinct advantages. They keep their operators safe while killing bad guys, but they can’t reestablish governance on territory from which extremists have been driven. Only legitimate state authorities can do that. It is time to refocus our attention on where they are going to come from.
Stalled talks are an opportunity. The warring parties in Libya, Yemen and Syria as well as their international supporters should be thinking hard about how these countries will be governed once the killing has stopped. Both the fighting and the peacemaking are worthless without an answer to that question.