Tag: Yemen

Forget renegotiation, try these ideas

Rob Satloff, abandoning previous suggestions for renegotiation of the nuclear agreement with Iran, now puts forward proposals for the US to undertake without any need for Iranian agreement. He ties these to defeat of the agreement in Congress (whether by a veto-proof majority or not I can’t tell), but that is not logically necessary for their consideration. So let’s consider them, one by one:

Consequences: Rob wants punishments other than full sanctions “snapback” defined for non-capital violations, as he rightly anticipates it will be difficult to to use “the nuclear option,” if I may call it that, unless the violation is major. Specifically, he proposes

to reach understandings now with America’s European partners, the core elements of which should be made public, on the appropriate penalties to be imposed for a broad spectrum of Iranian violations.

I see no reason not to talk about this and even agree the penalties with the Europeans now, but is making the consequences public likely to increase compliance?

I wonder. Penalties defined now are likely to be less severe than what we can actually get once a violation occurs. It might be far better to wait for a incident of noncompliance and respond vigorously. I see no justification for Rob’s assumption that penalties defined later have “no value.” The first violation and reaction are the key to imposing credible consequences.

Deterrence: Rob wants penalties agreed and defined for transfer of funds from sanctions relief to Iran’s regional trouble-making. He suggests:

…these new multilateral sanctions should impose disproportionate penalties on Iran for every marginal dollar sent to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, etc.

Assuming that Rob is correct that our intelligence agencies can in fact determine unequivocally what amount represents increased assistance (which would surprise me), I again see no problem in discussing this with our friends. As he notes, levying sanctions of this sort is not ruled out because they are unrelated to the nuclear issue. We should be traying to block these transfers regardless of what happens on the nuclear deal.

Pushback: This is a related idea:

“Ramp up U.S. and allied efforts to counter Iran’s negative actions in the Middle East, including interdicting weapons supplies to Hezbollah, Assad, and the Houthis in Yemen; designating as terrorists more leaders of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq that are committing atrocities; expanding the training and arming of not only the Iraqi security forces but also the Kurdish peshmerga in the north and vetted Sunni forces in western Iraq; and working with Turkey to create a real safe haven in northern Syria where refugees can obtain humanitarian aid and vetted, non-extremist opposition fighters can be trained and equipped to fight against both ISIS and the Iran-backed Assad regime.”

Each of these propositions deserves its own consideration, but in general it seems to me vital that we push back in some of these or other ways against Iranian misbehavior in the region, lest Tehran get the idea that the nuclear agreement blesses their ambition of achieving regional hegemony.

Declaratory policy: Rob wants a Congressionally endorsed statement that the US will use military force to prevent Iran from embarking, after the 15-year restrictions in the agreement, on enrichment that could “only” lead to a nuclear weapon. For reasons I fail to fathom, he thinks to be effective this has to be done now by the president who did the deal.

Even leaving aside that problematic “only” lead to a nuclear weapon (which betrays a lack of understanding of the many ways in which uranium enriched to high levels can in theory be used), Rob is self-contradictory. First Rob says President Obama’s threat that “all options are on the table” has lost credibility. Then he says it has to be this president to say more or less the same thing, this time with Congressional backing, in order to be credible.

More importantly, Rob fails to consider the international repurcussions of having the Administration do this right now. The hardliners in Iran love reiteration of the “all options” statement, as it demonstrates their thesis that American attitudes are unchanged and Washington seeks an opportunity to strike Iran.

If Congress wants to go on record, I don’t see who could stop it. Nor do I think anyone in Tehran doubts where Congressional sentiment lies. But the Administration has a stake in seeing maximum implementation of this agreement, which is threatened on the Iranian end by hardliners who didn’t want to see it done in the first place. Strengthening opponents of the deal in Tehran is not in the US interest.

Israeli deterrence: Rob wants to transfer the Massive Ordnance Penetrator and the means to deliver it to Israel.

Here more discussion is needed. Is this without end-use controls, or with them? What means are needed to deliver it, and how many of the bombs and delivery means are we talking about? How realistic is it to imagine that Israel will have the capabilities needed to evade Iranian air defenses and deliver these 30,000-pound monsters? Who is going to pay for this stuff?

So yes, there are certainly some things we should be doing to block Iranian misbehavior in the region but I’ve got more questions than answers about some of Rob’s other propositions.

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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal

 

These could be snapshots from an Iranian bazaar, but they were all taken at Shuk Levinsky, a largely Persian market in Tel Aviv.  PC: Eddie Grove
These Iranian bazaar snapshots were actually taken at Tel Aviv’s mainly Persian Shuk Levinsky. PC: Eddie Grove

On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran.  Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated.  Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.

 

Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.

 

Mount Hermon, on the border of the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, Lebanon and Syria.  A couple of weeks after the author skied there, the ski resort was evacuated after a nearby IDF vehicle was struck by an anti-tank missile fired by Hezbollah. PC: Eddie Grove
Mount Hermon, on the border of the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, Lebanon and Syria. A couple of weeks after the author skied there, the ski resort was evacuated after a nearby IDF vehicle was struck by an anti-tank missile fired by Hezbollah. PC: Eddie Grove

In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces.  Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill.  The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.

Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence.  They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.

Jordanian flag flying at the always windy Ajloun Castle.  PC: Eddie Grove
Jordanian flag flying at the always windy Ajloun Castle. PC: Eddie Grove

Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.

A view of Taba, Egypt from Mount Tzefahot, Eilat, Israel. PC: Eddie Grove
A view of Taba, Egypt from Mount Tzefahot, Eilat, Israel. PC: Eddie Grove

Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart.  They believe the US is appeasing Iran.

Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there.  Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy.  Change in Iran won’t happen fast.  Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.

Rosh HaNikra, Israel on the border with Lebanon.  PC: Eddie Grove
Rosh HaNikra, Israel on the border with Lebanon. PC: Eddie Grove

Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran.  However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians.  Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war.  Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.

The Maronite village of Al-Jish in Israel near the Lebanese border could be seen as a pocket of Lebanese culture inside Israel.  It contains a Maronite church (top right), and a Lebanese restaurant (top left) with delicious Lebanese food (bottom).  PC: Eddie Grove
The Maronite village of Al-Jish, Israel near the Lebanese border could be seen as a pocket of Lebanese culture inside Israel. It contains a Maronite church (top right) and a Lebanese restaurant (top left) with delicious Lebanese food (bottom). PC: Eddie Grove

Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides.  They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state.  They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.

After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch.  Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others.  They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison.  Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria.  Iran needs a reality check.

Joyce Karam (left), Dr. Daniel Serwer (center), and roy Gutman (right). PC: Eddie Grove
Joyce Karam (left), Dr. Daniel Serwer (center), and roy Gutman (right). PC: Eddie Grove

Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it.  There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now.  The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum.  The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.

The souq in Muscat, Oman.  Oman helped mediate between Iran and the P5+1 and has good trade relations with Iran.  It welcomed the deal.
The souq in Muscat, Oman. Oman helped mediate between Iran and the P5+1 and has good trade relations with Iran. It welcomed the deal.

Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly.  The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran.  Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious.  The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling.  Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively.  Now only 12% do.  The Arab street is suspicious of the deal.  The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people.  The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad.  Assad is a costly budget item for Iran.  When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.

Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done.  The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.

Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.

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Big surprise is no surprise

The Middle East Institute published my piece this evening:

The Iran nuclear deal has only one big surprise: it is consistent with the April 2 “parameters”  that preceded it and contains no surprises. No one caved. Nothing got walked back.

But there are some interesting additions. One is this: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” This is a written confirmation of the Supreme Leader’s controversial “fatwa” against nuclear weapons. It was not so long ago that Iran’s critics in the United States were complaining that the fatwa was only oral and not written. I have not noticed anyone welcoming the written version.

The “reaffirmation” wouldn’t be worth the paper it is printed on except for the detailed limits and intrusive inspections that the agreement provides. No softie on Iran, Dennis Ross confirms that these fulfill previous Iranian commitments to limit centrifuges, enrichment, and enriched uranium; end all plans for separating plutonium; and no longer engage in any research and development related to a nuclear explosive device. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring will be more comprehensive and intrusive than for other countries. While no system is foolproof, nuclear weapons have never been developed within an IAEA safeguarded program.

That leaves the possibility of a clandestine nuclear program outside the purview of the IAEA. There is reason to believe that Tehran had such a program until 2003, when it was allegedly stopped. Iran, which previously stonewalled IAEA inquiries on this subject, has now committed in the nuclear deal to clarifying its past nuclear activities with “possible military dimensions” by October 15, with a final assessment due from the IAEA on December 15. This will be an important early milestone in implementation (or not) of the nuclear deal. It is not the first time the Iranians have promised clarification. Beyond that date, the IAEA can request access to locations of concern. Iranian objections can be overridden by five of eight members of a joint commission overseeing implementation of the agreement. That joint commission includes five Western members (the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and the EU) as well as Russia, China, and Iran.

The agreement provides for sanctions to be lifted once Iran implements its obligations or passes certain time limits in compliance with the agreement. No sanctions get lifted without implementation, and some—like the arms embargo—remain in place for five or eight years (depending on the weapons involved). While most restrictions are lifted within 15 years, some remain in place in perpetuity, including strict IAEA safeguards and the prohibition on nuclear weapons research and development.

The question is what happens if one or another obligation is breached. There is an elaborate, but quick-paced (I count 35 days), dispute resolution mechanism. At that point, UN Security Council sanctions would be reinstated, unless the Council votes within 30 days to continue lifting them. This is a “snapback” mechanism, unprecedented so far as I know in the Security Council. It would give the United States (and other permanent members) a veto over sanctions lifting. Iran has stated that it would treat reinstatement of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments.

So, is this agreement a good thing or a bad thing?

It depends on what you think the alternative might be. At worst, it would be no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program, no IAEA monitoring, and no multilateral sanctions, as the EU and China are champing at the bit to do business with a cash, oil, and gas-rich Iran. At best we might in the absence of an agreement be able to sustain the sanctions for a while but not likely the IAEA monitoring and technological constraints, giving others in the region reason to initiate their own programs to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. War might set back the Iranian nuclear program for a few years, but it would also give them incentive to finish the job and unleash even more chaos than the region is currently enduring.

Relief from sanctions will unquestionably provide the Iranians with resources. Tehran is owed upward of $100 billion that will flow into its coffers, in addition to whatever its renewed exports will bring in today’s bearish oil market, likely to go down further because of Iran’s reentry into it. The Islamic Republic is a profoundly anti-Western regime that even without much available cash has managed to contribute to instability in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Its anti-Americanism may sound hollow after this agreement, which engages Iran in a continuing process involving the United States and three of its allies as well as the European Union, but unless there is a dramatic and unexpected change of heart at the top in Tehran we can anticipate more trouble from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies in the region and even beyond.

America’s friends in the Gulf will therefore be nervous about the implications of this agreement, though the United Arab Emirates was quick to say it welcomed it. Israel denounced it even before the ink was on the page. But soon enough both the Gulf states and Israel will become keen about insisting on fulfilling its every letter, as they have with the interim agreement currently in effect.

The debate in Congress will be vigorous. Most Republicans and a good number of Democrats will oppose the deal on the grounds that it licenses Iran to become a nuclear threshold state, ignoring the Obama administration’s conviction that this would happen faster and with fewer controls in the absence of an agreement. But the opponents are unlikely to muster the two-thirds majority in both houses required to override a presidential veto. The Supreme Leader is thought to have given the green light for this deal, but he has not yet pronounced on it. Assuming he says a dramatically reluctant “yes,” the Iranian Majlis will not block it.

The saga of implementation has not yet begun. It will last 10-15 years. If the agreement holds and prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it will have made an enormous contribution to peace and stability. If it fails, we will have to deal with the ugly consequences: war or a nuclearized Middle East.

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Iran’s return to oil markets

Thursday, the Wilson Center focused on “Middle East Energy: Beyond an Iran Nuclear Deal,” which explored the oil and gas sectors’ future given Iran’s possible sanctions relief. Speakers included David Goldwyn, President of Goldwyn Global Strategies LLC, David Gordon, Senior Advisor of the Eurasia Group, Julia Nanay, Principal at Energy Ventures LLC and Jean-Francois Seznec, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. The event was moderated by Jan H. Kalicki, Wilson Center Public Policy Fellow and Energy Lead.

Gordon talked about potential energy market responses with the entry of Libya and Iran into the market. Libya’s entry last year put downward pressure on oil prices. The country is currently in the process of building up its export volumes, but the political and security fragility remains. Iran’s market impact is also uncertain. There may be competition between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states for market share. Iran’s success is far from assured. The current uncertainty ends up being bearish for energy markets, which will lead to the strengthening of the US dollar. Only the risk of supply disruption and failure of nuclear talks could be bullish for markets.

If sanctions are lifted, Nanay thinks Iran’s key goal is to become the second largest producer in OPEC. Saudi Arabia’s oil production amounts to 10.3 million barrels a day, while Iran is at 2.8 million barrels a day. Iraq’s is a bit higher. Iran might bring back 700-800,000 barrels a day, with 20 million barrels released quickly and efficiently. Sanctions have also prevented oil revenues from flowing back to Iran. There may be as much as $100 billion that could be released quickly, possibly half from China. International oil companies (IOCs) also owe large sums to Iran.

Possible losers from sanctions relief are the Saudis, Russians, Nigerians and Kuwaitis. The Saudis and Russians have been able to capture some exports to China. Sanctions relief would decrease the market share of all oil exporting countries that have benefited from having Iran off the oil market.

Iran has several stalled projects with significant market potential in the oil and gas sectors. A South Pars project requires 24 phases to develop fully, of which 11 phases have already been done without sanctions removal. Iran is looking to complete more phases by next year. Iran has also planned three big Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects. Iran can ship this LNG to Europe and supply its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but politics may complicate partnerships. The only neighbor Iran has a good relationship with is Oman. An Iran-Oman gas pipeline is possible, but the countries may disagree on price.

Seznec disagreed with Nanay on Iran’s potential in the oil market. Iran will require technology and investment that would make it dependent on IOCs. Instead, Iran can emphasize natural gas, which both Iran and the Gulf states need. The GCC states—especially Saudi Arabia—could partner with Iran in the gas sector. The Saudis have the technology and money to help the Iranians redevelop their gas fields. The Kingdom is seeking to avoid overdependence on crude oil. Instead, it wants to add value by building capacity for refined products and chemicals. Their vision is eventually to get out selling crude and leave Iran and Iraq as the “third world countries” that produce raw materials.

Goldwyn commented on Iraq’s position in the oil market. He believes Iraq might increase production by completing the revamp of the Al Faw Peninsula, but that is an $8-10 billion dollar project.

On the Baghdad-Kurdistan Regional Government deal, Goldwyn pointed out two reasons for the unraveling:

  1. Baghdad hasn’t paid Kurdish forces what it owes.
  2. The Kurds are not exporting the agreed-upon average of 550,000 barrels per day.

If Iraq is unable to increase production much and Iran produces an additional 500-800,000 barrels a day, there is no need for OPEC quota renegotiation, Goldwyn said. There is room for rapprochement on economics between Iran and the Gulf states. But first there must be rapprochement on security. If Iran reduces its involvement in Yemen and Iraq, there is potential for détente with the Saudis, who would also have to do their part in reducing the flow of funds to Al Qaeda and ISIS. If both parties deliver, an economic deal is on the horizon. Otherwise, the current situation will continue, with the Saudis better financed and more competitive than any other player in the Gulf.

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What I’ll be looking for

I’ve pledged a piece on the Iran nuclear deal to the Middle East Institute, once it is done. I claim some competence in the matter, as I earned a master’s degree in physical chemistry at the University of Chicago (and a doctorate on the history of radiation protection at Princeton) and spent seven years as a science counselor in American embassies working on non-proliferation issues.

Here are some key things I’ll be looking for:

1. Does the deal meet provisions laid out in the April Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program?

The parameters were unprecedented in what they would require a potential bomb-building country to do. The Americans published them, but the Iranians in the end did not formally object to their contents (and the Iranian Foreign Minister implied the document was accurate). Does the new agreement (presumably called a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) faithfully reproduce and implement its provisions?

2. Are the verification mechanisms sufficiently intrusive to ensure that we will know if Tehran cheats?

This is in some respects the most important issue. The parameters promised inspections at uranium-producing facilities for 25 years and surveillance of centrifuges (and their production) 20. How will these provisions be implemented? What provisions have been made to ensure access to suspicious military sites? There is no history of nuclear nonproliferation using facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Can we be reasonably certain of discovering if Iran initiates a clandestine nuclear program outside the purview of the IAEA?

3. How are sanctions to be lifted?

Does lifting of sanctions follow verified implementation? Which sanctions are to be lifted and how? Will the architecture of sanctions remain in place, as pledged in the parameters?

4. What provisions have been made for “snap-back” of sanctions in the event of violations?

Who decides when there is a violation? How is it decided that sanctions will be reimposed? What is the promised “dispute resolution mechanism”?

5. Will the arms embargo on Iran be lifted?

The parameters promised lifting of all UN Security Council resolutions “on the nuclear issue.” Does this mean the arms embargo, which among other things has blocked Russian sales of advanced air defenses to Tehran, will be lifted and if so how and when?

Other issues

US representation in Tehran: This deal is so far-reaching and complex, it is difficult to see how it can be implemented effectively without an official US presence in Iran. Are provisions being made for return of US diplomats and technical experts? Does this mean re-opening of a US office (if not an embassy), or will the Americans work out of the embassy of Switzerland, which has represented the US there since we broke diplomatic relations in 1980?

Iran’s behavior in the region, support for terrorism and human rights record at home. Both Democrats and Republicans will raise these issues during the 60-day Congressional review period. The Obama Administration has been reluctant to press those concerns as hard as it might while the nuclear negotiations were ongoing. Will that policy now change? Will the US be more prepared to push back against Iran’s forces or their proxies in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Lebanon? Will Iran use the funds it gains from sanctions relief to make even more trouble, and how will the Administration react to that.

Regional security: Wars are currently raging in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Iran and the US are both directly or indirectly implicated in all of them. Can the nuclear deal somehow lead to a regional accord that includes Saudi Arabia and Turkey and enables a more effective effort against ISIS as well as restoration of state integrity and effective governance?

I look forward to getting some answers, maybe tomorrow.

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Containment in the Middle East

Tuesday the Atlantic Council hosted an event on its report “The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security” featuring Bilal Saab, Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council, Barry Posen, Director of the Security Studies Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Barbara Starr, Pentagon Correspondent for CNN, moderated the event.

Containment is the best strategy

Saab explained that the report is based on four preconditions:

  1. There will be no lasting security or stability in the Middle East as long as religious hubris, economic mismanagement and abrupt political changes dominate the region.
  2. The US cannot and should not be an agent pushing for change.
  3. Reforms cannot happen without addressing security challenges first.
  4. The US cannot address security challenges alone—it needs partners.

The Iraq invasion in 2003 was proof that the US does not have sufficient economic resources or know-how for nation-building and US presence de-legitimizes this process.

Given these preconditions, the best option is a US containment strategy with six pillars:

  1. Prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
  2. Deter large-scale military conflict. If deterrence fails, then consider military intervention.
  3. Limit escalation between Israel and Hamas and between Israel and Hezbollah.
  4. Reduce the scope and severity of civil wars.
  5. Degrade violent extremist groups and leave the “hard work” to regional stakeholders, so they can develop their own political narrative and ideology.
  6. Limit Iran’s destabilizing influence.

Saab added that though US participation will be limited to containing conflicts, it must help the Middle East develop a new regional security architecture that is conducive to US interests.

Iran nuclear deal

On the Iranian nuclear deal, the three panelists had differing opinions. Haass claimed if there is a deal, it would restrict ‘nuclear Iran,’ not ‘imperial Iran.’ He said lifting sanctions would grant Iran more resources, which would fuel its existing activities and exacerbate the challenges it poses. Additionally, managing the nuclear deal would become a consuming challenge for future American presidents as it would become a permanent part of American statecraft. Elements of the Iranian nuclear program would remain intact, which would allow nuclear activity in a region by a government whose stability is uncertain.

Posen argued that no deal would prolong the arduous task of sustaining the sanctions regime, which requires a lot of side payments. He also warned that if the deal crashes, constituencies in the US and abroad would call for a military strike. The consequence of maintaining the current status quo is more uncertainty about Iranian capabilities than if the deal happened. Furthermore, Posen urged that the US consider its interests first. American partners may frown on good Iran-US relations, but they would benefit the US.

Saab said that there would be uncertainty regardless of whether there is or isn’t a deal. America’s partners do not feel sure about their relationships with Washington. The Saudis have begun talking about launching their own nuclear program.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

There was more consensus on the security threat ISIS poses. Saab said ISIS does not pose a direct and imminent threat to the homeland. However, rooting ISIS out will be challenging to say the least. ISIS is a byproduct of the ills of the Arab state system, including political decay, economic mismanagement and corrupt governments. It is not just a consequence of Al Qaeda. Degrading ISIS is only the first step—and the US isn’t even good at that—but eliminating ISIS could take years.

Posen talked about ISIS’s expansionist nature—it “grabs” wherever it perceives weakness. ISIS has both ideological affinity and subversive capability, which make it costly to annihilate the group. Nevertheless, the US can spy on it and contain it by supporting coherent groups willing to fight against it.

Saudi Arabia, Posen thought, is paying alarmingly little attention to ISIS, even though the Kingdom is likely high on ISIS’s subversion list. He was surprised by the Saudis’ immense effort in Yemen compared to its actions against ISIS. Haass agreed with this assessment, adding that Saudi Arabia is too focused on Iran and manifestations of Iranian power, which is a misallocation of resources.

Saab claimed that Saudi Arabia does indeed care. Riyadh launched one of the world’s biggest counterterrorism operations against Bin Laden and has undergone many internal changes to be better equipped to deal with the ISIS threat.

Regional security

Haass was cynical about change in the Middle East’s security system, claiming it is premature. He explained the creation of a system requires balance of power and a shared concept of legitimacy—neither of which exists in the Middle East.

Posen doesn’t think the Iranian regional challenge amounts to much. Most of the places where Iran exercises influence are places deeply divided by problems not of Iranian creation. Iran did not create the Yemen civil war, even if it might gain some benefits from it.

 

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