Tag: Yemen
Peace picks September 14-19
1. Iran’s Regional Role After the Nuclear Deal | Monday, September 14th | 2:00 – 3:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | An internal debate is occurring within Iran about its regional role in the aftermath of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program. Nasser Hadian will present the findings of his new paper which argues that Iranian policymakers are divided between those who believe Iran must act more forcefully to help stabilize its neighbors and those who advocate a more minimalist approach– contrary to perceptions that Iran is solely determined to expand its intervention in regional conflicts, particularly as they formulate their own JCPOA posture, US policymakers should be aware of this debate, seeking ways, where possible, of working with Iran to decrease conflict and to prevent traditional US allies from exacerbating instability. The Iran Task Force, chaired by Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape and its role in the region and globally, and explore opportunities for an improved relationship with the West. It is supported generously by the Ploughshares Fund. Speakers include: Nasser Hadian, Professor, University of Tehran, Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow, Middle East Peace and Security Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council. Moderated by:
Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
2. Addressing Nontraditional Security Threats in South Asia | Tuesday, September 15th | 9:30 – 10:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | India is positioning itself to play a leading role in Asia and globally. The Modi administration is investing in strengthening security relationships, accelerating economic growth, and increasing trade to champion this new outlook. However, India faces several nontraditional security threats, which may limit its power trajectory if not addressed effectively. Latha Reddy will discuss the policy implications of these threats- including water security, climate change, and cyber warfare- and how India will play a leading role on these issues within and beyond its borders. Speakers include: Latha Reddy, Former Deputy National Security Adviser of India and Huma Haque, Atlantic Council Associate Director, South Asia Center.
3. Development policies to foster stability in West Africa | Tuesday, September 15th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | West Africa is making impressive progress in economic growth, democratization, and regional cooperation. While the recent rise in violence and conflict as well as drug trafficking, piracy, extremism, and other emerging threats have sparked concerns over its future development, efforts to prevent conflicts have also improved, contributing to overall stability. In a new report, ‘The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa,’ the World Bank examines the diverse drivers of fragility-from issues related to land ownership, to a growing youth population with expectations for inclusion, to accelerated development of the extractives industry-and suggests development interventions that can contribute to peace and stability. Countries in West Africa such as Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia offer lessons in building resilience, highlighting the important role of development policy to address these challenges. On Tuesday, September 15, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative and the World Bank will co-host a discussion about these dynamic trends in West Africa. After a brief presentation by the report’s author Alexandre Marc, chief specialist of the World Bank’s Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group, Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate a discussion among Marc, Amadou Sy, director and senior fellow of the Africa Growth Initiative, and Raymond Gilpin, dean of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, exploring the nature and reality of these threats as well as potential for development solutions to address them.
4. Post Agreement: The Role of Natural Gas in Iran’s Energy Future | Tuesday, September 15th | 12:00 – 1:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a panel discussion on the future of Iranian energy, particularly natural gas, in a post-sanctions world. The panel of Atlantic Council fellows includes Dr. Sara Vakhshouri, President of SVB Energy International, Barbara Slavin, Washington Correspondent for Al-Monitor, and Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Visiting Researcher and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. Yeganeh Torbati of Reuters will moderate the interactive discussion on the following issues and more:
- The latest insight on the Iran agreement in light of the pending US Congressional vote
- Iran’s energy policy priorities in the near and medium term, particularly as it relates to natural gas
- The outlook for foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector
- The geopolitical implications of Iranian natural gas development.
5. Protecting Civilians in Syria: Parameters of the Problem and Policy Options | Wednesday, September 16th | 11:30 – 1:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Images of dead Syrian children washing ashore in Turkey may serve to overcome that which is charitably described as “Syria fatigue:” widespread American and international apathy in the face of a grotesque and growing humanitarian abomination in which civilians are deliberately targeted for murder. This is a catastrophe with policy consequences. What are its dimensions and what options exist for mitigation? UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reported that the United Nations and its partners were unable to deliver food and aid to over 422,000 people in besieged areas in July. On August 13, US Representative to the United Nations Samantha Power decried the Syrian regime’s dropping of over 2,000 barrel bombs over a six-week period; the following weekend barrel bombs killed over 100 people in the Damascus suburb of Douma. Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Chief Antonio Guterres said the number of refugees is forecasted to reach 4.27 million by year end. While the United States expands its coalition with new partners to fight the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL), the Assad regime atrocities answered with words but no action bolster ISIS in its worldwide recruitment. Please join Ambassador Frederic Hof of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and a panel of distinguished experts for a discussion centering on the protection of Syrian civilians: the parameters of the problem and policy options for its mitigation. Panelists include: The Hon. Frederic C. Hof, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Rola Hallam, Medical Director, Syrian Civil Defense, Valerie Szybala, Executive Director, Syrian Civil Defense, and Raed Saleh, Head, Syrian Civil Defense.
6. Serbia’s future: Challenges and opportunities for regional stability, reconciliation, and integration |Wednesday, September 16th | 4:00-5:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On September 16, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings will host Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić for a public address on Serbia’s outlook, and how the country can enhance political and economic stability and cooperation in the region and reaffirm its European perspective. In his remarks, the prime minister will explore challenges and opportunities for the country and the continent as a whole, including the rapidly-growing influx of migrants and refugees and the importance of reconciliation in overcoming the difficult legacies of the past. Vučić became Serbia’s prime minister after his party’s victory in the March 2014 elections. Previously, from 2013 to 2014, he served as first deputy prime minister in charge of the fight against corruption and crime, and as minister of defense from 2012 to 2013. He is also the leader of the Serbian Progressive Party, which he helped to found in October 2008. Brookings Senior Fellow Fiona Hill will provide introductory remarks and moderate a question and answer session following Prime Minister Vučić’s remarks.
7. Iran in Central Asia and the Caucasus | Wednesday, September 16th | 5:00 – 7:00 | SAIS-Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Discussion of Iran in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
8. Anwar al-Awlaki, Yemen, and American counterterrorism policy | Thursday, September 17th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On September 30, 2011, the U.S.-born radical Islamic cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed by an American drone strike in Yemen, marking the first extra-judicial killing by the United States government against a U.S. citizen. Placed at the top of a CIA kill list in 2010 by the Obama administration, al-Awlaki was known for his intimate involvement in multiple al-Qaida terrorist plots against U.S. citizens, including the 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing attempt in Detroit and the 2010 plot to blow up U.S.-bound cargo planes. His calls for violent jihad remain prominent on the Internet, and his influence has turned up in many cases since his death, including the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 and the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris early this year. In a new book, “Objective Troy: A Terrorist, A President, and the Rise of the Drone” (Crown, 2015), The New York Times national security reporter Scott Shane, drawing on in-depth field research in Yemen and interviews with U.S. government officials, charts the intimate details of the life and death of al-Awlaki, including his radicalization, his recruiting efforts for al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the use of drone strikes by the United States to prosecute its counterterrorism goals. On September 17, the Intelligence Project will host Shane to examine the roles played by al-Awlaki in al-Qaida plots against the United States, al-Awlaki’s continued influence on terrorism, and the current state of al-Qaida today. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. Following their remarks, Riedel and Shane will take questions from the audience.
9. U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Priorities and Challenges | Thursday, September 17th | 1:00-2:00 | SAIS – Nitze Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Dean Vali Nasr and the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS invite you to join them for: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Priorities and Challenges with Ambassador Anne Patterson, assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs and Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Institute.
10. Veiled Ambition: A Simulation of Iranian-American Relations in the Middle East | Saturday, September 19th | 11:15-6:00 | George Washington University, Philips Hall | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant broke onto the international stage, terrifying millions and forcing the United States to re-examine its policies in the Middle East. Since that time, the United States has successfully brokered a nuclear deal with Iran, Yemen has fallen to Shia rebels, and the Islamic State has continued to wreak havoc throughout northern Iraq. The Middle East possesses an undeniable strategic interest to the United States: both for its natural resources, and for the valuable allies the United States has made in the region. With Shia influence increasing throughout Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, the National Security Council must once again analyze its strategic priorities: is the United States willing to work with Shia militias to counter the threat of the Islamic State? Can, or should, the United States convince Saudi Arabia to work with a Shia Yemen to eliminate the al Qaeda threat in the region? How should western actors approach the Syrian Civil War, an unending crisis for nearly four and a half years.
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Peace picks August 24-28
1. Promoting Nuclear Safety Cooperation in Northeast Asia | Tuesday, August 25th | 12:00-1:30 | East-West Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | China, Japan, and South Korea all have deep experience with nuclear energy and large commercial nuclear power sectors, and the use of nuclear power is expected to continue to expand, mostly driven by growth in China. There have been calls over the years to increase regional nuclear safety cooperation, and the need for such cooperation has been highlighted by the Fukushima accident in Japan, the fake parts’ certificates scandal in South Korea, and rapid reactor construction in China. The most recent proposal for strengthening regional nuclear safety cooperation came in South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). NAPCI envisions addressing “soft” issues, including nuclear safety, in order to build deeper regional cooperation on “hard” security issues, similar to the integration process in Europe, and Park has specifically cited the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) as a model for Northeast Asia. Yet, is EURATOM an appropriate model for Northeast Asia? Can NAPCI’s call for regional nuclear safety cooperation actually be realized, and what would effective cooperation look like? Strong, enduring commitment to nuclear safety cooperation by all regional actors will be necessary for NAPCI or any other initiative to succeed. This seminar will examine the current state of nuclear safety cooperation in Northeast Asia and offer a view to the future. Speaker: Dr. James E. Platte, Non-Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow, Pacific Forum, CSIS.
2. Peace, Conflict, and the Scale of the Climate Risk Landscape | Tuesday, August 25th | 1:15-2:45 | Webinar Sponsored by the Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Climate risks have the potential to affect every natural and social system, to harm populations, disrupt economic systems, and contribute directly or indirectly to conflicts within and across jurisdictional borders. The Global Climate Security webinar series convenes global thought leaders to seek pathways to improve responses to destabilizing climate risks. The opening webinar will examine the security implications of climate risk and will provide a context for the subsequent place-based and sector-based webinars. This session will address climate risk and security on all fronts from the risk assessment perspective (impacts on governance, economic vitality, national, regional and international security) to potential solutions (risk management, policy, and technical). Participants will hear from experts from the national intelligence and climate impact communities who will address the scale of the risks. The first webinar will set up the remaining webinars, which in turn will address how to respond in four sectors (national & subnational, industry, defense and global policy) based on risk assessment and responses commensurate with the risk. The intent is to examine steps to bridge the risk – policy analysis gap. Speakers include: Joshua Busby, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin Marc Levy, Deputy Director, Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Earth Institute, Columbia University, Mathew J. Burrows, Director, Strategic Foresight Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, and Nadya T. Bliss, Director, Global Security Initiative, Arizona State University.
3. Iran: What Next After the Nuclear Deal? | Tuesday, August 25th | 6:30-8:30 | Located at OpenGov Hub and sponsored by PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After last month’s Iran nuclear deal, what next for the Islamic Republic? Will the easing of sanctions bring it more into the diplomatic and international mainstream? Or will the new economic growth create a more assertive Iran that further antagonizes the rest of the region? What will the domestic consequences be of Tehran’s new openness to the outside world? And what, if anything, will happen to the nuclear program? Panelists include: Ariane Tabatabai, Visiting Assistant Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, Reza Akbari, Senior Program Officer, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, and Sam Cutler, Policy Advisor, Ferrari & Associates, P.C. Moderator: Negar Razavi, PhD candidate, University of Pennsylvania and Global Fellow, PS21.
4. International Youth Month Breakfast Briefing: “Young Democracy: Engagement as a Deterrent to Radicalization” | Wednesday, August 26th | 9:30 – 11:00 | Located at the Rayburn House Office Building and hosted by IFES | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join IFES for a breakfast briefing on how involving young people in constructive democratic processes can serve as a potential deterrent to radicalization. This panel will discuss engagement both before and after the age of enfranchisement, with a special emphasis on the political participation of young women and girls. Discussants will offer examples of programmatic work from multiple regions and countries, including Bangladesh, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Libya, Nepal, Syria and Yemen. This event will be co-hosted by the office of Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (TX-18). Speakers include: Matthew Cohen, Program Officer, Africa, IFES, Jessica Huber, Senior Gender Specialist, IFES, Juliette Schmidt, Deputy Regional Director, Asia and the Pacific, IFES, and Ambar Zobairi, Deputy Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa. Moderated by Augusta Featherston, Youth Adviser, IFES.
5. The Economic Impact of Lifting Sanctions on Iran | Thursday, August 27th | 10:00-11:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A new World Bank report assesses that the removal of economic sanctions against Iran could significantly boost economic growth in Iran—including $15 billion in annual oil revenue—while potentially reducing global oil prices as much as 14 percent in the short run, depending on OPEC’s response, and opening up a significant market for exports. Drawing from the report’s systematic and comprehensive analysis, Shantayanan Devarajan will discuss the economic and geopolitical implications of Iran’s potential reentry into the global economy. Carnegie’s Uri Dadush will discuss the economic consequences and Karim Sadjadpour will moderate. Speakers include: Shantayanan Devarajan, chief economist, MENA region, World Bank and Uri Dadush, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment. Moderator, Karim Sadjadpour, senior associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment.
PC: Eddie Grove
6. The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic | Thursday, August 27th | 10:00 – 11:30 | CSIS | REGISTRATION CLOSED- WATCH ONLINE | Please join us for the release and discussion of a new CSIS Europe Program report, The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic, which examines Russia’s economic, energy, and security strategies and aspirations in the Arctic, and the evolution of the Kremlin’s Arctic policies over the past decade. On the eve of President Obama’s and Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Anchorage, Alaska where they will convene Arctic and non-Arctic leaders to discuss climate impact and resilience, and global leadership in the Arctic, it is a timely moment to better understand the
largest and most dynamic Arctic actor and to assess whether the Arctic will remain a cooperative region or succumb to geopolitical tensions. Report author Heather A. Conley and project consultant Dr. Marlène Laruelle will examine the significant changes in Russia’s Arctic policies and rhetoric – particularly since President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012 – and offer their insights on Russia’s military posturing in the region, as well as how to develop new collaborative thinking to preserve and protect international Arctic cooperation. New York Times correspondent Steven Lee Myers, who has written about and traveled frequently to the Russian Arctic, will offer his reflections on the report and assess whether the
development of a 21st century “ice curtain” is realistic. The panelists will also preview the upcoming August 31st meeting in Alaska and assess the impact of the potential attendance of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic. Speakers include: Dr. Marlène Laruelle, Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University and Steven Lee Myers, Correspondent, The New York Times. Introduced and moderated by Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic, CSIS Europe Program.
7. A Normal Nuclear Pakistan | Thursday, August 27th | 12:30-2:00 | Stimson | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A commercial pathway for Pakistan to join the mainstream in the global nuclear order is highly unlikely. Pakistan’s leaders must therefore consider nuclear weapon-related initiatives that could facilitate mainstreaming, while also strengthening nonproliferation norms, bolstering global disarmament hopes, and setting the bar higher for new entrants into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This presentation will discuss a new report by the Stimson Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,” co-written by Toby Dalton (Co-Founder and Senior Associate, Stimson) and Michael Krepon (Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). The report takes a hard look at Pakistan’s nuclear weapon-related programs and its ambitions to be viewed as a normal state possessing advanced nuclear technologies.
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Forget renegotiation, try these ideas
Rob Satloff, abandoning previous suggestions for renegotiation of the nuclear agreement with Iran, now puts forward proposals for the US to undertake without any need for Iranian agreement. He ties these to defeat of the agreement in Congress (whether by a veto-proof majority or not I can’t tell), but that is not logically necessary for their consideration. So let’s consider them, one by one:
Consequences: Rob wants punishments other than full sanctions “snapback” defined for non-capital violations, as he rightly anticipates it will be difficult to to use “the nuclear option,” if I may call it that, unless the violation is major. Specifically, he proposes
to reach understandings now with America’s European partners, the core elements of which should be made public, on the appropriate penalties to be imposed for a broad spectrum of Iranian violations.
I see no reason not to talk about this and even agree the penalties with the Europeans now, but is making the consequences public likely to increase compliance?
I wonder. Penalties defined now are likely to be less severe than what we can actually get once a violation occurs. It might be far better to wait for a incident of noncompliance and respond vigorously. I see no justification for Rob’s assumption that penalties defined later have “no value.” The first violation and reaction are the key to imposing credible consequences.
Deterrence: Rob wants penalties agreed and defined for transfer of funds from sanctions relief to Iran’s regional trouble-making. He suggests:
…these new multilateral sanctions should impose disproportionate penalties on Iran for every marginal dollar sent to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, etc.
Assuming that Rob is correct that our intelligence agencies can in fact determine unequivocally what amount represents increased assistance (which would surprise me), I again see no problem in discussing this with our friends. As he notes, levying sanctions of this sort is not ruled out because they are unrelated to the nuclear issue. We should be traying to block these transfers regardless of what happens on the nuclear deal.
Pushback: This is a related idea:
“Ramp up U.S. and allied efforts to counter Iran’s negative actions in the Middle East, including interdicting weapons supplies to Hezbollah, Assad, and the Houthis in Yemen; designating as terrorists more leaders of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq that are committing atrocities; expanding the training and arming of not only the Iraqi security forces but also the Kurdish peshmerga in the north and vetted Sunni forces in western Iraq; and working with Turkey to create a real safe haven in northern Syria where refugees can obtain humanitarian aid and vetted, non-extremist opposition fighters can be trained and equipped to fight against both ISIS and the Iran-backed Assad regime.”
Each of these propositions deserves its own consideration, but in general it seems to me vital that we push back in some of these or other ways against Iranian misbehavior in the region, lest Tehran get the idea that the nuclear agreement blesses their ambition of achieving regional hegemony.
Declaratory policy: Rob wants a Congressionally endorsed statement that the US will use military force to prevent Iran from embarking, after the 15-year restrictions in the agreement, on enrichment that could “only” lead to a nuclear weapon. For reasons I fail to fathom, he thinks to be effective this has to be done now by the president who did the deal.
Even leaving aside that problematic “only” lead to a nuclear weapon (which betrays a lack of understanding of the many ways in which uranium enriched to high levels can in theory be used), Rob is self-contradictory. First Rob says President Obama’s threat that “all options are on the table” has lost credibility. Then he says it has to be this president to say more or less the same thing, this time with Congressional backing, in order to be credible.
More importantly, Rob fails to consider the international repurcussions of having the Administration do this right now. The hardliners in Iran love reiteration of the “all options” statement, as it demonstrates their thesis that American attitudes are unchanged and Washington seeks an opportunity to strike Iran.
If Congress wants to go on record, I don’t see who could stop it. Nor do I think anyone in Tehran doubts where Congressional sentiment lies. But the Administration has a stake in seeing maximum implementation of this agreement, which is threatened on the Iranian end by hardliners who didn’t want to see it done in the first place. Strengthening opponents of the deal in Tehran is not in the US interest.
Israeli deterrence: Rob wants to transfer the Massive Ordnance Penetrator and the means to deliver it to Israel.
Here more discussion is needed. Is this without end-use controls, or with them? What means are needed to deliver it, and how many of the bombs and delivery means are we talking about? How realistic is it to imagine that Israel will have the capabilities needed to evade Iranian air defenses and deliver these 30,000-pound monsters? Who is going to pay for this stuff?
So yes, there are certainly some things we should be doing to block Iranian misbehavior in the region but I’ve got more questions than answers about some of Rob’s other propositions.
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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Big surprise is no surprise
The Middle East Institute published my piece this evening:
The Iran nuclear deal has only one big surprise: it is consistent with the April 2 “parameters” that preceded it and contains no surprises. No one caved. Nothing got walked back.
But there are some interesting additions. One is this: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” This is a written confirmation of the Supreme Leader’s controversial “fatwa” against nuclear weapons. It was not so long ago that Iran’s critics in the United States were complaining that the fatwa was only oral and not written. I have not noticed anyone welcoming the written version.
The “reaffirmation” wouldn’t be worth the paper it is printed on except for the detailed limits and intrusive inspections that the agreement provides. No softie on Iran, Dennis Ross confirms that these fulfill previous Iranian commitments to limit centrifuges, enrichment, and enriched uranium; end all plans for separating plutonium; and no longer engage in any research and development related to a nuclear explosive device. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring will be more comprehensive and intrusive than for other countries. While no system is foolproof, nuclear weapons have never been developed within an IAEA safeguarded program.
That leaves the possibility of a clandestine nuclear program outside the purview of the IAEA. There is reason to believe that Tehran had such a program until 2003, when it was allegedly stopped. Iran, which previously stonewalled IAEA inquiries on this subject, has now committed in the nuclear deal to clarifying its past nuclear activities with “possible military dimensions” by October 15, with a final assessment due from the IAEA on December 15. This will be an important early milestone in implementation (or not) of the nuclear deal. It is not the first time the Iranians have promised clarification. Beyond that date, the IAEA can request access to locations of concern. Iranian objections can be overridden by five of eight members of a joint commission overseeing implementation of the agreement. That joint commission includes five Western members (the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and the EU) as well as Russia, China, and Iran.
The agreement provides for sanctions to be lifted once Iran implements its obligations or passes certain time limits in compliance with the agreement. No sanctions get lifted without implementation, and some—like the arms embargo—remain in place for five or eight years (depending on the weapons involved). While most restrictions are lifted within 15 years, some remain in place in perpetuity, including strict IAEA safeguards and the prohibition on nuclear weapons research and development.
The question is what happens if one or another obligation is breached. There is an elaborate, but quick-paced (I count 35 days), dispute resolution mechanism. At that point, UN Security Council sanctions would be reinstated, unless the Council votes within 30 days to continue lifting them. This is a “snapback” mechanism, unprecedented so far as I know in the Security Council. It would give the United States (and other permanent members) a veto over sanctions lifting. Iran has stated that it would treat reinstatement of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments.
So, is this agreement a good thing or a bad thing?
It depends on what you think the alternative might be. At worst, it would be no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program, no IAEA monitoring, and no multilateral sanctions, as the EU and China are champing at the bit to do business with a cash, oil, and gas-rich Iran. At best we might in the absence of an agreement be able to sustain the sanctions for a while but not likely the IAEA monitoring and technological constraints, giving others in the region reason to initiate their own programs to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. War might set back the Iranian nuclear program for a few years, but it would also give them incentive to finish the job and unleash even more chaos than the region is currently enduring.
Relief from sanctions will unquestionably provide the Iranians with resources. Tehran is owed upward of $100 billion that will flow into its coffers, in addition to whatever its renewed exports will bring in today’s bearish oil market, likely to go down further because of Iran’s reentry into it. The Islamic Republic is a profoundly anti-Western regime that even without much available cash has managed to contribute to instability in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Its anti-Americanism may sound hollow after this agreement, which engages Iran in a continuing process involving the United States and three of its allies as well as the European Union, but unless there is a dramatic and unexpected change of heart at the top in Tehran we can anticipate more trouble from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies in the region and even beyond.
America’s friends in the Gulf will therefore be nervous about the implications of this agreement, though the United Arab Emirates was quick to say it welcomed it. Israel denounced it even before the ink was on the page. But soon enough both the Gulf states and Israel will become keen about insisting on fulfilling its every letter, as they have with the interim agreement currently in effect.
The debate in Congress will be vigorous. Most Republicans and a good number of Democrats will oppose the deal on the grounds that it licenses Iran to become a nuclear threshold state, ignoring the Obama administration’s conviction that this would happen faster and with fewer controls in the absence of an agreement. But the opponents are unlikely to muster the two-thirds majority in both houses required to override a presidential veto. The Supreme Leader is thought to have given the green light for this deal, but he has not yet pronounced on it. Assuming he says a dramatically reluctant “yes,” the Iranian Majlis will not block it.
The saga of implementation has not yet begun. It will last 10-15 years. If the agreement holds and prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it will have made an enormous contribution to peace and stability. If it fails, we will have to deal with the ugly consequences: war or a nuclearized Middle East.
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Iran’s return to oil markets
Thursday, the Wilson Center focused on “Middle East Energy: Beyond an Iran Nuclear Deal,” which explored the oil and gas sectors’ future given Iran’s possible sanctions relief. Speakers included David Goldwyn, President of Goldwyn Global Strategies LLC, David Gordon, Senior Advisor of the Eurasia Group, Julia Nanay, Principal at Energy Ventures LLC and Jean-Francois Seznec, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. The event was moderated by Jan H. Kalicki, Wilson Center Public Policy Fellow and Energy Lead.
Gordon talked about potential energy market responses with the entry of Libya and Iran into the market. Libya’s entry last year put downward pressure on oil prices. The country is currently in the process of building up its export volumes, but the political and security fragility remains. Iran’s market impact is also uncertain. There may be competition between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states for market share. Iran’s success is far from assured. The current uncertainty ends up being bearish for energy markets, which will lead to the strengthening of the US dollar. Only the risk of supply disruption and failure of nuclear talks could be bullish for markets.
If sanctions are lifted, Nanay thinks Iran’s key goal is to become the second largest producer in OPEC. Saudi Arabia’s oil production amounts to 10.3 million barrels a day, while Iran is at 2.8 million barrels a day. Iraq’s is a bit higher. Iran might bring back 700-800,000 barrels a day, with 20 million barrels released quickly and efficiently. Sanctions have also prevented oil revenues from flowing back to Iran. There may be as much as $100 billion that could be released quickly, possibly half from China. International oil companies (IOCs) also owe large sums to Iran.
Possible losers from sanctions relief are the Saudis, Russians, Nigerians and Kuwaitis. The Saudis and Russians have been able to capture some exports to China. Sanctions relief would decrease the market share of all oil exporting countries that have benefited from having Iran off the oil market.
Iran has several stalled projects with significant market potential in the oil and gas sectors. A South Pars project requires 24 phases to develop fully, of which 11 phases have already been done without sanctions removal. Iran is looking to complete more phases by next year. Iran has also planned three big Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects. Iran can ship this LNG to Europe and supply its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but politics may complicate partnerships. The only neighbor Iran has a good relationship with is Oman. An Iran-Oman gas pipeline is possible, but the countries may disagree on price.
Seznec disagreed with Nanay on Iran’s potential in the oil market. Iran will require technology and investment that would make it dependent on IOCs. Instead, Iran can emphasize natural gas, which both Iran and the Gulf states need. The GCC states—especially Saudi Arabia—could partner with Iran in the gas sector. The Saudis have the technology and money to help the Iranians redevelop their gas fields. The Kingdom is seeking to avoid overdependence on crude oil. Instead, it wants to add value by building capacity for refined products and chemicals. Their vision is eventually to get out selling crude and leave Iran and Iraq as the “third world countries” that produce raw materials.
Goldwyn commented on Iraq’s position in the oil market. He believes Iraq might increase production by completing the revamp of the Al Faw Peninsula, but that is an $8-10 billion dollar project.
On the Baghdad-Kurdistan Regional Government deal, Goldwyn pointed out two reasons for the unraveling:
- Baghdad hasn’t paid Kurdish forces what it owes.
- The Kurds are not exporting the agreed-upon average of 550,000 barrels per day.
If Iraq is unable to increase production much and Iran produces an additional 500-800,000 barrels a day, there is no need for OPEC quota renegotiation, Goldwyn said. There is room for rapprochement on economics between Iran and the Gulf states. But first there must be rapprochement on security. If Iran reduces its involvement in Yemen and Iraq, there is potential for détente with the Saudis, who would also have to do their part in reducing the flow of funds to Al Qaeda and ISIS. If both parties deliver, an economic deal is on the horizon. Otherwise, the current situation will continue, with the Saudis better financed and more competitive than any other player in the Gulf.
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