Tag: Yemen
Deal or no deal
Everyone is anticipating a nuclear deal with Iran today, or not. Either way it is the big news.
I’d bet 60/40 on a “framework” political commitment that lays out some basic and well-known parameters: limits on enriching and stockpiling uranium, slowing of plutonium production, lifting of sanctions and limits over a decade or more, and International Atomic Energy Agency verification.
I don’t expect much on what I regard as the most critical question: answers to the IAEA questions about “possible military dimensions.” No IAEA-safeguarded nuclear program has ever generated the material used in a nuclear weapons program. All proliferation has been accomplished in secret. Iran has still not clarified some of its past activities, but that issue is treated separately between Tehran and the IAEA, not in the P5+1 talks.
Any agreement is going to be difficult for both the US and Iran. Hardliners abound in both countries. Distrust is the rule, not the exception. President Obama needs to be able to argue credibly that framework agreement will in fact prevent Iran from gaining the material needed to make a nuclear weapon in less than a year, as well as ensure that we will know if a decision to produce nuclear weapons is made. President Rouhani will have to be able to argue credibly that Iran’s basic rights have been respected and sanctions significantly alleviated.
Both Tehran and Washington will need to be able to argue that a deal is better than no deal. Washington’s argument will include the inevitable fraying of the sanctions regime if there is no deal. Tehran’s argument will include the inevitable additional damage to Iran’s economy and the (unmentioned but still important) possibility of domestic instability. Both will want to avoid war, which would be devastating for Iran but also embroil the US in still another Middle Eastern conflict, without setting the Iranian nuclear program back more than a few years.
Within the P5+1 team, China and Russia will weigh heavily towards a deal that is generous to Iran. The UK, France and Germany will be closer to the US position, with France apparently arguing for a tougher stand on sanctions than the US. These other participants will be able to influence the shape of what is proposed, but it will ultimately be up to Iran and the US to accept or reject it.
I won’t be surprised if there are last-minute hitches that extend the negotiations, at least for a few hours. That is common in all international negotiations, not least because officials in capitals–in this case Presidents Obama and Rouhani as well as Supreme Leader Khamenei–will need to give a final green or red light. But it is also true that the temptation to throw in a last demand at midnight is great, since the other side by that time is anticipating a result.
Whatever is decided, or not, today or early tomorrow in Lausanne will need further technical elaboration in the months to come before the end-June deadline for a full agreement. Technical details are important. We can expect further drama in the weeks and months to come.
Iran and the US remain at odds on other Middle East issues, including most notably at the moment Syria and Yemen. Even in Iraq, where both are fighting against the Islamic State, their fundamental interests diverge. Even with a deal, peace is unlikely to break out. But a deal might well prevent things from getting much worse.
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Peace picks March 23 – 27
- Boko Haram, the Islamic State’s West African Franchise | Monday March 23 | 12:00 – 1:00 | Hudson Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Boko Haram swore fealty to the Islamic State earlier this month. The Nigerian Islamist terrorist organization, infamous for the abduction of 276 Chibok schoolgirls last April, has a long record of violent atrocities. Recently, it has increased attacks on marketplaces and public spaces, indiscriminately murdering moderate Muslims and Christians alike. How will this new affiliation impact the operations and reach of Boko Haram? To assess the humanitarian situation in Nigeria and the global security implications of an alliance between two of the world’s deadliest terror groups, Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom Director Nina Shea will host a discussion with Bukky Shonibare and Emmanuel Ogebe. Bukky Shonibare is a strategic team member of the #BringBackOurGirls Campaign and the coordinator of Adopt-A-Camp, a program that assists internally displaced persons in Nigeria. She will provide her firsthand account of conditions on the ground. Emmanuel Ogebe, a human rights lawyer from Nigeria, will evaluate the broad impact of the new alliance between Boko aram and the Islamic State.
- Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: Learning from 2013-2014 & Looking Ahead | Monday March 23 | 3:30 – 5:00 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | President Obama has raised the possibility of another push for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement before he leaves office. With stability on the ground already severely at stake, it is imperative that any renewed attempt take account of lessons learned from last year’s round of failed talks. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Center for a New American Security on March 23, for a discussion with Ilan Goldenberg, the chief of staff to the U.S. special envoy during those talks and author of the new report Lessons from the 2013-2014 Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Negotiations. What suggestions and recommendations can we draw from a process that built upon and at times diverged from the path of previous diplomatic efforts? How can they be leveraged by the U.S., the international community and the parties themselves to move forward constructively toward a peace agreement? Goldenberg will be joined by a panel of experts who will offer an assessment of the report’s findings and recommendations, particularly in light of lessons learned from earlier rounds of negotiations. The panel will include William B. Quandt, Professor Emeritus, Department of Politics, University of Virginia and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Director of Arab-Israeli Conflict Programs, USIP, will
- Jerusalem: Divided or Indivisible? | Tuesday March 24 | 9:30 – 11:00 | Foundation for Middle East Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Israel has controlled East Jerusalem for almost 50 years. During that time, Israeli authorities have been responsible for municipal services, housing, and urban planning for Jerusalem’s more than 300,000 Palestinian Arabs. Yet even as Israeli politicians proclaim that Jerusalem will never be divided, the contrast between its Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods is starker than ever. The poverty rate for Palestinians in East Jerusalem is near 80%, physical infrastructure in Palestinian neighborhoods is poor, public facilities are few and far between, and a chronic housing shortage leads Palestinians to resort to unpermitted construction, for lack of alternatives. Simultaneously, Israeli settlement and building and construction further consolidates Israeli control over the city, undermining prospects for a political resolution on the city. The inequity and friction between Palestinians and Jews in Jerusalem is in many ways a microcosm of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. FMEP invites to hear from Yudith Oppenheimer from Israeli NGO Ir Amim as she outlines key findings from its report, “Jerusalem: The Rising Cost of Peace,” a longitudinal mapping of developments on the ground from the introduction of the Clinton Parameters in 2000 until today. In context of the findings, Yudith will discuss the current forecast for a political resolution on the city. Yudith is joined by Nava Sheer (Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights), who will present on the challenges facing those who advocate the development of planning policies and practices that are more just and respectful of human rights, and responsive to the needs of local communities in Jerusalem.
- Facing Terrorism: A Lebanese Perspective | Wednesday March 25 | 12:00 – 1:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Lebanon is surprisingly quiet while the region around it is literally burning. The country is facing many challenges, from the vacancy in the presidency to Hezbollah’s involvement in the fight in Syria to the presence of over one million Syrian refugees. Because of the government’s war on terror, Lebanon has succeeded in keeping a lid on the sources of tension in the country while fighting extremism and fending off terrorism. Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, a key figure in this fight to keep the country stable and secure, will discuss fighting extremism in Lebanon and how to keep Lebanon from becoming involved in the surrounding wars.
- Voices of Civil Society in Iraq | Wednesday March 25 | 12:00 – 2:00 | National Endowment for Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As part of the World Movement for Democracy’s Civic Space Initiatives (CSI), the World Movement will hold an event to discuss a landscape of civil society in Iraq. The event will serve as a launch of the World Movement’s new CSI video, Fatima. Fatima Al-Bahadly, featured in the film, will be one of the featured panelists. The CSI video shows how she deals with challenges and works with various communities, such as youth, women, religious minorities, and the public sector (provincial council). Amina Hassan, who was behind a camera and produced the Fatima video, is also an extremely courageous activist. Because of her media/journalism work, she was shot three times by militants some years ago, but she survived. And, today she is committed to continuing working to address social issues through media production. The activists will be joined by Zainab al-Suwaij, from the American Islamic Congress in Washington DC. Laith Kubba, Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, will act as moderator.
- Fragility and Extremism in Yemen, Again |Thursday March 26 | 9:00 – 10:30 | Bipartisan Policy Center | Yemen seemingly only attracts U.S. attention when tied to a terrorist attack or plot: the USS Cole in 2000; Anwar al-Awlaki’s incitement to terror since 2004; the “underwear bomber” in 2009; the cargo plane plot in 2010. The country’s long-simmering political fragility and endemic civil wars largely escape notice. Now, both dynamics are at play simultaneously: just days after Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took credit for the Kouachi brothers’ attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the Iran-backed Houthis have overrun the capital and forced the resignation of the Yemeni government. Please join us for a discussion of recent events in Yemen and how they will affect U.S. counterterrorism efforts and regional dynamics. The panel debate will feature Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, William D. Murray, Founder, Alphom Group and former Senior Executive, Central Intelligence Agency. The debate will moderated by Mark Hosenball, Journalist, Reuters.
- The Way Forward in the U.S.-Afghanistan Security Partnership | Thursday March 26 | 11:00 – 12:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join us as Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan, discusses the way forward for the U.S.-Afghanistan partnership. How can the two countries continue to work together to ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability? What kinds of support do the Afghan security forces require to stave off Taliban advances? What should be the long-term U.S. role in helping to stabilize the country? Following months of political tensions over disputed election results, the two main contenders, Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani, agreed last fall to a power sharing arrangement in which Ghani became the country’s new President and Abdullah was sworn in as his Chief Executive. The two leaders will be in Washington for an official visit March 22-25. Jim DeMint, President, The Heritage Foundation, will act as discussant.
- States of Fragility: Post-2015 Ambitions | Friday March 27 | 10:30 – 12:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | More than 1 billion people live in countries affected by armed conflict or by the fragility of their societies. Fragile states are often vulnerable to conflict because their populations tend to see their governments as ineffective, illegitimate, or both. As a group, they are the ones that lag furthest behind in achieving the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. USIP invites to a discussion on a new report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions,” sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. The panel will include Melissa Brown, Director, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID, Alexandre Marc, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence-Cross Cutting Solutions Area, World Bank Group, Brenda Killen, Deputy Director, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD, Jolanda Profos, Peace and Conflict Adviser, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD, Sarah Hearn, Associate Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation. Andrew Blum, Vice President of Program Management and Evaluation, USIP, will moderate, and Nancy Lindborg,
President, USIP, will hold the opening remarks. - Discussion with Prince Moulay Hicham of Morocco on the Future of Authoritarianism in the Middle East | Friday March 27 | 11:00 – 12:30 | Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs | Morocco’s Prince Moulay Hicham Ben Abdallah El Alaoui is an established voice calling for political reform and greater democracy in the Arab world. As an author, scholar, and philanthropist, he has been deeply involved in establishing creative initiatives for scholarly research on the Middle East on topics including democracy, climate change, governance, and authoritarianism. He will share his expertise on current regional issues during his lecture.
- Colombia: Peace from the Regions | Friday March 27 | 3:00 – 4:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Colombia Peace Forum is a series of policy discussions sponsored by USIP to support a peaceful resolution to one of the world’s longest-running internal armed conflicts. At our March 27 forum, a panel of experts will analyze how a peace accord might be implemented on the ground. How will it build on existing efforts? And how can it be made inclusive and participatory? The session also will take up questions of the linkages among the regions and with the central government; the rights and needs of citizens; and ways to enhance citizens’ participation and effectiveness in promoting peace in the regions. The program will be conducted in Spanish with a simultaneous English translation for those who attend the event. The webcast will be in Spanish and an English video of the event will be available a day or so after. Speakers will include Virginia M. Bouvier, Senior Advisor for Latin America Programs, USIP, Andrés Santamaria Garrido, President, National Federation of Ombudspeople (Personeros), Adela Aguirre, Ombudswoman of Pasto, Department of Nariño and Marino Córdoba, Afro-Colombian Peace Council (CNPA) and Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (AFRODES).
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The Levant will never be the same
I spoke Thursday morning at the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome on “The Fight Against ISIS and US Middle East Policy.” The powerpoint I used is attached.
Questions focused on Iran and whether it might play a positive or negative regional role if a nuclear deal is reached. My guess is that it may continue to play a negative role, because the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will lose something in a nuclear deal and may require compensation. That could come in the form of a free hand to pursue aggressive Iranian objectives in the region, including not only Syria and Iraq but also in Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain.
There is, however, one important constraint on Iran: partition of Iraq or Syria would be against its interests, as it would likely lead to problems in the Iranian province of Eastern Kurdistan. Iran will not want its strong support for Shia militias in Iraq or for the regime in Syria to precipitate partition of either of those countries. The question is whether they will recognize the danger before it becomes irreversible. In my view, it is important to have Iran inside any future multilateral talks on Syria, precisely to expose them to the risks of going too far.
A couple of people raised the question of how the ISIS is financed. I know of no one with a really good answer to this question. I certainly don’t have one. It is clear enough that they used to get lots of money from trading in oil and oil products, but the anti-ISIS coalition has destroyed a good deal of their capacity to refine (and the drop in oil prices hits them too). They gained a good deal of hard cash from banks in Mosul, but that is a non-renewable resource. My impression is that Gulf funding has largely dried up, though it may still continue from private sources.
One person asked about the mutual silence of ISIS and Israel. They seem to be leaving each other alone. I think that is a temporary bit of restraint. Both recognize the danger and enmity of the other but are not willing yet to engage. That condition won’t last forever. Israel wants to be sure ISIS does not gain control of its border with Syria. ISIS will go after Jerusalem when it feels strong enough to do so.
A good deal of the discussion, including Riccardo Alcaro’s enlightening introduction, revolved around the question of how stability might be brought to areas liberated from ISIS as well as the necessity of doing so. General Allen has only just begun the process of talking with the Iraqis about stabilization. There are no easy answers, but security, governance and essential services will need to be provided. We are a long way not only from defeating ISIS but also from ensuring that the war does not create vacua that even more radical groups might seek to fill.
If you think of the war against Islamic extremism as having begun with the US attack on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, it is clear we have been more successful in fragmenting and spreading the enemy than in containing him, much less defeating him. That’s due in large part to stabilization failures, not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere. It would be better not to repeat that experience, though I have little confidence we have either the means or will required.
The war has displaced and impoverished many millions. Minorities are on the run. Relative majorities are frightened and distrustful. States are failing. Borders are evaporating. Extremism is reaping rewards. Moderation is fading. The Levant will never be the same.
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Sunnis don’t like ISIS
Munqith Dagher Wednesday presented at CSIS his latest findings on Iraqi public opinion concerning ISIS. A pioneer in public opinion polling in Iraq and CEO of the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, Dagher challenged common narratives about ISIS as well as more conventional wisdom about terrorism and radicalization.
CSIS Fellow Anthony Cordesman reminded the audience that the Arab world plays the primary role in the campaign against ISIS. Arabs also remain the primary ISIS casualties: State Department data show an exponential increase in terrorist attacks in recent decades, from 300 major attacks yearly between 1998 and 2008 to 4700 in 2013. Neo-salafist extremist groups have been growing rapidly, by 60% in the last two years. Moreover, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) suffers social and economic deterioration, including rapid population growth and high unemployment – particularly among youth. These challenges must be overcome if ISIS and similar groups are to be defeated.
June 9, 2014 was a benchmark in the history of terrorism, Dagher argued. The takeover of Mosul and eventually 40% of Iraqi territory by ISIS was not entirely unexpected – in fact public opinion data had indicated deep problems in the Mosul area for years. In order to understand these problems more thoroughly, Dagher began a careful study of public opinion in Iraq and Syria, relying on a combination of nationwide face-to-face polling and in-depth interviews with opinion leaders from ISIS-controlled areas. The data provide tests for three alternative explanations of ISIS expansion: religion, poverty and lack of services, and political and social factors.
The first proposition is that ISIS represents Sunni religious sentiment in Iraq and Syria. Polling data however, point to disharmony between Sunni populations and ISIS: while 90% of respondents describe religion as important to their lives, only 13% of Syrians support ISIS, whereas 94% of Iraqi Sunnis describe it as a terrorist organization. There is also a strong ideological contradiction between the local population and ISIS: 81% of Iraqi Sunnis want separation of religion from politics. Dagher also pointed to the strong pride that Mosul Sunnis have for their history, which stands in contrast to ISIS’ destruction of cultural heritage. These recent actions may be less ideological imperative than ISIS response to recent controls put in place along the border that make smuggling historic artifacts more difficult.
A second explanation for the growth of ISIS is that it corresponds to high levels of poverty and failure of the state to provide services. This is often put forward as an explanation of radicalization more generally. However, Dagher could find no statistically significant differences between areas controlled by ISIS and areas outside of ISIS control in terms of unemployment. There is also no significant difference between Shia and Sunni household incomes. Dagher also pointed to the growth of ISIS in Libya, a country that has long enjoyed a relatively high level of development, according to UN Human Development Reports.
Instead, Dagher suggested that political and social factors are key to explaining ISIS’ growth. A number of indicators point in this direction. In the months leading up to the takeover of Mosul, 83-91% of Sunnis believed that Iraq was going in the wrong direction, registering high levels of discontent, insecurity and distrust of the state and the justice system. Sunnis also reported a drastic decline in national sentiment: while 80 percent saw nationality as the primary basis for their identity in 2008, only 40 percent did the same in 2014. Distressingly, similar results of growing insecurity and distrust were found in recent opinion polls in Libya and Yemen.
While these numbers paint a somber picture of the political situation in Iraq and the region more generally, there are also hopeful indications. Since the Maliki government was removed, trust in government made a tremendous jump, from 4% to 47%. There is also significant support for the international anti-ISIS coalition. These figures should give impetus to Iraq’s allies to focus on tackling the underlying political and social factors that have contributed to the rise of ISIS.
Dagher cautioned about the destabilizing role of Shia militias and the influence of Iran in the current fight against ISIS. Among Sunnis, the view of the Shia militias is extremely negative. This is hardly a surprise – Shia militias have displaced, killed and imprisoned Sunnis throughout the areas they have conquered. There is good reason to be highly critical of the use of Shia militias to defeat ISIS. The current offensive against Tikrit is one example – according to Dagher the embattled Tikritis would prefer ISIS over the Shia militias. If we want Sunni communities to fight ISIS, we must help them overcome the pervasive political and social problems they are facing and persuade them there is in fact hope at the end of the tunnel.
Dagher’s slide presentation is available here.
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Bluster with consequences
Prime Minister Netanyahu was better today in Congress than yesterday at the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee. But still blustering.
He argued that the nuclear deal with Iran currently under consideration is bad because
- it leaves a lot of nuclear infrastructure in place (enabling what he regards as a minimal one-year breakout time);
- Iran could evade the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections or evict the inspectors, as North Korea did;
- It would leave Iran unconstrained in a decade.
Netanyahu wants a better agreement that continues sanctions and restrictions on the nuclear program until Iran stops its aggression and support for terror in other countries (he mentioned Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon in this connection) and ends its threat to annihilate Israel. Failing this, Netanyahu wants no deal.
Netanyahu failed to explain how the US would be able to get the kind of deal he is talking about. The Europeans, Russia and China are unlikely to continue sanctions if the current deal is not concluded. Without multilateral sanctions, Iran would still be feeling some pressure from the oil price collapse and unilateral US sanctions, but it is hard to picture Tehran signing on to something more restrictive with a disunited international community than with a united one.
Netanyahu also said explicitly that he prefers no deal to the current deal, which he described as paving the way for an Iranian nuclear weapon. That’s loony. Without some sort of deal–at least extension of the interim Plan of Action–Iran would be free to race for a nuclear weapon without constraints other than the existing IAEA inspections. If Netanyahu thinks they are inadequate in the deal being negotiated, which beefs them up significantly, why would they be any better without a deal?
Looking beyond the bluster, there were a few interesting commissions and omissions in the speech. Netanyahu dropped the explicit threat of war. He did say Israel can defend itself and will stand alone if necessary, but he neither demanded that the US go to war against Iran nor stated clearly what Israel would do. He presumably has come to understand that the military option is a bad one: it won’t succeed in destroying everything, it would accelerate Iran’s nuclear efforts and it would have to be repeated in a few years time. Iran’s nuclear program involves many installations, some of which are buried deep underground. Even the US would have trouble damaging it beyond repair.
I share Netanyahu’s concern with Iranian behavior throughout the Middle East (and occasionally beyond, witness the terrorism it sponsored in Argentina). I’m not sure he is correct that Iran is as radical as ever, but let’s concede that premise. He imagines maintaining sanctions will be useful in moderating Iranian behavior or bringing about regime change. There are two problems with this hypothesis. There is no reason to believe it true–countries isolated by sanctions often become more radical, not less–and there is no way to maintain the sanctions.
So what we got this morning was more classic Netanyahu: bluster without any serious effort to explain how his newly discovered alternative, a better deal, could be achieved. I trust the speech will help him in his electoral campaign in Israel, if only because it shifts the debate there away from his vulnerabilities (economic and social policy) and towards security, which favors the Israeli right wing (though not necessarily Netanyahu himself). Here in the US, it will make life harder for the Obama Administration, as it implicitly roused the Congress to oppose any deal Secretary Kerry brings home.
I suppose Speaker Boehner, who invited Netanyahu to address Congress without informing the White House, is satisfied and hopes this show will help him face down a brewing revolt against his leadership among House Republicans. Netanyahu hopes Israelis won’t notice that he has put the country’s relationship with the United States at risk. I hope both lose those bets.
PS: Some Israelis seem to agree with me:
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Libya and Yemen: forgotten civil wars resurface
A C-SPAN recording of the event can be accessed here.
While the conflicts in Syria and Iraq may be making most of the headlines in the Middle East recently, the conflicts in Libya and Yemen still simmer under the surface. On Wednesday, a panel discussion at the Brookings Institution, moderated by Daniel Byman, sought to revisit these conflicts. The panel was timely, in light of recent escalation of violence in both countries.
The discussion was kicked off by Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey, who recently returned from a visit to Libya. The renewed conflict there, he argued, is an aftershock of Gaddafi’s legacy of divisive politics, which the post-2011 transitional government failed to overcome. The civil war has now turned into a conflict between two large coalitions: the anti-Islamists in Tobruk and the Islamists in Tripoli. However, the real dividing line is not between Islamists and anti-Islamists, but between elements of the old order and revolutionary forces. Both camps have engaged in demonization of their opponents, polarizing the political environment.
At the same time, the coalitions are facing fragmentation, which is both encouraging and worrisome. While fragmentation allows for identification of moderates supportive of a peaceful solution, it also opens up the possibility of spoilers that could undermine the ongoing peace process.
A particularly worrisome development is the rise of the Islamic State in the country. Jihadism has been a factor in Libya since before the revolution. A number of post-revolutionary jihadist militias have been formed – most notably the Al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar al-Sharia. Anti-Islamist forces have now weakened Ansar al-Sharia, opening up space for ISIS recruitment, particularly among the groups younger cohorts.
If no peace deal materializes in the current round of Geneva talks, the international community needs to consider its options. One suggestion has been to cut off Libya’s state revenues – a significant portion of which is held in Europe. While this might be a powerful measure, as both sides rely on state revenues to fund their allied militias’ sophisticated weaponry, there is also the possibility of blowback in the form of further fragmentation, making European policymakers unwilling to move forward.
A UN force has also recently been floated, but large uncertainties remain, including the size of the required force. According to some estimates around 30,000 troops would be necessary. Meanwhile, intervention by Libya’s neighbors – most notably Egypt – would likely inflame the conflict rather than bring about a solution.
Ending on a cautiously positive note, Wehrey argued that there is a growing sense of exhaustion among segments of Libya’s population, resulting in emergence of pragmatists in both camps. Identifying and bringing these pragmatists into the national dialogue process is likely the best way to ensure that the conflict is peacefully resolved.
Yemeni blogger Sama’a al-Hamdani of Yemen-iaty provided a somber account of the recent developments in Sana’a. Yemen, which was only a few years ago compared to Tunisia as a success of the Arab Spring, is now increasingly being compared to Libya and Syria. According to al-Hamdani, the conflict is today playing out between the Houthi movement, a significant but uncoordinated Southern secessionist movement and remaining supporters of the outgoing Hadi government. Tribal actors and the Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda are also playing important roles.
An important cause of the current conflict is the unjustified extension of the political transition, which cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Hadi government. Al- Hamdani also blamed Western governments for failing to engage Yemeni society beyond the government itself. As a result, they have no pan B. Going forward, al-Hamdani warned against isolating the Houthis since this would likely push them more firmly into the hands of Iran. Instead, the West should reengage with the authorities in Sana’a and push all parties to pursue a peaceful solution to the crisis.
Former ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, echoed al-Hamdani’s points, criticizing the policy failures of the West. A key failure of Western analysis is the tendency to frame Yemeni politics in a static pattern bound to misrepresent the country’s kaleidoscopic political dynamics.
Bodine also pointed out that the crisis in Yemen is not a failure of intelligence, since many of the events that have taken place since September were predictable. Rather, the crisis is a policy failure that resulted from single-minded pursuit of counter-terrorism objectives rather than broader political goals necessary to stabilize Yemen. If Washington is to play a constructive role in the country, it must go beyond its drone strategy.
Deputy director at Brookings’ Doha Center, Ibrahim Sharqieh, attempted to draw some parallels between the two conflicts. On a positive note, Sharqieh pointed out that the current levels of instability in Libya and Yemen were not entirely out of norm for transition processes at the early stage. The conflicts may still be contained before they turn into full-fledged civil wars. On the other hand, both conflicts have become self-sustaining. In Libya, the high number of displaced numbers almost a million in a country of six million inhabitants. The plethora of militias benefits from the continuing conflict.
Sharqieh also pointed out that spillover effects are giving both conflicts regional and international dimensions. In Libya, the recent involvement of Egypt is negatively affecting prospects for stability. Both conflicts also have the potential to disrupt oil markets: while Libya’s civil war has caused a drop in production to about one third of capacity, Houthi control of Bab al-Mandeb, the narrow straight linking the Red Sea with the Bay of Aden, may cause significant disruption of oil transportation from the Gulf.
In conclusion, Sharqieh argued that both countries suffer from legitimacy challenges. Uncertainty about who represents the parties to the conflict, whether it be the non-Houthi parties in Yemen or the Dawn coalition in Libya, has made negotiations more difficult. Moreover, in Yemen UN over-management of the process has weakened local ownership and thereby legitimacy of the transition process. Moving forward, the UN in Libya should take note of this lesson by leaving the parties with clear ownership of both the process and the implementation of a peaceful solution.
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