Tag: Yemen
Bluster with consequences
Prime Minister Netanyahu was better today in Congress than yesterday at the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee. But still blustering.
He argued that the nuclear deal with Iran currently under consideration is bad because
- it leaves a lot of nuclear infrastructure in place (enabling what he regards as a minimal one-year breakout time);
- Iran could evade the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections or evict the inspectors, as North Korea did;
- It would leave Iran unconstrained in a decade.
Netanyahu wants a better agreement that continues sanctions and restrictions on the nuclear program until Iran stops its aggression and support for terror in other countries (he mentioned Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon in this connection) and ends its threat to annihilate Israel. Failing this, Netanyahu wants no deal.
Netanyahu failed to explain how the US would be able to get the kind of deal he is talking about. The Europeans, Russia and China are unlikely to continue sanctions if the current deal is not concluded. Without multilateral sanctions, Iran would still be feeling some pressure from the oil price collapse and unilateral US sanctions, but it is hard to picture Tehran signing on to something more restrictive with a disunited international community than with a united one.
Netanyahu also said explicitly that he prefers no deal to the current deal, which he described as paving the way for an Iranian nuclear weapon. That’s loony. Without some sort of deal–at least extension of the interim Plan of Action–Iran would be free to race for a nuclear weapon without constraints other than the existing IAEA inspections. If Netanyahu thinks they are inadequate in the deal being negotiated, which beefs them up significantly, why would they be any better without a deal?
Looking beyond the bluster, there were a few interesting commissions and omissions in the speech. Netanyahu dropped the explicit threat of war. He did say Israel can defend itself and will stand alone if necessary, but he neither demanded that the US go to war against Iran nor stated clearly what Israel would do. He presumably has come to understand that the military option is a bad one: it won’t succeed in destroying everything, it would accelerate Iran’s nuclear efforts and it would have to be repeated in a few years time. Iran’s nuclear program involves many installations, some of which are buried deep underground. Even the US would have trouble damaging it beyond repair.
I share Netanyahu’s concern with Iranian behavior throughout the Middle East (and occasionally beyond, witness the terrorism it sponsored in Argentina). I’m not sure he is correct that Iran is as radical as ever, but let’s concede that premise. He imagines maintaining sanctions will be useful in moderating Iranian behavior or bringing about regime change. There are two problems with this hypothesis. There is no reason to believe it true–countries isolated by sanctions often become more radical, not less–and there is no way to maintain the sanctions.
So what we got this morning was more classic Netanyahu: bluster without any serious effort to explain how his newly discovered alternative, a better deal, could be achieved. I trust the speech will help him in his electoral campaign in Israel, if only because it shifts the debate there away from his vulnerabilities (economic and social policy) and towards security, which favors the Israeli right wing (though not necessarily Netanyahu himself). Here in the US, it will make life harder for the Obama Administration, as it implicitly roused the Congress to oppose any deal Secretary Kerry brings home.
I suppose Speaker Boehner, who invited Netanyahu to address Congress without informing the White House, is satisfied and hopes this show will help him face down a brewing revolt against his leadership among House Republicans. Netanyahu hopes Israelis won’t notice that he has put the country’s relationship with the United States at risk. I hope both lose those bets.
PS: Some Israelis seem to agree with me:
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Libya and Yemen: forgotten civil wars resurface
A C-SPAN recording of the event can be accessed here.
While the conflicts in Syria and Iraq may be making most of the headlines in the Middle East recently, the conflicts in Libya and Yemen still simmer under the surface. On Wednesday, a panel discussion at the Brookings Institution, moderated by Daniel Byman, sought to revisit these conflicts. The panel was timely, in light of recent escalation of violence in both countries.
The discussion was kicked off by Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey, who recently returned from a visit to Libya. The renewed conflict there, he argued, is an aftershock of Gaddafi’s legacy of divisive politics, which the post-2011 transitional government failed to overcome. The civil war has now turned into a conflict between two large coalitions: the anti-Islamists in Tobruk and the Islamists in Tripoli. However, the real dividing line is not between Islamists and anti-Islamists, but between elements of the old order and revolutionary forces. Both camps have engaged in demonization of their opponents, polarizing the political environment.
At the same time, the coalitions are facing fragmentation, which is both encouraging and worrisome. While fragmentation allows for identification of moderates supportive of a peaceful solution, it also opens up the possibility of spoilers that could undermine the ongoing peace process.
A particularly worrisome development is the rise of the Islamic State in the country. Jihadism has been a factor in Libya since before the revolution. A number of post-revolutionary jihadist militias have been formed – most notably the Al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar al-Sharia. Anti-Islamist forces have now weakened Ansar al-Sharia, opening up space for ISIS recruitment, particularly among the groups younger cohorts.
If no peace deal materializes in the current round of Geneva talks, the international community needs to consider its options. One suggestion has been to cut off Libya’s state revenues – a significant portion of which is held in Europe. While this might be a powerful measure, as both sides rely on state revenues to fund their allied militias’ sophisticated weaponry, there is also the possibility of blowback in the form of further fragmentation, making European policymakers unwilling to move forward.
A UN force has also recently been floated, but large uncertainties remain, including the size of the required force. According to some estimates around 30,000 troops would be necessary. Meanwhile, intervention by Libya’s neighbors – most notably Egypt – would likely inflame the conflict rather than bring about a solution.
Ending on a cautiously positive note, Wehrey argued that there is a growing sense of exhaustion among segments of Libya’s population, resulting in emergence of pragmatists in both camps. Identifying and bringing these pragmatists into the national dialogue process is likely the best way to ensure that the conflict is peacefully resolved.
Yemeni blogger Sama’a al-Hamdani of Yemen-iaty provided a somber account of the recent developments in Sana’a. Yemen, which was only a few years ago compared to Tunisia as a success of the Arab Spring, is now increasingly being compared to Libya and Syria. According to al-Hamdani, the conflict is today playing out between the Houthi movement, a significant but uncoordinated Southern secessionist movement and remaining supporters of the outgoing Hadi government. Tribal actors and the Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda are also playing important roles.
An important cause of the current conflict is the unjustified extension of the political transition, which cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Hadi government. Al- Hamdani also blamed Western governments for failing to engage Yemeni society beyond the government itself. As a result, they have no pan B. Going forward, al-Hamdani warned against isolating the Houthis since this would likely push them more firmly into the hands of Iran. Instead, the West should reengage with the authorities in Sana’a and push all parties to pursue a peaceful solution to the crisis.
Former ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, echoed al-Hamdani’s points, criticizing the policy failures of the West. A key failure of Western analysis is the tendency to frame Yemeni politics in a static pattern bound to misrepresent the country’s kaleidoscopic political dynamics.
Bodine also pointed out that the crisis in Yemen is not a failure of intelligence, since many of the events that have taken place since September were predictable. Rather, the crisis is a policy failure that resulted from single-minded pursuit of counter-terrorism objectives rather than broader political goals necessary to stabilize Yemen. If Washington is to play a constructive role in the country, it must go beyond its drone strategy.
Deputy director at Brookings’ Doha Center, Ibrahim Sharqieh, attempted to draw some parallels between the two conflicts. On a positive note, Sharqieh pointed out that the current levels of instability in Libya and Yemen were not entirely out of norm for transition processes at the early stage. The conflicts may still be contained before they turn into full-fledged civil wars. On the other hand, both conflicts have become self-sustaining. In Libya, the high number of displaced numbers almost a million in a country of six million inhabitants. The plethora of militias benefits from the continuing conflict.
Sharqieh also pointed out that spillover effects are giving both conflicts regional and international dimensions. In Libya, the recent involvement of Egypt is negatively affecting prospects for stability. Both conflicts also have the potential to disrupt oil markets: while Libya’s civil war has caused a drop in production to about one third of capacity, Houthi control of Bab al-Mandeb, the narrow straight linking the Red Sea with the Bay of Aden, may cause significant disruption of oil transportation from the Gulf.
In conclusion, Sharqieh argued that both countries suffer from legitimacy challenges. Uncertainty about who represents the parties to the conflict, whether it be the non-Houthi parties in Yemen or the Dawn coalition in Libya, has made negotiations more difficult. Moreover, in Yemen UN over-management of the process has weakened local ownership and thereby legitimacy of the transition process. Moving forward, the UN in Libya should take note of this lesson by leaving the parties with clear ownership of both the process and the implementation of a peaceful solution.
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Negotiations fail, force prevails
The United States is closing its embassy in Sanaa in the aftermath of the takeover (that’s a coup by another name) by Houthi insurgents, who Friday issued a constitutional declaration. It provides for dissolution of the existing parliament, formation of a “more representative” 551-member National Transitional Council that will elect a five-member presidency council, and a two-year transition period. The goals are laudable:
- achieve a dignified life for the popular masses,
- end corruption through an effective national strategy, reform public service,
- eliminate flaws in community justice,
- relieve oppression,
- reform the security and military institutions on national bases as well as
- restore trust and respect for these institutions,
- improve the livelihood of their members,
- achieve security in society,
- face down criminal takfiri forces and their allies and supporters,
- build a strong, cohesive Yemeni society that does not exclude any person or party, and
- end conflicts, divisions and ruptures.
What could go wrong?
As Nadwa Aldawsari pointed out at the Carnegie Endowment this afternoon, the Houthi victory marks the death knell of the Gulf Cooperation Council transition plan that UN envoy Jamal Benomar has tried assiduously to implement. It failed, she thought, because it provided immunity to former President Saleh and kept in place much of his regime, while excluding the Houthis. Despite having previously fought against them, Saleh took advantage of his situation to make common cause with the Houthis, an armed group that is dominated by an early Shia sect known as Zaidis.
While Nasser Arrabeyee, speaking by Skype from Sana’a, would prefer that the Houthis leave parliament as is and occupy instead places in the Shura Council, there is no sign they are prepared to do that. The Houthis seem intent on governing through the transition period. The risks that entails are all too obvious: Nadwa pointed to the large ungoverned spaces in Yemen, where Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)–the Sunni takfiris mentioned above–have more or less safe haven, despite the American drone war. It is unclear to me whether that will continue without the embassy open. In any event, it has not been successful at stemming recruitment to AQAP, which appears to be stronger in manpower and weapons today than several years ago.
The situation in Yemen may also evolve into a proxy war between Iran, which has supported the Houthis with money, arms and ideology, and Yemen’s weightiest neighbor, Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have cut off aid to Yemen, which is an astoundingly poor country. Key Yemeni tribal leaders are thought to be in the Kingdom now. They are no doubt looking for support to do combat with the Houthis.
Yemen’s south, once independent, is once again moving in that direction, hindered only by the disunity of its secessionist advocates. According to Laura Kasinof, the state has evaporated there, with little impact as its presence was already so attenuated. Tribal rather than formal justice is preferred in much of the area.
Nasser underlined that the Houthis are for the moment very much in charge. The powersharing arrangement President Hadi had been using is gone. Former President Saleh is no longer “dancing on the heads of snakes” to govern, but he is still orchestrating the dance and trying to ensure that his son Ahmed eventually takes power.
Negotiations have failed. Force has prevailed. Not clear what is next, but it isn’t likely to be good.
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Peace picks February 9-13
- A Visit to Tehran: former Congressman shares his outlook for U.S.-Iran Relations | Monday February 9 | 2:00 – 3:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As nuclear talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) enter what could be their final stage, former Rep. Jim Slattery will provide insights about the attitudes in Iran toward an agreement and the obstacles a deal may face both in Tehran and in the U.S. Congress. Slattery, who made his first visit to Iran in December, will also discuss his extensive experience promoting interfaith dialogue with Iran as part of an effort coordinated by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Norway and the Catholic University of America. The event will also feature Bharath Gopalaswamy, Acting Director, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council and Jim Moody, Associate Director-Investments, Oppenheimer Company and will be moderated by Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
- Leaderless Revolutions and their Challengers with Srdja Popovic | Tuesday February 10 | 10-11:30 am | Rome building of SAIS | RSVP to itlong@sais.edu | Blueprint for Revolution is not only a spirited guide to changing the world but a breakthrough in the annals of advice for those who seek justice and democracy. It asks (and not heavy-handedly): “As long as you want to change the world, why not do it joyfully? It’s not just funny. It’s seriously funny. No joke.” – Todd Gitlin, author of The Sixties and Occupy Nation
- Egyptian Women: Small Steps Ahead on a Very Long Journey | Tuesday February 10 | 12:00-1:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Women were pivotal cogs in the wheel of Egypt’s political development over the past four years. Whether it was the popular uprisings against former President Hosni Mubarak or Islamic rule, or referenda or elections, women were called upon at times of the country’s greatest need and never failed to heed the call. Now that the country is gearing up for parliamentary elections, will women’s efforts finally be recognized with appropriate political representation and will their voices be heard? The Wilson Center invites to a discussion with Moushira Khattab, Chair of Women in Foreign Policy Group, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs; former Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center; former Minister of Family and Population, Egypt; and former Egyptian Ambassador to South Africa and to the Czech and Slovak Republics.
- Making Sense of Yemen’s Power Crisis | Tuesday February 10 | 12:00 – 1:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Houthi advances in Yemen’s capital city of Sana’a and the subsequent resignation of the president and his cabinet have thrown the country into chaos in recent weeks. In this new reality, will Yemen be able to find a balance of power, or will it descend into greater violence and instability? This event will explore the factors driving the Houthis, the current government, the former regime, the Islamist Islah party, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and address how these forces will shape Yemen’s domestic political map going forward. Carnegie invites to a discussion on Yemen’s political players and the outlook for the country’s future. The discussion features Nasser Arrabyee, a Yemeni journalist based in Sana’a and founder and president of Yemen Alaan, a media production company, Nadwa Aldawsari, co-founder and executive director of the Sheba Center for International Development and Laura Kasinof, freelance journalist and author of ‘Don’t Be Afraid of the Bullets: An Accidental War Correspondent in Yemen’. Carnegie’s Intissar Fakir will moderate.
- The State of Islamism: The New Generation | Wednesday February 11 | 9:30 – 11:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Over the past year, Islamists have triggered tectonic shake-ups across the Middle East. Borders have been redefined. Tactics have turned bloodier. States are unraveling under the pressure. Moderate Islamists are being sidelined as militants alter the region more than any trend since modern states became independent. Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt’s Sinai are flashpoints, but no country is exempt. The impact has rippled worldwide, evident in the Charlie Hebdo attack. The Woodrow Wilson Center, in cooperation with the U.S. Institute of Peace, is hosting a debate on the state of Islamism, with Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar, Nathan Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, David Ottaway, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center and Les Campbell, Senior associate and regional director, Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute. Opening remarks will be made by Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Managing Conflict in a World Adrift | Wednesday February 11 | 14:30-17:00 | USIP |REGISTER TO ATTEND |The recent eruptions of violence in the Middle East, parts of Africa and Eastern Europe illustrate the high hurdles of conflict management amid rapidly shifting power dynamics. Rafe Sagarin, an evolutionary biologist at the University of Arizona, will open the event with a keynote address on what we can learn from nature about the important role of institutions in adaptive approaches to conflict management. Pamela Aall, senior fellow at Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and senior advisor for conflict prevention and management at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), will lead a lively and thought-provoking conversation examining these forces and potential approaches with one of her co-editors and two contributing authors of the new book, Managing Conflict in a World Adrift co-published by USIP and CIGI. The volume is the fourth in a landmark series by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall.
- Conflict and Convergence: Toward Common Interests in the Troubled Middle East | Wednesday February 11 | 4:00-5:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Paris attacks earlier last month were the most recent in a spate of violence connected to the proliferation of extremist groups throughout the Middle East. When coupled with trends like rising sectarianism, the dark side of individual empowerment, the diffusion of power, and demographic shifts, the outlook for the region remains murky: ISIS and other terrorist groups are upending regional security; Iran is moving closer to having a nuclear weapons capability; Libya is disintegrating; and the “promise” of the Arab Spring has clearly been unfulfilled. While ISIS’s advances have led to the formation of an international coalition led by the United States to counter this virulent extremist group, some of the underlying causes of ISIS’s rise and growth – state failure, political illegitimacy, and economic underdevelopment – remain unaddressed. Too often, the West attends to the region in reaction to its ills, with a view to containing them. The Atlantic Council invites to a discussion on the major strategic issues at stake in the Middle East and a long-term assessment of the opportunities and challenges for 2015 and beyond. Panelist are Salam Fayyad, Former Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, The Hon. Stephen J. Hadley, Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and The Hon. Francis Ricciardone, Vice President and Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council.
- 2015 Sheikh Abdullah Saleh Kamel Symposium: An Energy Revolution? The Political Ecologies of Shale Oil in the Middle East, US and China | Wednesday February 11 – Friday February 13 | Georgetown University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) is hosting its annual Sheikh Abdullah Saleh Kamel Symposium, this year looking at the impact of the shale oil revolution on the Middle East. The symposium will feature panels on environmental, social and political economy implications of shale oil as well as ramifications on foreign policy issues. It also features a wide range of scholars, including Osama Abi-Mershed, Director Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Dr. Peter Gleick, President and Co-founder, Pacific Institute, Dr. Jeremy Boak, Director of the Center for Oil Shale Technology and Research at the Colorado School of Mines, Dr. Mark Giordano, Director of the Program in Science, Technology and International Affairs, Georgetown University, Dr. Mohamed Ramady, Visiting Associate Professor of Finance and Economics at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, Dr. Eckart Woertz, Senior Research Fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and Mr. Fawzi Aloulou, Energy Economist at the Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy.
- High Stakes: How This Year’s Climate Negotiations Will Impact National Security | Thursday February 12 | 9:00 – 10:30 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | “The Pentagon says that climate change poses immediate risks to our national security. We should act like it,” said President Obama in his recent State of the Union Address. But what does that mean for international climate negotiations? The Wilson Center invites to a discussion with Nick Mabey, chief executive of the environmental NGO E3G, who will present new analysis on the relationship between successful climate diplomacy and national security. Mabey will discuss how critical the next year is in climate diplomacy and how the UNFCCC and Montreal Protocol processes can help improve international risk management. As climate change negotiations accelerate leading up to this fall’s UN climate conference in Paris, it is essential that decision-makers in the executive and legislative branch understand these delicate connections and how their actions may have unintended security consequences.
- Nuclear Bargains Reviewed: Washington’s Cold War nuclear deals and what they mean for Iran | Friday February 13 | 1:00 – 2:30 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Or Rabinowitz, author of ‘Bargaining on Nuclear Tests’, will discuss her research in the context of the looming dead-line for the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 on the future of Iran’s nuclear program. Bargaining on Nuclear Tests demonstrates that the 1969 bilateral American-Israeli deal on Israel’s nuclear ambiguity was not an exception; it served as the model for two following nuclear bargains with Pakistan and South Africa. Dr. Rabinowitz’s research demonstrates that Washington’s willingness to reach such nuclear bargains is influenced by superior geo-strategic considerations that override non-proliferation policies. The fate of the Pakistani and the South African deals should serve as a stark reminder to Israeli policymakers that understandings can expire when bilateral interests no longer converge.
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Yemen: failed policy in a failing state
Speaking at Georgetown University on Tuesday, former ambassador to Yemen, Barbara K. Bodine, took a critical view of current U.S. policy in Yemen. While President Obama in September was praising U.S. successes in fighting Al-Qaeda in Yemen as a model for the ISIS campaign, Ambassador Bodine argued that US policy has largely failed to achieve its aims in the country, and has corroded its relationship with Yemen’s government and people. At a time when Yemen is once more teetering on the edge of disruption, Bodine called for broader US engagement on development and governance.
Yemen, argued Bodine, is a country that has wobbled on the margins of collapse for a long time. Historically, the country has been the host of other states’ proxy battles, from the war between Nasserists and Saudi monarchists in the 1960s to the ongoing war on terror. Domestic challenges have also been prevalent, with Yemen having the youngest population in the Middle East. It is severely lacking in natural resources, including access to water.
At the same time, Yemen has a tradition of pulling itself back from the brink. The former ambassador pointed out that in the aftermath of the 2011-12 uprising that ended the reign of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen emerged relatively successful. The crisis ended in the negotiated transfer of power, the confirmation of the new president (Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi) in a referendum and the establishment of a National Dialogue Conference that was broadly inclusive. Compared to the rest of the region, Yemen seemed to have fared relatively well in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
At the same time, challenges have haunted the Yemen transition, leading to the current collapse. The Houthis had been excluded from the political process in the GCC transition plan, along with a number of other political actors. The inability to proceed also led to extension of the terms of the feckless transition government, while criticism of government corruption grew louder within the country. In launching their campaign on the capital in September of last year, the Houthi rebels were kicking in an open door.
Initial steps taken by the Houthis were also largely constructive, including the establishment of a capable technocratic government that could implement the promises of the 2012 political transition agreement. Since then however, the political situation has been spiraling out of control, culminating in the Houthi occupation of the presidential palace and the resignation of president Hadi’s government two weeks ago. Yemen, on the verge of political – and financial – collapse, is now rapidly running out of options.
In light of the bleak political situation, the former ambassador called upon the US administration to alter fundamentally its approach to Yemen. Bodine lamented the use of drones “as a strategy rather than a tool” of Yemen policy, pointing out that since the use of drones was escalated in Yemen under Obama, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) numbers had swelled from the hundreds to the thousands.
Instead, the US needs to make a commitment to governance and economic development a more explicit part of the its strategy. This would not require a significant change in the resources at the administration’s disposal. Sadly however, neither Americans nor Yemenis seem to be aware of these efforts. Increased publicity abouit this aspect of American policy would be a cheap and effective way to support fragile transition efforts.
Bodine warned against accepting the Saudi narrative of the Houthi rebels as Iranian stooges. While Iranian support of the rebels is evident, the Houthi movement is in essence an indigenous movement, and should therefore be approached as local political actors first and foremost. The prospect of a failed Yemen, with the potential for AQAP expansion in the south, would be a far more threatening scenario to the Saudi monarchy and its Western allies than the specter of increased Iranian influence.
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Couphobia
Fear of coups (couphobia?) has broken out in all too many places. Turkey’s President Erdogan is cracking down on the Gulen movement members for fear they are plotting against him. Russia’s President Putin has done the same with foreign funding of nongovernmental organizations. Egypt’s President Sisi fears the Muslim Brotherhood will do to him what he has done to their (former) President Morsi, who languishes in prison.
Even in Macedonia, an EU candidate country, the Prime Minister says the opposition was plotting to oust him. Then again, the United States is said to be orchestrating an anti-Victor Orbán coup d’état in EU member Hungary.
I can’t be sure all these claims are as baseless as that last one. Washington just doesn’t care enough about Hungary to engineer a coup there. My guess is that Sisi has plenty to worry about, as he has vastly overdone the repression, creating a growing reservoir of resentment that might fuel an effort to oust him one day, though Egyptians are so tired of disorder (and the army so satiated) that it is unlikely a coup there would be popular. Erdogan and Putin are likewise doing their best to fulfill their own prophecies by making life hard for their legitimate opponents, whose natural reaction will be to think about their options. A coup might be one of them.
Then there are the guys–and they are guys–who really should fear a coup. Syria’s President Asad has destroyed his country in order to prevent anyone else from challenging his hold on power. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un presumably thinks he protected himself, but who knows which uncle or cousin still alive might make the attempt?
Yemen’s President Hadi is facing a coup in everything but name. The Houthi rebels who have him trapped don’t want to displace him, partly for fear that would end military assistance against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from the Americans the Houthis love to hate. Libya can’t have a coup because it is unclear who has power. It is having a civil war instead.
All the couphobiacs should remember Nouri al Maliki. He was so afraid of a coup that he appointed cronies to command his army and grabbed as much direct control over the other institutions of the state as he could. The result was collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces when faced with the Islamic State and his removal from power because even the Iranians and his own Dawa party turned against him. It doesn’t always work that way, but the example should serve to illustrate the perils of concentrating power too much.
The couphobiacs are unlikely to be chastened however. Once they start down the road of repression, it is hard to turn around or back out. They fear removal from power means they lose their lives as well. What Erdogan, Putin and Sisi need more than anything else is assurance that they can retire gracefully and live out their natural lives. Not everyone can afford to keep autocrats in power well into senility, as the Saudis do. But countries that want their autocrats to retire need to follow the Vatican’s lead and provide funding and protection (before they start committing war crimes and crimes against humanity). Come to think of it, that’s America’s solution too.
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