Tag: Yemen
How many is enough?
The right question is not why U.S. troops need to stay in Afghanistan after 2014 but rather how many are needed to counter the resurgence of Al Qaeda there. Fred and Kim Kagan say upwards of 30,000 and cast aspersions on the “amateurs” who call for fewer. The Administration seems to be focusing on 10,000, plus several thousand advisors from NATO allies. The Administration has most of the qualified professionals in its employ.
I put myself solidly in the amateur category, which is clearly where the Kagans also belong. But even an amateur sees the big hole in their argument. They fail to consider the possibility that U.S. troop presence helps to generate the recruits Al Qaeda requires. This is no small matter. Any good military commander needs to ask whether offensive efforts are generating more enemy fighters than they are eliminating. David Petraeus, who on this showed far better judgment than in his personal life, famously asked this question in Iraq about the U.S. detention policy there (and arranged to free a good number of people when those in charge told him the bad news). There is ample evidence that this counter-productive effect is happening in Yemen, where the numbers of estimated Al Qaeda activists have grown markedly during the course of the U.S. drone war there. Could the same thing be happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
I can’t answer that question, but others have tried to do so. It has been years since reasonable observers concluded that on balance drone strikes are counter-productive in Pakistan, which is the center of gravity of the war on extremists. The problem is that there is a lot of collateral damage, and population anxiety, for every high-level target killed. Three quarters of Pakistanis now regard the United States as an enemy. If even a tiny percentage of them joins Al Qaeda to fight against us, we are in trouble.
There is another problem. U.S. troops in Afghanistan will be vulnerable to asymmetric Iranian attacks if Israel or the U.S. goes after the Tehran’s nuclear program. If you think preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons is a top U.S. priority, you should want to minimize the number of American troops exposed if military action becomes necessary.
The Kagans and many others will complain loudly if “only” 10,000 American troops are left in Afghanistan. They also wanted to leave American troops in Iraq. I find it hard to fathom what good that would have done, and easy to imagine how problematic it would have been as Prime Minister Maliki tries to exert more centralized authority over both Sunni and Kurds. The notion that American commanders would necessarily stand up for truth, justice and the American way is not convincing.
The United States has more troops abroad than it can afford, and likely also more than some of the societies in which they operate find acceptable. I’m just an amateur, but so is the man in charge. He should want to keep those low options open.
Wisdom, not resolve
I’m in Atlanta this week for Thanksgiving, which Americans will mark tomorrow with parades, running races, a giant meal, lots of football (watching and playing) and much debate on the issues of our day, from cranberry sauce recipes to the state of world affairs. Some will go to church, but most will mark the day entirely at home–or in a relative’s home–with marathon culinary preparations, a lengthy and leisurely afternoon meal and a long denouement of talk, napping and TV, in my family followed in the late evening by a giant turkey sandwich, on white toast.
I mention these things because close to 50% of my readers are non-Americans, only some of whom will have enjoyed the Thanksgiving experience first hand. To my knowledge, the holiday is entirely a New World phenomenon. Canada has its own version, celebrated last month. Of course lots of cultures express thanks in both religious and non-religious ways, but I wonder if any have made it quite the major event that the North Americans have. Readers should feel free to enlighten me.
Americans certainly have a great deal to be thankful for. We are slowly climbing out of a lingering recession, we’ve gotten through the difficult quadrennial drama of presidential elections without the uncertainties that have sometimes plagued the process, our troops are out of Iraq and moving out of Afghanistan, and there is no existential threat on the horizon, even if there are many less dramatic challenges. We are the solution to our own worst problems, which focus on the relatively mundane questions of what the government should spend money on and where it should find the revenue needed.
The world is not in such good shape. While statistics show that the overall frequency of war is down, the catalogue is full of long lasting conflicts and their devastating impacts on people: the revolution and civil war in Syria are getting on to marking two years, Israel and Palestine have been in conflict one way or another for 65 years, the Afghanistan/Pakistan war is dragging into its 12th year, and I don’t know how to determine when the war against al Qaeda in Yemen, the war against its affiliates in Somalia or the war in Eastern Congo began. Then there are the more recent conflicts: northern Mali and the all but defeated revolution in Bahrain. And there are the wars that might come: perhaps against Iran, in the South or East China Seas, on the Korean peninsula or between South Sudan and Sudan.
I can’t claim that most Americans will be thinking about these disasters as they give thanks for their own blessings. They are more likely to be thinking about Breezy Point and Hoboken, two communities that hurricane Sandy devastated early this month. We’ve still got tens of thousands homeless and some without power weeks later. Those who turn to America for help–and many do–are going to find us preoccupied these days with our own needs. I suspect this will not be just a short-term phenomenon, but a longer-term effort to put our own house in order, limiting commitments abroad and prioritizing them in accordance with America’s own interests.
This will sound ungenerous to non-Americans, who may bemoan American interference but also look to the U.S. to step in to help stop the Gaza fighting and turn to Washington when other disasters strike. We will continue to do what we can where vital American interests are at stake, but it will be healthy if we are a bit less committed and rely on others rather more than we have in the past. Our withdrawal–retrenchment is what some call it–will not be absolute. It has to be calculated and calibrated. Good judgment, not ideology, should be its guide.
That is one of the many reasons I am grateful to the American people for re-electing President Obama. I don’t always agree with his judgment–I’d rather he did more on Syria, for example–but he is thoughtful and cautious in ways that fit our current circumstances. Managing the relative decline in American power and constructing a global architecture that will limit conflict and provide space for those who choose to live in free societies to prosper are the great challenges of the coming generations. Wisdom, not resolve, is the essential ingredient to meet them.
Easier said than done
Hillary Clinton is on her way from Cambodia to Jerusalem. This is precisely the opposite direction from the one President Obama intends for American foreign policy: his announced intention is to pivot American attention from the Middle East to Asia. His visit to Asia just a few days after re-election was meant to underline that message.
The current Middle East crisis is over Gaza, where rocket launches against Israeli targets have precipitated a ferocious response, so far mainly from the air (though there have also been sea and land artillery barrages). Israel has mobilized ground forces, which appear ready for a land incursion into Gaza. Hamas, which governs Gaza (but does not necessarily launch all the rockets), has attracted support from Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, which is seeking to mediate a ceasefire.
This is a pretty clear cut case of the urgent taking priority over the important. Even in the Middle East, there are things going on that are more important to vital U.S. interests than the highly regrettable Hamas/Israel conflagration. The civil war in Syria above all requires more attention than it has gotten, even if Obama’s hesitancy to get more deeply involved is understandable when you look at the array of unappealing options available. Iran’s nuclear program continues to produce 20% enriched uranium. If diplomacy does not produce an end to its nuclear weapons ambitions in the next few months, military action by both the U.S. and Israel becomes likely. The fight against al Qaeda in Yemen isn’t working well–the drone war seems to produce more terrorists than it kills. Let’s not even mention the sometimes faltering revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, or the apparent extremist takeover of northern Mali.
Whatever. For the moment Gaza is at the top of America’s to do list. The immediate problem is a ceasefire, but Ehud Yaari argues that a broader arrangement is really what is needed. This would entail high-level political agreements between Egypt and Israel on blocking arms smuggling to Hamas, clamping down on extremists in Sinai and opening the border crossing between Egypt and Gaza to both trade and people.
The problem with these ideas is that they tie Hamas-governed Gaza more closely to Egypt and loosen its already attenuated ties to the West Bank, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) governs. If there is any sense at all in Israel’s right-wing efforts to block Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution the rest of the world favors, it lies precisely in a scheme to separate Gaza and the West Bank, returning the former to Egypt’s suzerainity and the West Bank to Jordan.
But that does not mean Yaari’s ideas are bad, only that what I take to be their unintended consequences should not be allowed to block Palestinian unity. It is an added irony that the main obstacle at the moment is the Palestinians themselves, who have not managed to reconstitute a united polity despite many efforts to do so. It will be interesting to see if the Israeli air attacks sharpen the differences between Gaza and the West Bank or narrow them. Palestinian unity, like the pivot to Asia, is easier said than done.
Yemen isn’t working
Daniel Byman, Brookings fellow and the moderator of Tuesday’s event about “Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al-Qaeda,” noted that Yemen has become increasingly important in Washington over the past decade. Despite this, few understand Yemen. American political leaders have not found a successful strategy to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al-Qaeda in Yemen. Ibrahim Sharqieh of Brookings Doha and Gregory Johnsen, Ph.D. candidate at Princeton, did not claim the expertise to address moral or legal questions about drone strikes, but they questioned their effectiveness in achieving U.S. objectives.
Sharqieh noted the fluctuations of U.S. interest in Yemen over the past 14 or 15 years. Until the Yemeni people elected a new president in parallel with “Arab Spring” reformation movements across the Middle East, the U.S. cooperated with the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime. When the al Qaeda threat was high, the U.S. gave Yemen more assistance, attention, and aid money. When the threat was low, the Yemen issue would be replaced with other more pressing foreign concerns. This approach makes it in Yemen’s interest to have some al Qaeda presence. Johnsen agreed that a mutually dependent relationship has formed between new President Hadi and the U.S. Hadi needs the U.S. because he lacks domestic support and the U.S. needs Hadi to continue its drone strikes. Sharqieh explained that this relationship excludes the Yemeni people from the discussion of fighting al Qaeda increasing a sense of alienation.
Sharqieh proposed a new approach focused on political settlement, development and local ownership of the conflict against al Qaeda. First, the Yemeni political transition must be successful in order to provide hope for the people and reinforce the nonviolence of the Yemeni uprising. The Iran-backed north, separatist south and influence of the old regime are barriers to the success of the political settlement. Second, the U.S. should adopt a sustainable assistance program to combat the serious challenges to stability: the 46% unemployment rate, 56% of people under the poverty line, 300,000 suffering from malnutrition, and significant illegal immigration. Third, Yemenis need to feel ownership of the al Qaeda threat. Many resent the U.S. drone attacks as a violation of national sovereignty.
Johnsen agreed that the “Yemen Model” for fighting terrorism has not been effective. It was on the day of President Obama’s inauguration in 2009 that Said Ali al-Shihri announced the joining of al Qaeda‘s Saudi branch with a Yemeni contingent to form al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In December 2009, Secretary of State Clinton added the organization to the list of known terrorist groups and the U.S. carried out its first drone attack in Yemen. Days later al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula placed a suicide bomber on a plane to Detroit. From the Christmas Day failed attack to today, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has grown from 200 or 300 to anywhere from 1,000 to 6,000 members.
How has the organization grown so quickly? Civilian deaths in drone attacks are partly to blame, Johnsen believes, in addition to economic and humanitarian challenges. The U.S. views Yemenis as terrorists and non-terrorists, but al Qaeda members in Yemen might also be tribal figures, community leaders, friends or family. Yemen is not like Afghanistan where al Qaeda members are often easily identifiable foreigners.
“Yemen is a broken country,” Johnsen said, and the path forward for the U.S. will not be easy. The U.S. cannot win the fight against al Qaeda alone. Yemeni tribes and Saudi Arabia are well-positioned to help, if they want to do so. The Obama administration has never explicitly defined for a foreign or domestic audience the moral or legal framework in which the drone strikes operate. It is possible that the U.S. has burned all bridges that could have encouraged tribal allies to take up the fight against al Qaeda, but Washington could improve the prospects with an apology for past civilian deaths and an honest effort to find a better strategy.
This week’s peace picks
1. Secularism, Islamism, and Women’s Rights in Turkey, Monday November 12, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Georgetown University
Venue: Georgetown University, 37th Street NW and O Street NW, Washington, DC 20057, Edward B. Bunn S.J. Intercultural Center, Room 450
Speaker: Serpil Sancar
Please join us on Monday, November 12 from 12-2pm in ICC 450 for a talk with Professor Serpil Sancar, Visiting Scholar at George Washington University as she discusses Secularism, Islamism and Women’s Rights in Turkey. Lunch will be provided.
Register for this event here.
2. External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities, Monday November 12, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Truland Building, Room 555
Speakers: Thomas Flores, Idean Salehyan
While some militant groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes. We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces the incentives of militant groups to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population. However, unlike the lucrative resources such as minerals and petroleum, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms. Some external principals – namely, democratic states with strong human rights lobbies – are more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than others.
Rebels backed by states with theses characteristics should engage in comparably less violence than those backed by other states. We also predict that multiple state sponsorsalso lead to abuse, for no single state can effectively restrain the rebel organization. We test these expectations with new disaggregated organization-level data on foreign support for rebel groups and data on one-sided violence against civilians. The results are consistent with our argument. We conclude that principal characteristics help influence agent actions, and that human rights organizations exert a powerful effect on the likelihood of civilian abuse and the magnitude of wartime atrocities.
RSVP for this event to Barre Hussen at carevent@gmu.edu.
3. Public Diplomacy in the Next Four Years: A Post-Election Look at American Strategies and Priorities for Engaging the World, Tuesday November 13, 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Elliott School of international Affairs
Venue: The Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: James Glassman, Judith McHale, Paul Foldi, P.J. Crowley
The upcoming U.S. Presidential election may have a dramatic impact on American foreign policy. On November 13, an experienced panel of international affairs experts will gather at the George Washington University to discuss the course of U.S. Public Diplomacy for the next four years.
Please register for this event here.
4. The Procedural and Subtantive Elements of Prosecuting Cases of Trafficking in Persons: Comparative, Tuesday November 13, 9:00 AM – 4:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Nitze building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Policymakers, attorneys, law professors, and representatives from legal clinics and NGOs will discuss this topic. For a complete agenda, visit bitly.com/Ublfr6.
Please register for this event here.
5. Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum: “Comedy and Conflict”, Tuesday November 13, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Rome Building Auditorium
Speakers: Yahya Hendi, Elahe Izadi, Craig Zelizer, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana
Yahya Hendi, Muslim champlain at Georgetown University; Elahe Izadi, comedian and National Journal reporter; Craig Zelizer, associate director of the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University; and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana (moderator), visiting assistant professor in the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University, will discuss this topic.
Register for this event here.
6. Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al Qaeda, Tuesday November 13, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Room
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Gregory Johnsen, Ibrahim Sharqieh
Rife with political turmoil, Yemen has proven fertile ground for al Qaeda-linked groups in the post-9/11 era. Until the beginning of 2012, the United States cooperated with the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, but his departure – orchestrated by the U.S. – raises questions for future counterterrorism cooperation. How much ground has al Qaeda gained in Yemen despite setbacks in Pakistan? Can the United States effectively manage events in Yemen without becoming entangled in another costly ground war? What more can be done to prevent al Qaeda’s influence from spreading further throughout the Arabian Peninsula?
Register for this event here.
7. U.S.-Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post-Cold War Era, Tuesday November 13, 10:30 AM – 12:00 PM, CSIS
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street NW, Washingto, Dc 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: John Hamre, Bulent Aliriza, Bulent Aras
Please join us on November 13 for the release of “U.S. – Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post-Cold War Era,’ jointly prepared by the CSIS Turkey Project and the Center for Strategic research (SAM) of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The report is the product of a year-long study that included workshops in Washington and Ankara. It incorporates U.S. and Turkish perspectives on the evolving relationship, examines the opportunities and challenges the alliance has confronted in the past six decades and looks ahead to those it is likely to face in the coming years.
RSVP for this event to rbeardsley@csis.org.
8. A New Deal? Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Egypt, Tuesday November 13, 2:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Elliott School of Interntional Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speaker: Yezid Sayigh
Yezid Sayigh is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the future political role of Arab armies the resistance and reinvention of authoritaian regimes, and the Israel-Palestine conflict and peace process.
Register for this event here.
9. Middle East Institute’s 66th Annual Conference, Wednesday November 14, 8:45 AM – 5:30 PM, Grand Hyatt Washington
Venue: Grand Hyatt Washington, 1000 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20001
The Middle East Institute’s 66th Annual Conference is an opportunity for policymakers, government officials, students, the media, and the interested public to come together to discuss the future of the Middle East. Entitled “New Horizons, New Challenges: The Middle East in 2013,” the conference the conference will convene experts from across the U.S. and the Middle East to examine the momentous political trnsitions underway in the Arab World and forecast the year ahead for a region in flux. The full-day conference will analyze the obstacles impeding democracy in Egypt and Syria, and the reaction of countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia to the shifting regional dynamics brought about by the Arab Awakening. It will also look at evolving U.S. policy in the Middle East in response to the new realities on the ground and to the demands of the Arab revolutions. The conference will include four 90-minute panels on “U.S.-Mideast Diplomacy in Transition: New Era, New Principles”; “Challenges Ahead for Egypt”; “After the U.S. Election: What’s at Stake for Iran?”; and “Syria and the Regional Implications of the Crisis.”
10. Launch of the Asia Foundation’s 2012 Survey of the Afghan People, Wednesday Novembe 14, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, The National Press Club
Venue: The National Press Club, 529 14th Street NW, Washington, DC, 20045, 13th Floor
Speakers: Andrew Wilder, Sunil Pillai, Palwasha Kakar, Mark Kryzer
The Asia Foundation will release findings from Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of teh Afghan People – the broades, most comprehensive public opinion poll in the country – covering all 34 provinces with candid data gleaned from face-to-face interviews with nearly 6,300 Afghan citizens on security, corruption, women’s rights, the economy, development, and the Taliban. This marks the eighth in the Foundation’s series of surveys in Afghanistan; taken together they provide a barometer of Afghan public opinion over time.
Register forthis event here.
11. How to Promote Local Order and Property Rights Under Weak Rule of Law?, Wednesdday November 14, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 736
Speaker: Chris Blattman
Chris Blattman, assistant professor of international and public affairs and political science at Columbia University’s School of Internatonal and Public Affairs, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to itolber1@jhu.edu.
12. Serbia’s Road to EU Accession: Prospects and Potential Pitfalls, Thursday November 15, 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massacusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speaker: Ljubica Vasic
Ljubica Vasic, member of the Serbian Parliament, will discuss this topic.
Register for this event here.
13. Benghazi and Beyond: What Went Wrong on September 11, 2012 and How to Prevent it from Happening at Other Frontline Posts, Thursday November 15, 10:00 AM, The Rayburn House Office Building
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20515, Room 2172 Rayburn HOB
Speakers: Michael Courts, William Young
14. Protest and Rebellion in the Middle East, Thursday November 15, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: Marc Lynch, Wendy Pearlman, Jillian Schwedler, David Patel
Three leading political scientists will discuss opportunities, resources, and emotions in regional social protest movements. A light lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
15. The Obama Administration and U.S. Foreign Policy, Thursday November 15, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 812
Speaker: James Mann
James Mann, author-in-residence at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and author of The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to reischauer@jhu.edu.
16. Drafting Egypt’s Constitution, Thursday November 15, 1:00 PM – 2:15 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
The new Egyptian constitution is surrounded by controversy over who should write it, when it should be drafted, and which principles and values it should embody. With a draft already published, debate is as intense as ever.
Register for this event here.
17. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Thursday November 15, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Feroz Khan, George Perkovich, Peter Lavoy
The story of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons developments remains in dispute, with a rich literature of colorful and differing accounts. In his latest book, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), Feroz Khan presents a comprehensive picture of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. What internal and external pressures threatened Pakistan’s efforts? What conditions contributed to its attainment of a viable program in the face of substantial political and technical obstacles?
Register for this event here.
18. Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring – A Conversation with Michael Willis, Thursday November 15, 5:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speaker: Michael Willis
Professor Willis will be discussing his new book Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring.
Register for this event here.
19. Lebanon in the Shadow of Syria Civil War, Friday November 16, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs
Venue: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 3307 M Street NW, Washington, DC 20007, Suite 200
Speaker: Irina Papkova
The car bombng that killed Lebanese security chief Wissan al-Hasan last month has raised new concerns that Lebanon is being increasingly drawn into the Syrian civil war. Indeed, predictions that Lebanon would descend into sectarian violence as a result of the Syrian uprising have abounded since the begining of the conflict. Yet, Lebanon – once a byword for religious civil war – has managed so far to avoid that catastrophic scenario. Irinia Papkova, a Berkley Center research fellow now living in Beirut, will address the current political situation in Lebanon and the threats and challenges facing its leaders in the shadow of the Syrian conflict.
Register for this event here.
A dangerous place
Yesterday’s circus in a House hearing on the killing of U.S. officials last month in Benghazi was barely over when news reached Washington that Al Qaeda had assassinated the Yemeni security chief at the U.S. embassy in Sanaa. No doubt these incidents will continue to provide grist for the American political mill, where candidate Romney is trying to pin blame on the Administration and portray America as besieged.
We are not besieged on most days, but we are at risk. The thousands of our fellow civilians who serve abroad cannot do what they are there to do without running risks. You can build fortress embassies, as we have in Baghdad, and provide personal security details. But nothing reduces the risks to zero.
Some of the security measures we take inhibit achievement of the mission. Andrew Exum tweeted to me this morning:
It’s what the military refers to as the false balance between the men and the mission. In the end, the mission must come 1st.
Diplomats and aid workers need to be out on the street talking with people, monitoring projects, taking the pulse of local communities, giving speeches, engaging with the press and civil society generally. Law enforcement officials need to be consulting closely with their police and interior ministry counterparts. There is no use in an embassy or consulate that incarcerates and warehouses our civilian presence abroad, which is what the euphemistically named “diplomatic security” part of the State Department likes to do.
We need to get smarter about how to protect our people, while recognizing that there are no risk-free formulas. Anonmity and changing daily patterns is a lot better protection for many diplomats than a personal security detail. Spreading our people out, and moving them around frequently, is a lot safer than concentrating them in one hardened place. Relying on properly trained and equipped local security forces is often better than using highly visible Americans, who become easy targets.
Our four colleagues in Benghazi were killed in a fortress-like facility guarded principally by Americans. They–or someone else–might suffer the same fate using the approach I am suggesting. We need to ensure that we don’t have more people abroad than we really need. We also need to make sure they are undertaking efforts that are worth the risk to life and limb that they necessarily entail.
Congress is likely to move in quite a different direction. It will provide more funding for higher and thicker walls, and more American protection, as it does from time to time. Then it cuts that funding after a few years of quiet, leaving the State Department with an enormous capital infrastructure but without the means to maintain it.
The pointy end of the diplomatic spear is a dangerous place. Let’s get smarter and more agile about wielding it.
PS: I stumbled on this after drafting the above. So I’m not alone in my devotion to the mission.