Tag: Yemen
This week’s peace picks
Lots of good events in DC this week, several of them big all-day events. I’ll be away part of the week in Vienna–that’s my excuse for not going to everything. Write-ups for peacefare.net are, as always, welcome.
1. Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA, Stimson, noon June 25
Event Details
On June 13, 2012, The Centre for International Governance Innovation released its long-awaited report, “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA.”
The report will be presented at an event on June 25 in Washington, DC, co-hosted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute North America (SIPRI North America). CIGI Senior Fellow Trevor Findlay, author of the report, will present the report’s findings. He will be introduced by Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, executive director, SIPRI North America.
The release of “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA” marks the culmination of a two-year research project that examined all aspects of the Agency’s mandate and operations ― from major programs on safeguards, safety, security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to governance, management and finance. The report makes multiple recommendations, both strategic and programmatic, for strengthening and reform of the Agency. The project was a joint undertaking of CIGI’s global security program and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada.
Professor Findlay holds a joint fellowship with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He also holds the William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs at NPSIA and is director of the CCTC.
When & Where
SIPRI North America, Stimson Center
1111 19th Street NW
Twelfth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
3. Iran and the West: Oil, Sanctions, and Future Scenarios, SAIS room 500 BOB, 9-12:45 June 26
Room 500
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC
| 9:00 – 9:15 | Light Breakfast |
| 9:15 – 9:30 | Welcoming RemarksAmbassador Andras Simonyi (Managing Director, SAIS CTR) |
| 9:30 – 11:00 | PANEL I Energy and Politics: Myths and Reality of a Complex InteractionSpeakers:
Claudia Castiglioni (Calouste Gulbenkian Fellow, SAIS CTR) Sara Vakhoshouri (President of SVB Energy International and former Advisor to Director of the National Iranian Oil Company International) Guy Caruso (Senior adviser in the Energy and National Security Program at CSIS, former administrator of the Energy Information Administration) Moderator: Robert J. Lieber (Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) |
| 11:00 – 11:15 | Coffee |
| 11:15 – 12:45 | PANEL II The Future of Iran-West Relations: A Transatlantic PerspectiveSpeakers:
Michael Makovsky (Foreign Policy Director at the Bipartisan Policy Center) Abbas Maleki (Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at Center for International Studies, MIT) Moderator: Suzanne Maloney (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution) |
4. Crisis Yemen: Going Where? City Club, 555 13th St NW, 10-noon June 26
June 26, 2012
Crisis Yemen: Going Where?
Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Lecturer and Director, Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative, Princeton University; and former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen
Mr. Gregory Johnsen, Ph.D. Candidate, Princeton University; author, Waq al-waq blog and The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia; and former Fulbright and American Institute for Yemeni Studies Fellow in Yemen
Dr. Charles Schmitz, Associate Professor of Geography, Towson University; President, American Institute for Yemeni Studies; and former Fulbright and American Institute for Yemen Studies Fellow in Yemen
Mr. Robert Sharp, Associate Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, U.S. Department of Defense/National Defense University
Dr. John Duke Anthony, Founding President & CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations; former Fulbright Fellow in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen; and official observer for four of Yemen’s presidential and parliamentary elections
5. Armed Drones and Targeted Killing: International Norms, Unintended Consequences, and the Challenge of Non-Traditional Conflict, German Marshall Fund, 12:15- 2 pm June 26
| Date / Time |
Tuesday, June 26 / 12:15pm – 2:00pm Register with host
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|---|---|
| Location |
German Marshall Fund 1744 R Street NW, Washington DC, 20009
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| Speakers | Mark R. Jacobson, Sarah Holewinski, Mark V. Vlasic |
| Description | A discussion of the dilemmas posed by the use of RPVs, or “drones to include the implications for alliances, international norms, and their use outside of traditional armed conflict. The panel will also address the unique capability this new technology presents as well as the potential for unintended consequences and “blowback.”Speakers include Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of CIVIC (Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict) who is preparing a report on drones with the Colombia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Mark Vlasic from Georgetown University and Madison Law & Strategy Group PLLC who has served at the World Bank and the Pentagon and has authored a legal analysis of Targeted Killing in the Georgetown Journal of International Law. The event will be moderated by Dr. Mark Jacobson, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and former Deputy NATO Representative in Afghanistan. |
6. Third Annual Conference on Turkey: Regional and Domestic Challenges for an Ascendant Turkey, National Press Club, 9-5 June 27
The Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies
in collaboration with the Institute of Turkish Studies present:
“Regional and Domestic Challenges for an Ascendant Turkey”
June 27th, 2012
9:00am-5:00pm
National Press Club
529 14th Street, NW 13th Floor
Washington, DC 20045
Conference Schedule:
8:45am – 9:00am: Registration
9:00am – 9:15am: Welcome
Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin, Middle East Institute
Gönül Tol, MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies
Ross Wilson, Institute of Turkish Studies
9:15am – 10:00am: Opening Keynote
Senator John McCain
United States Senate
10:00am – 10:30am: Keynote
Ömer Çelik
Deputy Chairman of the Justice and Development Party
10:30am – 10:45am: Coffee Break
10:45am – 12:15pm
Panel 1: Turkey’s Domestic Calculus: The Kurds, the Constitution, and the Presidential System Debate
Yalçın Akdoğan, Member of Parliament, Justice and Development Party
Ruşen Çakır, Turkish Daily Vatan
Michael Gunter, Tennessee Technological University
Levent Köker, Atilim University
Moderator: Michael Werz, Center for American Progress
12:15pm – 1:00pm: Lunch*
1:00pm – 1:45pm: Keynote
Ibrahim Kalın
Chief Adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
1:45pm – 3:15pm
Panel 2: Turkey, the EU, and the U.S.: Evolving Partnerships Post-Arab Spring
Brice de Schietere, Delegation of the European Union to the U.S.
Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, IREX
Ambassador Ross Wilson, Atlantic Council
Yaşar Yakış, Center for Strategic Communication, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moderator: Sharon Wiener, Koç University
3:15pm – 3:30pm: Coffee Break
3:30pm – 5:00pm
Panel 3: Turkey’s Leadership Role in an Uncertain Middle East
Amr Darrag, Freedom and Justice Party, Egypt
Joost Hiltermann, International Crisis Group
Yigal Schleifer, Freelance Journalist
Robin Wright, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Moderator: Abderrahim Foukara, al-Jazeera
*Complimentary lunch will be available on a first come first served basis
Follow @CSIS for live updates
The CSIS Southeast Asia Program will host its second annual conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea June 27-28, 2012.
The conference is a timely policy level discussion of the complex and important issues around the South China Sea. The program will take place a week before Secretary of State Clinton departs for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell will deliver the keynote speech on Wednesday, June 27 and Senator Jim Webb (D-VA), chairman of the Senate’s Asia Pacific subcommittee, will present a keynote address on Thursday, June 28.
In addition, CSIS is pleased to have recruited a world-class group of experts from Asia and the United States to initiate the dialogue around five key themes:
- Recent developments in the South China Sea
- South China Sea in ASEAN-U.S.-China relations
- Assessment of the South China Sea in a changing regional landscape
- Role of international law in resolving and managing territorial disputes
- Policy recommendations to boost security and cooperation in the South China Sea
Continuing disputes suggest there is a great need and interest to explore security in the South China Sea. We have invited approximately 20 experts to make presentations and will invite senior officials, executives, academics, and members of the media to participate in the dialogue. The full conference agenda is available here.
Please click here to RSVP by Monday, June 25, 2012. When you RSVP you MUST include the panels you wish to attend.You must log on to register. If you do not have an account with CSIS you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, please contact imisadmin@csis.org.
8. Libya, One Year Later, CATO, noon June 27
Noon (Luncheon to Follow)
Featuring Diederik Vandewalle, Adjunct Associate Professor of Business Administration and Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College; Jonathan Hutson, Director of Communications, Enough Project to End Genocide and Crimes against Humanity; Benjamin H. Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies, Cato Institute; moderated by Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst, Cato Institute.
The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
If you can’t make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org/live and join the conversation on Twitter with the hashtag #CatoEvents. Also follow @CatoEvents on Twitter to get future event updates, live streams, and videos from the Cato Institute.
Some political commentators have called the Obama administration’s intervention last year in the Libyan civil war an “undeniable success” and one of “the greatest triumphs and signature moments in Barack Obama’s presidency.” One year later, however, Libya remains in crisis. Reports suggest that operatives linked to al Qaeda are active in Libya. Militias are detaining thousands of former regime loyalists and engaging in widespread torture. Instability remains rampant and has spilled into neighboring states. Moreover, President Obama’s unilateral decision to intervene contravened congressional war powers.
What do these troubling developments mean for the future of the UN’s “responsibility to protect”? Did the death of Muammar Qaddafi vindicate the intervention? Will Qaddafi’s example make other so-called rogue states less willing to relinquish their nuclear programs? Were political commentators premature in declaring NATO’s intervention a success? Please join us as leading scholars examine this under-appreciated and almost forgotten topic.
Cato events, unless otherwise noted, are free of charge. To register for this event, please fill out the form below and click submit or email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by noon, Tuesday, June 26, 2012. Please arrive early. Seating is limited and not guaranteed. News media inquiries only (no registrations), please call (202) 789-5200.
9. Sanctions on Iran: Implications for Energy Security, Brookings, 9-12:30 June 29
Next month, international economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran will intensify dramatically. Although Iran has been the target of various U.S. and multilateral sanctions throughout most of the past three decades, the latest measures are the most severe in history. These actions have been credited with reviving Iran’s interest in negotiations with the world, but they have yet to persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and are creating new challenges for the international coalition that has sought to constrain Iran. They also pose new uncertainties for energy markets and the international economy at a precarious period in the global recovery and the U.S. presidential campaign.
On June 29, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a discussion assessing the wide-ranging implications of the Iran sanctions regime and consider the prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
After each panel, participants will take audience questions.
Details
June 29, 2012
9:00 AM – 12:30 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
For More Information
Brookings Office of Communications
events@brookings.edu
202.797.6105
Event Agenda
- 9:00Welcoming Remarks
- 9:15Panel One: Strategic and Energy Implications of Iran Sanctions
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Moderator
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-
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- 10:45Break
- 11:00Panel Two: International Approaches to Iran Sanctions
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Moderator
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-
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Tanvi Madan
Fellow
The Brookings Institution
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No, Yemen won’t work in Syria
Tonight at the International Peace Institute in New York, Jamal Benomar, special representative of the UN Secretary General for Yemen, discussed whether the “Yemen model,” a negotiated transfer of power from Bashar al Assad to one of his two vice presidents, Farouk al-Sharaa, might work in Syria (the female vice president, Najah Al-Attar, was not mentioned–no surprise that). I attended all but the last few minutes by webcast.
Jamal was appropriately circumspect. Yemen, he emphasized, was a unique and complicated situation. The state started to collapse and lose control over parts of the country. The President refused the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deal initially and only accepted when offered complete immunity not only for himself but also for others in his regime. The solution was a Yemeni one, based on face-to-face negotiations among Yemenis and codified eventually in UN Security Council resolution 2014 with support from the GCC and participation by other actors in Yemeni society. Women’s rights, rule of law and democracy are explicit parts of the agreement. The vice president, now President Hadi, had the trust of the opposition. A military committee is responsible for disengagement and security sector reform. There is also provision for a national dialogue, constitution-making, national reconciliation and traditional justice. It is a clear and detailed road map culminating in elections in February 2014.
There is no way to transplant the Yemeni model. Yemen has a history of political parties, active politics and powersharing. There is a sophisticated civil society. Parliament functions, elections are held. There is democratic space that does not exist in Syria. The peace deal is a power sharing arrangement between parties that believed there was no viable military solution (a “mutually hurting stalemate” in the parlance of conflict management). All wanted a peaceful and orderly transition.
Yemen suffered nothing like the level of violence we have seen in Syria. The total number of protesters killed in Yemen was 270 or so, far fewer than the more than 10,000 in Syria. The Security Council, the region and the international community more generally spoke with one voice. That voice was in favor of transition and backed the UN as facilitator. The agreement was signed in Riyadh because the presence of the Saudi King was useful. The Yemenis in the end all cooperated because they concluded there was no other way than a peaceful solution. Implementation of the agreement is on track.
So there may be lessons from Yemen, but Ambassador Abdullah M. Alsaidi (former Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations) summarized the differences between Yemen and Syria:
- the Syrian regime is stronger and controls the territory
- Yemen had a coherent opposition that is lacking in Syria
- Yemen had more democratic space than Syria, because its reunification in 1990 made it necessary
- the region and the UN Security Council are united in Yemen, divided in Syria
- rebel forces in Yemen were relatively larger
- the Yemeni military resisted a military solution and insisted on a political course, which is not yet the case in Syria
- in Syria the vice president has disappeared from sight and doesn’t have the confidence of the opposition (or perhaps even of Bashar al Assad)
The government in Syria still believes it can win militarily. It faces a divided Security Council and a divided Arab world. No, the Yemen model won’t work in Syria, not at least under current conditions.
But the UN has certainly demonstrated that in the more permissive Yemeni conditions it can, given time, add value in facilitating negotiations among local actors and prevent the worsening of a conflict that would have had devastating humanitarian and political effects. UN agencies have also been able to provide a good deal of humanitarian relief. Yemen is a success story, so far. Success in Syria will require that both sides realize that further military action will not produce results.
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Playing chess with Mike Tyson
I might wish that were the name of William Dobson‘s book about how dictators are adjusting to contemporary pro-democracy rebellions, as the original text of this post said, but really it’s Dictatorship 2.0. I haven’t read it but intend to do so, as there was a lively discussion of it yesterday at the Carnegie Endowment with Karim Sadjadpour chairing, Dobson presenting, Otpor‘s Srdja Popovic and Marc Lynch commenting.
It is hard to be an old style dictator today, Dobson avers. Really only North Korea is left, as Burma has begun to adjust. The plug can’t be pulled on communications, which means dictators need to get savvy and use more subtle forms of repression: targeted tax inspections, contested but unfree and unfair elections (preferably with the opposition fragmented), control over television and the courts, big handouts to the populace. Dictatorships today do not aim for ideological monopolies but rather to prevent and disrupt mobilization.
Oppositions have to adjust as well. Srdja outlined the basics: they need unity, planning and nonviolent discipline. They must be indigenous. Internationals can help, mainly through education and help with communications. Protesters need to avoid confronting dictatorial regimes where they are strong and attack them where they are weak. You don’t challenge Mike Tyson to box; better to play chess with him. This means avoiding military action in Syria, for example, and focusing on the regime’s economic weakness. The contest is between opposition enthusiasm and the fear the regime seeks to impose. Humor and “dispersive” tactics that do not require mass assembly in the streets (work and traffic slowdowns, boycotts, graffiti, cartoons) are increasingly important in reducing fear.
Marc emphasized the sequence of events in the Arab awakening: Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia made people elsewhere realize what was possible, Mubarak’s overthrow in Egypt made it seem inevitable, Libya and Yemen were far more difficult, a reversal that has continued in Syria, where the regime has substantial support from Alawites and Christians afraid of what will happen to them if the revolution succeeds. The tipping point comes when perception of a regime changes from its being merely bad to being immoral.
So who is next? Saudi Arabia and Jordan are in peril, Marc suggested. Bahrain is living on borrowed time. Srdja suggested Iran, which is moving backwards towards an old style dictatorship after the defeat of its Green Movement, can only be challenged successfully if the protesters learn from their mistakes. They need better leadership and a focus on the state’s inability to deliver services. China, Dobson said, has been good at pre-empting large protests. Burma may not be adjusting quickly enough to avoid an upheaval.
I didn’t hear mention of Russia, Cuba, Algeria, and lots of other places that might be candidates, but no one was trying to be comprehensive. Wherever they may be, dictatorships will adjust to what they see happening elsewhere and try to protect their monopoly on power from those who challenge it. Their opponents will also need to adjust. It is thus in both war and peace.
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Shifting sands
Uncertainty is breaking out all over the Greater Middle East.
With Crown Prince Nayef’s death in Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud will soon have to look past its octogenarian leadership to the next generation, with all the uncertainties that implies. Will the next generation be as attached to religious and social Wahhabi conservatism as the current one? Will it open an era of serious reform?
The suspension of the UN monitoring effort in Syria presages an increase in violent conflict with a highly uncertain outcome. Russia seems determined to keep Bashar al Assad in power, though its Foreign Minister denies it. Iran will certainly exert itself in that direction. I doubt the armed rebellion can beat the Syrian security forces any time soon, but we could see a lengthy insurgency fed by Saudi and Qatari arms shipments through Turkey.
The only real certainty in Egypt is that the military is trying to hold on to power. Whether it can and what the consequences will be is highly uncertain, as are the results of today’s presidential election. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has arrogated to itself legislative power, which means it now has to deal with Egypt’s economy and social problems along security and law and order. I don’t know any military establishments equal to that task, but the risk of new parliamentary elections may be greater than the SCAF wants to run. It could end up forced to rule Egypt, likely badly, for some time to come.
Iraq‘s Prime Minister Maliki has faced down a parliamentary rebellion but Al Qaeda has renewed its murderous attacks against the country’s Shia. If they succeed in reigniting Iraq’s sectarian warfare, the promise of a relatively democratic society that produces a lot of oil will evaporate, leaving a bitter residue.
Iran‘s Supreme Leader Khamenei has concentrated power as rarely before in the Islamic republic’s history, but American and Israeli threats of military attack against it nuclear program make prediction even a year out difficult.
After ten years of rule by Hamid Karzai, even Afghanistan faces the uncertainty of an election (to be held no one knows when in 2013 or 2014) in which he will not be running and an end to the NATO combat role shortly thereafter.
I needn’t mention next month’s elections in Libya or the aging leadership in Algeria, where military success in repressing Al Qaeda in the Maghreb seems to have pushed the militants into the Sahel, where they are destabilizing several other countries.
A region that enjoyed decades of stability–some would say stagnation, much of it autocratically imposed–now registers high volatility. Of course volatility can move in either direction: there are possible positive developments as well as negative ones. Tunisia has pushed the envelope in the positive direction. Yemen seems to be making progress against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates, though some think the government offensive and U.S. drone attacks are creating more extremists than they are killing. Morocco and Jordan have attempted some modest reforms that seem unlikely to suffice, but they may stave off open rebellion.
It is not easy to deal with uncertainty. Most experts would recommend triage and prioritization. Triage happens naturally. There are only a few Middle East problems that will make it to the President’s desk: Iran and Egypt most frequently, Afghanistan because of the American troops, and we can hope Syria when Obama meets with Putin this week at the G-20 in Moscow.
Prioritization of issues is harder. Even those who recommend it muddle exactly what they mean. Colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment recommend in a recent overview of the situation in the Middle East:
international actors should focus on a few, very specific issues for special emphasis, such as international human rights standards, the maintenance of existing treaty relationships, and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.
But then they go on to recommend economic cooperation aimed at job creation, a non sequitur virtually guaranteed to disappoint expectations given limited U.S. resources and a track record of failure. Not to mention the difficulty of meeting human rights standards, since these require equal gender treatment not readily available in the workplace in many of the countries in question.
Shifting sands will make navigation in the Middle East difficult for a long time to come. I recommend to all my international affairs students that they learn Arabic, or another of the regional languages (Farsi most of all). Even if American oil production continues to reduce already low U.S. dependence on the Middle East, the global oil market and the extremist movements the region has spawned will ensure we remain engaged there for a long time to come, triage and prioritization notwithstanding.
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Is Al Qaeda Inc. bankrupt?
It is hard for me to imagine adding anything original to the flood of commentary on the Letters from Abbottabad, as West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center calls them. As the New York Times put it,
The frustrations expressed by Bin Laden as he issued instructions sometimes in vain might be familiar to any chief executive trying to keep tabs on a multinational corporation that had grown beyond its modest origins.
Osama even worried about which currencies to keep ransom proceeds in. Mario Draghi will be pleased to learn that Al Qaeda’s reserves were kept in euros as well as dollars. I guess its only a matter of time before they add Chinese renminbi.
In what I’ve read so far, which is not much, Bin Laden’s advice on leadership stands out:
As you well know, the best people are the ones most agreed on by the people, and the key attributes that bring people together and preserve their staying behind their leader are his kindness, forgiveness, sense of fairness, patience, and good rapport with him, as well as showing care for them and not tax them beyond their ability.
What must always be in the forefront of our minds is: managing people at such times calls for even greater wisdom, kindness, forgiveness, patience and deliberation, and is a complex task by most any measure.
This is quoted from the last of the letters, labelled no. 19 in the translations.
Getting people to do what Al Qaeda does obviously requires much more kindness than portrayed in American movies. This is an important lesson. The evil groups of people do is almost always done for some purpose the members of the group regard as good, not evil. Leadership is what convinces them that they are acting for a good purpose, so it needs to behave well towards those it wants to rally. At other points in the letters, it is clear that Bin Laden was unhappy with Al Qaeda and affiliated attacks on Muslims. He wanted his cadres to focus on Americans, because they are the real enemy.
Americans hope to defeat Al Qaeda. Certainly it has suffered a good deal of damage, self-inflicted as well as drone and special forces-inflicted in the last few years. But it is unlikely to disappear entirely, any more than homegrown right-wing terrorism, much reduced from its heyday, has disappeared entirely from the United States. The real question the Bin Laden papers pose is how much more effort we should put into what the Bush administration called the Global War on Terror, which we are still fighting in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan and other places.
Only a closer examination of the entire trove of letters and other documents could enlighten us as to the answer. I doubt the American public will ever get that privilege. The published letters have presumably been carefully chosen. They can give us only an incomplete picture of Al Qaeda. We’ll have to rely on the assessments of our (not always) intelligence community and the wisdom of our elected leaders to make the decision on whether Al Qaeda Inc. is bankrupt.
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Ingredients of success
I’m spending the day at the “The Arab Spring: Getting It Right,” the annual conference of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in lovely Crystal City. Here are a few highlights.
The first session focused on the ingredients for successful democratic transitions. Here are my quick notes:
Dan Brumberg, Georgetown, in the chair:
- Systemic problems need systemic solutions: if you get rid of torture, you need forensics.
- Need process of consensus and pact-making.
- Religion is an important dimension of identity that needs to be part of that process.
Jason Gluck, USIP: constitution-making
- People need to know why they need a new constitution. What are the core principles they want enshrined there?
- Egypt: battles over timing, constitutional committee reflect lack of answers. Exclusiveness undermines the constitution-writing body.
- Tunisia: using simple majority, not consensus, in committees writing the constitution, with little outreach to civil society beyond Tunis.
- Libya: only four months for constitution-writing, which doesn’t allow deep consideration or public participation. Inclusivity is in doubt.
- Process matters more than constitutional content. Because it makes for legitimacy. Making a constitution is a political, not a legal exercise. It incarnates core values of the state and society.
- Not a drafting exercise but a national dialogue about needs and aspirations.
- Inclusive, participatory, consensual, transparent, deliberative processes are more likely to have good results.
Alfred Stepan, Columbia: transition needs these elements:
- Legitimate constitution written by a representative group.
- A government results from popular vote.
- Powersharing (with military or religious authorities) is not necessary
- The government has to have real authority over policy.
- Civil society more important in deconstructing autocracy than in reconstructing the state, which requires political society and leadership.
- Major transitions (end of WWII, 1989) have required international support, but Arab awakening is getting much less external assistance.
- Brumberg: ironically, opposition consensus building happens more in autocratic society like Tunisia rather than in more open one like Egypt.
Tunisia has been successful because parties have been talking with each other and developing consensus (pact-making) for a long time (since 2003)
Laith Kubba, National Endowment for Democracy: getting it right means avoiding chaos or crisis. Indicators:
- Military “neutralized” and under civilian control: Tunisia OK, Egypt not and militias are the problem in Libya.
- Security apparatus has to shift from protecting regime to protecting state.
- Economic equity has to increase.
- State institutions need to emerge that allow society to be free, including at local level.
- Democratic culture, including associations, free but responsible press.
- New elites emerging in political parties, youth groups, think tanks.
- Education improving.
Big risk: those who reject democratic culture as a foreign import.
Comment from a Tunisian participant, whose name I missed:
- Traditional solidarity was important in Tunisia. Reduced likelihood of revenge.
- So too was role of women.
The second session focused on regional and global impacts:
Radwan Ziadeh, Syrian National Council and Carr Center, Harvard
- Syria is not like Tunisia, Yemen or Libya. It is now more like Bosnia: international community hesitancy, political opposition cannot deliver so Free Syria Army is taking over, regime crimes are systematic.
- Hoping for protection of civilians in a safety zone along Turkish border by an Administration that includes people who made the mistakes in Bosnia.
- Three hundred observers are insufficient.
- Need for military action without UN Security Council approval, but UNGA (137 countries) and Friends of Syria provide cover.
- Everyone looking for U.S. leadership, but Washington is inhibited by domestic considerations, lack of oil interest.
- Arabs lack resources and legitimacy to act.
Brian Grim, Pew Research Center: Religion and the Arab Spring
- Government restrictions on religion are increasing in more countries and those with greater population before Arab spring.
- Problem is especially strong in Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where constitutional guarantees for religious freedom are not strong and apostasy laws are prevalent, enforced both by governments and social hostilities.
- Restrictions on conversion 80% in MENA, where both government violence and social hostilities are prevalent.
Caryle Murphy, Woodrow Wilson Center: A View from the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia)
- Arab Spring affects Saudi Arabia externally: Egypt, Bahrain, Iraq.
- Saudi effort is to manage and keep it away from the Gulf.
- Foreign policy activism: GCC confederation? First step with Bahrain?
- Riyadh is disappointed in the U.S., lack of confidence in U.S. willingness to intervene.
- Arab Spring also affects Saudi Arabia internally: TV, internet and Twitter have made young Saudis more aware of the rest of the world and want to be more like it. Ditto those studying abroad.
- But impulse is still evolutionary, not revolutionary. Unemployment is the big youth problem. Government is aware but will it move fast enough to accommodate youth demands for jobs and more freedom?
- Society still very conservative, political consciousness very limited, including both secularists and Islamists.
- Petitions for constitutional monarchy, Umma party formation led to government clampdown.
- Eastern Province: Shia very unhappy.
- Religion is a focus of debate, which is important because it is the foundation of legitimacy.
Aylin Unver Noi, Gedik University (Turkey): Regional Alignments
- Ankara has shifted foreign policy towards Middle East.
- Sunni resistance camp emerging, pro-Palestinian, Islamist-led, democratic governments.
- Revolution in Syria would cause it to join this camp, as Jordan might.
- Turkey concerned with Kurdish aspirations, especially PKK activities in Syria.
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