Tag: Yemen
Droning on
The Washington Post reports today that the CIA wants to expand drone attacks in Yemen:
Securing permission to use these “signature strikes” would allow the agency to hit targets based solely on intelligence indicating patterns of suspicious behavior, such as imagery showing militants gathering at known al-Qaeda compounds or unloading explosives.
The United States has long used this less discriminating approach in Pakistan, where I am told we killed a lot of tall guys in long white robes before finding Osama bin Ladin holed up in his Abbottabad villa.
This is not an easy policy choice, but the right course is to err on the side of caution. The Post article emphasizes the risk of drone strikes putting the U.S. on the government side in Yemen’s wars with several groups of insurgents. I don’t see that as the main issue. After all, we recognize and support the government in Sanaa, even if we don’t intend to get involved in Yemen’s internecine battles. None of the insurgents are going to think we are not on the government’s side.
The Post also emphasizes that the drone strikes have killed a lot of the “right” people, more than are killed in strikes based on specific intelligence about their whereabouts. That, too, is not pertinent to the decision-making. We’d kill a lot of the “right” people by mowing down whole villages too, but it wouldn’t be morally correct or wise.
The issue is the impact of the strikes. Do they work, or do they not? Do they reduce risks to the United States or American forces? A recent quantitative analysis of the drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan suggests that they have reduced militant violence, BUT:
Finally, it is important to reiterate that any reduction in terrorist activity associated with the drone campaign appears modest in scope. Although a decline in violence in FATA in 2010 coincided with the peak of the drone campaign, FATA militants remain active and violence remains high. To the extent drone strikes ”work,” their effectiveness is more likely to lie in disrupting militant operations at the tactical level than as a silver bullet that will reverse the course of the war and singlehandedly defeat al Qaeda.
Others find more ambiguous results.
The bigger question is the impact on the population in areas where drones strike, and on the broader political context . This is where things get dicey, in particular if you hit the wrong people (no matter how many “right” ones you kill). Joshua Foust warned about these consequences earlier in the year. While some Pakistanis and Yemenis may celebrate the deaths of particular militants, there will always be collateral damage, the more so if the “rules of engagement” are loosened. It is difficult to imagine that most Pakistanis and Yemenis will welcome the deaths of innocent countrymen in U.S. drone attacks intended to protect Americans. How long will their governments put up with us? We’ve seen in President Karzai the negative consequences of too many mistaken strikes (not only by drones) and night raids.
General Petraeus, whom I know and respect, needs to repeat the question he asked himself about detention facilities when he took over in Iraq and later in Afghanistan: are we creating more terrorists than we are taking out of circulation? No RAND study will likely answer this question. We’ll have to rely on good judgment, which is in short supply as Washington gears up for its quadrennial blood-letting between Democrats and Republicans. There isn’t much mileage for an American politician in not doing the max to get the terrorists in Yemen, but restraint might in the end save more American lives.
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Let your people go!
Tonight is the Jewish festival of Passover, when we celebrate liberation. Last year, I called this season the Passover of Arab liberation, but noted the difficulties Syria was facing.
This year we seem to be somewhere in the middle of the ten plagues, with Bashar al Assad not even beginning to think about letting his people go (and in fact inflicting the plagues, which is not something pharaoh did). The mutual ceasefire deadline is set for April 12, provided Damascus pulls back from populated areas and ceases artillery fire on April 10. In the meanwhile, Bashar seems to have intensified the military attacks in an effort to do as much deadly damage as possible to his opposition. While I hope Kofi Annan’s effort is successful, you’d have to be Moses-like in inspiration to bet on it.
We should nevertheless consider the possibilities. If by some fluke the Syrian army really does withdraw from some places, I hope the revolution will tuck away its guns and somehow demonstrate its overwhelming superiority in numbers. It is particularly important that April 12/13 see a massive demonstration of opposition in Damascus and Aleppo, even if that means everyone just staying home in a general strike. It will also be vital that the UN deploy observers quickly, and in far greater numbers than the couple of hundred currently contemplated.
It seems far more likely that Bashar will not withdraw or cease fire. What then? There is really no sign of international will to intervene. Despite ample documentation of artillery attacks on civilian targets as well as helicopter operations, neither the Turks nor the Arab League are preparing serious military action to enforce a no-fly zone or create humanitarian corridors or safe zones. The Syrian security forces are busy mining the borders so that civilians can’t escape. While it seems unlikely that Bashar can prevail 100%, he is well on his way to reducing the opposition to a low-intensity insurgency, with the bulk of the population sullenly resenting but accepting restoration of the dictatorship. At least for a while, it is likely to be significantly more draconian than before the rebellion started.
This is a bad outcome, but I am afraid not the worst. If the fighting continues to escalate and Bashar still survives, the consequences could be catastrophic for the region. The violence might then overflow Syria’s borders and pose serious problems for Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and maybe even Turkey. If Bashar manages to stay in place, it is vital that the Friends of Syria, that unwieldy conglomeration of more than 80 countries, maintain and tighten its efforts, in particular the sanctions and diplomatic isolation. We see in Burma how strategic patience can win the day.
Many of my friends and colleagues are appalled that nothing more is being done. I can’t describe myself as comfortable with this state of affairs. But it is important to recognize that there are other priorities on earth. The Administration’s first concern has to be Iran. There is no way to get a negotiated solution to its nuclear challenge, or prevent the Israelis from using military means, unless the United States maintains a credible military threat. Entering a war with an uncertain outcome in Syria would not be a smart prelude to dealing with Iran. American resources, though large, are not infinite–we wouldn’t want to run out of cruise missiles or suffer serious aircraft losses in a second priority fight.
There is also a diplomatic factor. The best way to mount a credible threat against Iran is with UN Security Council backing. What are the odds of the Russians conceding that if we go to war with Syria without their cooperation? The odds may not be good in any event, but we need at least a small chance for success.
So I am afraid our Syrian heroes will need to continue their efforts. I still prefer they be nonviolent ones. Nothing that has happened in the last few weeks of violent attacks convinces me that the Free Syria Army will shorten the reign of Bashar al Assad by as much as a single day. It is far more likely that their attacks will frighten large numbers of people who might otherwise have joined nonviolent protests.
I’ll pray for the Syrians at Seder tonight, as I trust many Jews around the world will do. Not because I think praying will do the Syrians any good, but because the parallel between today’s Syrians and our own liberation narrative should inform our sensibilities. The people of Syria are seeking the freedom that Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Yemenis have all started to enjoy, even if they are still at the beginning of their journeys through the wilderness. I hope the Syrians catch up soon.
The most frequent injunction in the Old Testament is to treat a stranger like ourselves:
…you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt… {Leviticus 19:33-34}
Bashar: let your people go!
PS: I missed this Monday, but you shouldn’t:
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This week’s “peace picks”
Frighteningly busy week in DC. Experts bloom even before the cherry blossoms:
1. Chinese Heir Apparent, Xi Jinping and U.S.-China Relations, SAIS, rm. 806 Rome, 12-2 pm March 5
Since 2009, the Islamist insurgency known as Boko Haram has escalated its attacks across Nigeria, targeting the country’s security forces, politicians and innocent civilians – Muslims and Christians alike. The Nigerian government, led by President Goodluck Jonathan has demonstrated itself ill-equipped and unprepared to manage such a crisis, juggle economic woes, compounded by the country’s fuel crisis and political unrest.
Last summer, General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, confirmed Boko Haram’s links to al-Qaeda. Only after Boko Haram bombed the United Nation’s headquarters in Abuja did Washington take notice of this emerging threat to international security. Not only is Nigeria the largest African oil exporter to the U.S. but its peacekeeping contributions are the largest on the continent, as is its population. In November 2011, the Sub-committee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the House Homeland Security Committee, chaired by Rep. Patrick Meehan (R-PA), released a report on Boko Haram’s threat to the U.S. homeland.
Join us as we assess Boko Haram’s threat to Nigeria, the region, and the United States.
Keynote Remarks by
The Honorable Patrick Meehan (R-PA)
Member, United States House of Representatives
Followed by a Discussion with
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.
Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic Council
Ricardo René Larémont, Ph.D.
Professor of Political Science and Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton
3. After Elections: Next Steps in Yemen’s Transition, IFES, 12-1:30 pm March 6
Where:
IFES
1850 K Street, NW, 5th Floor
Washington, DC 20006
Yemen’s February 21 presidential election resulted in the end of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 32-year rule. While some questioned the purpose of a one-candidate election, many others hailed it as a crucial first step in Yemen’s transitional process.
As the country moves forward, please join for a conversation on the next steps in Yemen’s political transition that will address issues including:
- What are the priority issues for the constitutional committee?
- What will be the role of civil society, youth protesters and opposition groups?
- What challenges exist for reconciliation with entities such as Al-Hirak and the Houthis?
Featured Speakers:
Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid, Head of the UN Human Rights Training and Documentation Centre for South West Asia and the Arab Region
Grant Kippen, Chief of Party in Yemen, IFES
Ibrahim Sharqieh, Deputy Director of the Brookings Doha Center (invited)
Moderated by Michael Svetlik, Vice President of Programs, IFES
Please RSVP by registering online
NOTE: Lunch will be served.
4. Arab Spring or Islamic Winter? SAIS, Rome Auditorium, 2-3:30 pm March 6
A politically incorrect debate among Arab, US and European observers a year after the Arab uprisings.
A question and answer period will follow.
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
Rome Building Auditorium
Moderator: Kurt Volker, Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Robbie Friedmann, Georgia State University
Karim Mezran, Johns Hopkins University
Daniele Moro, Visiting Scholar, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Pablo Pardo, Washington Correspondent, El Mundo
Daniel Robinson, Chief White House Correspondent, Voice of America
Samuel Tadros, Hudson Institute
5. Assessing the Implications of the Russian Presidential Election, Woodrow Wilson Center, 10-noon March 7i
Live Briefing from Moscow and DC
The Kennan Institute will sponsor a Moscow-Washington, DC seminar assessing the implications of the first round of the Russian presidential vote. U.S. commentators will be joined via video conference in Moscow with some of Russia’s leading political actors, including Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Ryzhkov.
Moderator: Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute
Maria Gaidar, Founder, Democratic Alternatives (DA!), Russia
Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation
Henry Hale, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University
Stanislav Belkovsky, Director, National Strategy Institute, Moscow
By Videoconference from Moscow:
Moderator: Olga Bychkova, Journalist, Ekho Moskvy
Alexei Navalny, Attorney, Moscow Bar Association
Vladimir Ryzhkov, Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and Chairman, Republican Party of the Russian Federation
Please note that seating for this event is available on a first come, first served basis. RSVP is required to attend. Please call on the day of the event to confirm. Please bring an identification card with a photograph (e.g. driver’s license, work ID, or university ID) as part of the building’s security procedures.
The Kennan Institute speaker series is made possible through the generous support of the Title VIII Program of the U.S. Department of State.
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Henry Hale//Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan InstituteAssistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Affairs, The George Washington University
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Ariel Cohen //Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation
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Director, National Strategy Institute, Moscow
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Maria Gaidar //Founder, Democratic Alternatives (DA!), Russia
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Journalist, Ekho Moskvy
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Attorney, Moscow Bar Association
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Professor, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and Chairman, Republican Party of the Russian Federation
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Blair A. Ruble//Director, Kennan Institute and Comparative Urban Studies Project
6. The Saffron Revolution: Prospects for Democracy in Burma, Center for National Policy, noon-1:15 March 7
Featuring:
Former Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security CouncilMarvin Ott
Former Deputy Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on IntelligenceJennifer Quigley
Advocacy Director, US Campaign for Burma
*A light lunch will be served*
Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333
Washington, DC 20001
202-682-1800
Map
Click here
7. Time to Attack Iran? U.S. Policy and Iran’s Nuclear Program, Carnegie Endowment, 7-8:30 pm March 7
6:00 – 7:00 PM
Networking Reception
7:00 – 8:30 PM
Debate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Participants: Elbridge A. Colby, CNA
Participants: Jamie M. Fly, Foreign Policy Initiative
Participants: Dr. Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University
Moderator: Eli Lake
Moderator: Newsweek and The Daily Beast
To RSVP, click here.
Despite diplomatic negotiations, international condemnation, and harsh economic sanctions, Iran continues to violate its international obligations by pursuing nuclear weapons capability. While some are still holding out hope for a negotiated solution, a different debate has emerged in the United States over whether it is now time for the use of military force to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions.
Join the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) as it hosts a debate over the use of the military option against Iran’s nuclear program with Elbridge A. Colby (research analyst at CNA), Jamie M. Fly (FPI executive director), and Matthew Kroenig (assistant professor at Georgetown University) on March 7, 2012, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW). Eli Lake, senior national security correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast, will moderate the discussion.
Background Reading
- Dr. Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012.
- Elbridge A. Colby and Austin Long, “Why Not to Attack Iran,” The National Interest, January 11, 2012.
- Jamie M. Fly and Gary Schmitt, “The Case for Regime Change in Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012.
8. Who Owns the Syrian Revolution? The Roles and Challenges of Women and Minorities in the Syrian Uprising, USIP, 9:30-12:45 March 9
As the Syrian uprising enters its second year, uncertainty about the challenges confronting women and minorities looms especially large. Women have played a critical role throughout the uprising, with activists like Suhair al-Attasi, Razan Zaitouneh, and others emerging as leaders of protest and resistance to the Assad regime. Yet their contributions have often been overshadowed. Questions persist about whether women’s concerns and perspectives will be fully addressed, either in the current uprising or in a potential post-Assad Syria. How can Syrian women ensure that their voices are heard as the revolution unfolds and a new Syria takes shape?
Tensions around the future of minorities in Syria are also escalating. While the opposition includes Christians, Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and other minorities, the Syrian National Council (SNC), the most widely-recognized coalition of anti-regime forces, has struggled with the perception that it is not truly inclusive. It is often seen as heavily influenced by Islamists whose outlook toward minorities is viewed as uncertain, despite the SNC’s commitment to pluralism and tolerance. The Syrian regime, meanwhile, has characterized the opposition as a terrorist movement led by Sunni extremists. It has played, with some effect, on the fears of Syrian minorities about what their future might hold should the Asad regime be overthrown. As violence in Syria has escalated, moreover, sectarian tensions have become apparent. Can the uprising succeed without full support from Syria’s minorities? Will it be possible to prevent Syria from falling into sectarian conflict, and potentially a sectarian civil war?
To address these and other issues concerning the roles and challenges of women and minorities in Syria’s revolution, on March 9, from 9:30 am – 12: 45 pm, the U.S. Institute of Peace will hold two moderated discussion panels, co-sponsored with United for Free Syria and the Syrian Emergency Task Force.
9:30 am – 11:00am | Panel 1: Women and the Future of the Syrian Revolution
Speakers:
- Ms. Rajaa Altalli
Ms. Altalli is a Syrian political activist who serves as Director of International Relations for the organization Syrian Christians for Democracy.” She is a also co-founder of the Support Center for Syrian Minorities based in Washington, D.C. Ms. Altalli is a Ph.D. candidate in mathematics and geometric analysis at Northeastern University in Boston, and has taught mathematics at several universities in Syria.
- Ms. Farah Al Attasi
Ms. Al Attasi is a prominent author and commentator who appears frequently on Arab and American media to discuss Syrian affairs, as well as Middle Eastern issues and U.S. relations with Arab and Muslim worlds. She is currently Executive Director of the American Arab Communication & Translation Center (ACT), the founder and president of the Arab Information and Resource Center in Washington D.C., and owner of Zenobia Lounge, the first multicultural café and bookshop about the Arab and Muslim worlds. In addition, Ms. Al Atassi is the author of many publications in Arabic and English, including a collection of short stories titled “The Mask.”
- Marah Bukai
Ms. Bukai is a Syrian American author, academic researcher, and journalist who has dedicated her professional life to building bridges between the United States and the Arab and Muslim worlds through cultural dialogue. She has worked as senior media adviser at Vital Voices, a lecturer at the University of Maryland and Georgetown University, and is currently Public Diplomacy Program Specialist at FSI. Ms. Bukai is also the founder and chair of the Alwatref Institute for Humanitarian Studies, which aims to bridge the gap between East and West and increase the knowledge of the Middle East among American people. Bukai has five publications of poetry, including, most recently, a volume of poems titled “O,” that was published by Waref Publishing House in Washington, D.C.
- Rasha Alahdab, Esq.
Ms. Alahdab is a founding partner of Syrian Women for Syria, and a founding board member of Syrian Expatriates for Democracy. She is also a member of the Secretariat in the Syrian National Assembly and a member of the law office of the Syrian National Council, as well as a member of the law office of the National Change Current, a Syrian opposition organization.
- Ms. Rafif Jouejati
Ms. Jouejati is the CEO of a Virginia-based management consulting firm, and has been supporting the Syrian Revolution since March 2011. She currently serves as the English-language spokesperson for the Local Coordination Committees in Syria, the National Consensus Movement, and Activists for a Free Syria. She also supports the SNC’s Media Office by writing, translating, and editing press releases, statements, and other communiqués. Ms. Jouejati is also the Program Manager for the SNC-sponsored “A Thousand Years for Syria” initiative.
- Kathleen Kuehnast, Ph.D. (Moderator)
Director, Center of Innovation on Gender and Peacebuilding
U.S. Institute of Peace
11:00 am- 12:45 pm | Panel 2: The Roles and Challenges of Minorities in Syria’s Revolution
Speakers:
- Abed Alo, M.D.
Born in a Kurdish village north of Aleppo, Syria, Dr. Alo is a Surgeon and Fellow of The American College of Surgery. Dr. Alo has been active in the Syrian Kurdish Diaspora in the United States, and an active participant in and supporter of the Syrian pro-democracy movement since it’s inception. Dr. Alo will be speaking on behalf of the Syrian Kurdish community. Dr. Alo is also a member of United for Free Syria.
- Mr. Oudei Abouassaf
Born in Damascus, Syria, Mr. Abousassaf’s family is originally from the Druze-majority city of Sweida, in the south of the country. He is a member of the board of Syrian Expatriates in Support of the Syrian Revolution, Sweida. From 2009 – 2011 he held a position in the Department of Defense. Mr. Abouassaf was last in Syria in January 2011 and saw first-hand the situation on the ground in Syria. Mr. Abouassaf will speak on behalf of the Syrian Druze community.
- Mr. Oubab Khalil
Mr. Khalil, an Alawite, grew up in Lattakia province, Syria. He received a B.A. in law from Beirut Arab University in 2001, and he joined the Syrian Law Society Damascus Bar in 2003. Mr. Khalil immigrated to the United States in 2006, where he has been an outspoken critic of the Syrian government, and involved in promoting freedom and democracy in Syria; efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Syria; and raising awareness about the importance of establishing a secular and pluralistic state in Syria. Mr. Khalil is a member of the board of Syrian Expatriates Organization.
- Najib Ghadbian, Ph.D.
A Syrian academic and member of the Syrian National Council (SNC), Professor Ghadbian is associate professor of political science and middle east studies at the University of Arkansas. He is the author of several books and articles in English and Arabic. His Arabic book, “The Second Assad Regime: Bashar of Lost Opportunities,” was published in 2006. Dr. Ghadbian was a signatory to the Damascus Declaration and is currently active within the Syrian opposition abroad.
- Ms. Dima Moussa, Esq.
A Syrian-born attorney and member of the Syrian National Council (SNC), Ms. Mousa has been affiliated with the Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University, focusing on Arab women’s rights. She has also volunteered with an organization that assisted Iraqi refugees in adjusting to life in the United States. In recent months, Ms. Moussa has been active in the Syrian-American community, serving as a media spokesperson for a key grassroots movements in Syria, in addition to independently working with activists inside and outside Syria. Ms. Moussa is fluent in Arabic and English, in addition to speaking Assyrian.
- Steven Heydemann, Ph.D. (Moderator )
Senior Adviser for Middle East Initiatives
U.S. Institute of Peace
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Wising up
Two weeks ago, I was getting ready to write a post suggesting that Bashar al Assad would likely win his current contest with Syrian protesters. It looked as if they had made a definitive choice in favor of a violent uprising, one that the Syrian security forces are capable of defeating. The net result would have been a low-level insurgency, aka civil war, one that would lead to increasing sectarian separation and destabilization of neighboring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. That outcome–the worst of all possible worlds for the United States–is still possible.
But Friday’s 41 peaceful demonstrations in Damascus, a few of them large, suggest that the opposition has wised up. Rather than a force-on-force confrontation they are bound to lose, the protesters spread out their efforts and kept them non-violent. Such coordinated risings in the capital are far more important for gaining adherents and defying the regime than killing a few soldiers or even Shabiha (non-uniformed regime goons) would be. It has forced the regime today to rush its security forces into the capital to squelch the defiance and re-establish fear. With any luck, they’ll find nothing to repress, as the protesters will hopefully be ready to ignite efforts elsewhere.
This is smart revolution. Drawing lines around specific territory and trying to defend it would be dumb revolution, because it identifies precisely the territory that the regime has to attack to kill its enemies. It has shown no hesitancy to do that. Safe areas and humanitarian corridors are unsafe unless defended with adequate force, which no one has yet shown any sign of readiness to field.
Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, the Chinese are showing some signs of veto remorse, averring openly that they support the Arab League plan calling for Bashar al Assad to step aside and allow his vice president to take charge of a transition to democracy. I’d be the first to admit that a similar scheme is not looking so great in Yemen, where yesterday’s one-candidate election will presumably lead to Vice President Hadi’s takeover of power and initiation of some kind of transition. The problem in Yemen is that those sharing power do not include the protesters who initiated the revolution and who reject amnesty for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The situation in Syria is different. There really is no question of amnesty for Bashar. The best he can hope for is exile in Iran, which backs him to the hilt. But he could just as well end up dead like Muammar Qaddafi or on trial like Hosni Mubarak, prospects that are presumably inspiring his murderous attempts to repress the demonstrations.
“Friends of Syria,” the international coalition in favor of the revolution, plans to meet Friday in Tunisia. This is a good occasion to reiterate support for the Arab League plan, tighten sanctions, press for greater unity among the Syrian opposition and reiterate support for nonviolent protest. It may also be a good opportunity to strategize about bringing China and even Russia into the fold. The Chinese seem halfway there. The Russians will need some guarantees on access to port facilities in Syria before signing on.
Meanwhile, watch those Iranian warships that traversed the Suez Canal yesterday. They have now docked at Tartus. If they deliver weapons or personnel to Syria, it would be a good moment for someone to intervene. That’s not trivial, since there is no arms embargo, but that’s why we’ve got all those clever lawyers in the State Department. I hope they are busy scribbling the decision memos.
PS: The Iranians claimed the ships docked, but the Pentagon says they never did. Maybe someone in Tehran understood the risk.
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This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
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Arab world: positive balance, still teetering
I need a scorecard to keep track of political change in the Arab world, so here it is:
- Egypt: New Egyptian parliament led by Muslim Brotherhood met for the first time yesterday. It needs to choose a commission to write the new constitution and call elections for president in June. Other powers are uncertain. Supreme Council of the Armed Forces still running things and holding on to perks and power.
- Yemen: President Saleh has left for the U.S. for medical treatment. I still find it incredible he would come here given the risks of a court deciding to hold him accountable for crimes for which he has immunity in Yemen. A single-candidate “election” February 22 is scheduled to elevate his vice president to the presidency. It is unclear to me what good this will do. Protests continue, his relatives cling to power and dissident parts of the armed forces control parts of the capital.
- Libya: Demonstrators in Benghazi Sunday attacked National Transitional Council offices in a protest over lack of transparency in deciding the electoral law to be used in May elections and in disbursing money. That’s the good news. Occasional strife among the armed militias is the bad news.
- Syria: The Arab League, much criticized because its human rights observers have failed to stop the violence, proposed a serious transition plan, which the Syrian National Council accepted and the Assad regime rejected. The Russians are saying that their patience has run out. A strong UN Security Council resolution would be a fine way to show that they mean what they say.
- Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom is cracking down hard on demonstrations in the majority Shia, oil-producing east.
- Bahrain: Despite the Bassiouni report‘s frankness about human rights abuses during last year’s repression of protests, the monarchy shows no sign of letting up and the Americans, anxious to keep the Fifth Fleet there, aren’t complaining too loudly.
- Morocco, Algeria, Jordan: All attempting various degrees of reform to forestall revolution. Largely succeeding so far. In forestalling that is. Reforms are modest.
So what once looked like a wave of Arab spring protest has now broken into rivulets moving in many different directions as they hit harder and softer obstacles. A few regimes are gone, but most are still holding on, in some cases just barely. Tunisia is the great success story, so far.
There are quite a few shoes that haven’t dropped yet, but likely will: Egypt’s economy is devastated, shoulder launched antiaircraft missiles are circulating in and beyond Libya, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may well expand further in Yemen, sectarian war threatens in Syria. The new regimes, especially in Egypt, look likely to be tougher-minded towards Israel, even if domestic issues predominate in the short term. 2012 is likely to be even more challenging than 2011.
Still: the overall direction is clear enough. There will likely be more freedom of speech and expression in much of the Arab world once this tide goes out. There will also be more Islamists in power and fewer supposedly secular and pro-Western autocrats. There will likely be more political competition, though how long it will be permitted to last is uncertain. It is also unclear how much governance will improve, in particular whether accountability and transparency will triumph over cronyism and corruption, and whether human rights–especially minority rights–will be respected. The balance for the year is positive, but there are still a lot of things to sort out.
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