Tag: Yemen
This week’s “peace picks”
Still a bit slow on international affairs this week in DC. Maybe it’s domestic politics and the State of the Union? But still some good picks, unfortunately some clustered on the same day:
1. Is Foreign Aid Worth the Cost? Woodrow Wilson Center, 5th floor, January 23, 2012, 4-6 pm
There will be a live cast of this event.
Many Americans think foreign aid consumes 25 % or more of the federal budget when in fact it costs less than 1%. Some presidential candidates are calling for the elimination of all foreign aid. Yet as the U.S. moves into the global economy that depends increasingly on the economic development and growth of all countries, American aid, trade and investment all play vital parts in the well-being of the U.S. economy. What is the outlook for foreign assistance funding in the current Congress and how are Members’ attitudes shaped by new budgetary constraints being forced by the growing national debt? This panel of experts will explore the value of foreign aid, its successes and failures and how it might be better targeted for maximum effectiveness in the future.
The Panel
Charles O. Flickner, Jr. is former staff director of the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, a position he held from 1995 to 2003. Prior to coming to the House, he served as a staff member on the Senate Budget Committee from 1974 to 1994. From 1969 to 1970, he served in a mechanized infantry unit of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. He is author of the chapter, “Removing Impediments to an Effective Partnership with Congress,” in Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership (CSIS, Brookings, 2007). He earned a B.S. degree from Loyola University in 1969, and pursued graduate studies at the University of Virginia from 1970 to 1974.
Donald M. Payne is a Democratic Representative of the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey in the U.S. House of Representatives where he has served since 1989. He is the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and as a member of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere. He is also a senior member of the House Education and Labor Committee where he serves on the Subcommittee on Early childhood, Elementary and Secondary Education, and the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections. He also serves as the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation whose mission is to advance the global black community by developing leaders through internships and fellowship programs, and to inform policy and educate the public. He previously served as the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. Prior to his election to Congress as the first elected African American from New Jersey, he served on various municipal and county offices in and around Newark, as an executive of the Prudential Insurance Company, Vice-President of Urban Data Systems, Inc., and as an educator in the Newark and Passaic Public School Districts. He is a graduate of Seton Hall University, and pursued graduate studies at Springfield College in Massachusetts.
Carol J. Lancaster is Dean of the School of Foreign Service and a Professor of Politics at Georgetown University. She previously directed Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown from 2005 to 2009 and before that GU’s African Studies Program from 2004 to 2005. During the Clinton administration she served as the Deputy Administration of the U.S. Agency for International Development from 1993 to 1996, and during the Carter administration as a member of the policy planning staff at the Department of State from 1977 to 1980, and then as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at the Bureau of African Affairs. She has published numerous books and articles on the politics of foreign aid and development including, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development and Domestic Politics (2007), and, George Bush’s Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos? (2008). She earned a BSc degree from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, and MSc and Ph.D. degrees in international relations from the London School of Economics.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran is senior correspondent and associate editor at The Washington Post where he has worked in various capacities since joining the paper in 1994 as a reporter on the metropolitan staff. His positions included being been a correspondent in Cairo and Southeast Asia, assistant managing editor, and bureau chief in Baghdad for the first two years of the Iraq war. He is the author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a best-selling account of the troubled American effort to reconstruct Iraq. He recently completed his second stint as a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, this time working on a book that focuses on counterterrorism in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of Stanford University.
2. Regional Implications of the Conflict in Somalia, CSIS, January 24, 10-11:30 am
Freelance Policy Analyst, Horn and East Africa
David W. Throup
Senior Associate, CSIS Africa Program
Moderated by
Richard Downie
Fellow and Deputy Director, CSIS Africa Program
B1 Conference Center, CSIS
1800 K St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
Regional involvement in Somalia’s conflicts has reached a new level, with all of its neighbors directly engaged in combat operations. Please join the CSIS Africa Program for a discussion of how the conflict is reshaping political and security dynamics in the Horn and East Africa region.
Please RSVP to Katie Havranek at africa@csis.org
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Member of Congress
Michael O’Hanlon
Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Joshua Foust
Fellow, American Security Project and Correspondent, The AtlanticWith US troop withdrawals moving forward, is an end in sight for the decade long war in Afghanistan? Will peace talks with the Taliban yield results? Join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel to discuss what the end of the Afghan War might mean for American interests and the people of the region.*A light lunch will be served*
Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333
Washington, DC 20001
202-682-1800
Map
Click here
4. The Syrian Uprising Seen From The Arab World, IISS, January 24, 2-3:30 pm
Emile Hokayem
Senior Fellow for Regional Security
IISS-Middle East
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Coffee 1:45 pm – 2:00 pm
Discussion 2:00 – 3:30 pm
IISS-US
2121 K Street NW
Suite 801
Washington, DC 20037
Emile Hokayem will discuss developments in the Levant region, specifically Syria’s descent into civil war.
Mr Hokayem is the Senior Fellow for Regional Security at the IISS-Middle East in Manama, Bahrain. Previously, he was the Political Editor and international affairs columnist of The National and a resident fellow at the Henry L Stimson Center. He holds a Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. He recently returned from Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey and Lebanon, where he met with members of the Syrian opposition and the Free Syrian Army.
This meeting will be moderated by Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US and Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East.
IISS-US events are for IISS members and direct invitees only. For more information, please contact events-washington@iiss.org or (202) 659-1490.
5. Yemen’s Stalemate, January 25, GWU, 12:30-2 pm
Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
1957 E Street NW
Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Sheila Carapico, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Richmond
Laurent Bonnefy, Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman, France; Centre français d’archéologie et de sciences sociales de Sanaa, Yemen
Moderated by:
Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs; Director, Institute for Middle East Studies; Director, Middle East Studies Program, GW
Three leading political scientists discuss political dynamics and prospects for Yemen.
A light lunch will be served.
RSVP at: http://go.gwu.edu/yemenstalemate
Sponsored by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) and the Institute for Middle East Studies
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Burma gets real, but how real?
There can be no doubting the significance of Burma’s moves in the past day or two: a massive release of amnestied political prisoners and a ceasefire with Karen ethnic insurgents. There have already been some smaller prisoner releases and cancellation of a Chinese-built dam, which was the subject of local protests. Elections for a limited number of parliamentary seats are scheduled for April 1. Aung San Suu Kyi, a political prisoner for decades, has agreed that her political party will participate.
A military junta has run Burma for almost 50 years. It was only in March that the junta turned over some authority to a “civilian” government. The current president, Thein Sein, spent his entire career embedded in the autocratic regime, mainly as a military officer. Among other distinctions, he ran the much criticized relief effort after Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
Thein Sein seems to have the backing of the generals for a dramatic shift in Burma’s course, one that has already elicited from the United States a Secretary of State visit and an intention to name an ambassador. There has been none in Burma since 1990, in protest of military regime policies, but the embassy remains open under a Chargé d’Affaires.
I am not a great believer in brilliant diplomatic strokes. Most seem that way only in retrospect. Diplomacy is usually a long, hard slog. When the full story is told, this one too may turn out to be more Sisyphean than Herculean.
But I still can’t help but note the incredible difference with what is going on today in Syria or Yemen (and what went on previously in Libya). The Burmese autocratic leadership, after many years of using brutal repression, has decided to go in a different direction. The Middle East would look very different today if Bashar al Assad and Ali Abdullah Saleh had decided likewise before it was too late. Burma has at least an opportunity now to go down the well-trodden Asian road to a more open political system. South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and others have achieved democratic reform and improved economic prosperity without violent revolution.
Still, it is not clear how far the Burmese generals intend things to go. Are they opening up the system in a way that will lead to their own loss of power? Or is this an effort to open a restricted space for civilian political competition and governance, with the generals keeping at least control of security and foreign policy? How will they react to efforts to establish accountability for past abuses of human rights? What if it proves difficult to extend the ceasefire with the Karen and other ethnic groups into political settlements? Some of the political prisoners released yesterday had been released years ago, only to be re-arrested. Could it happen again?
What is happening in Burma is real, but just how real is not yet clear.
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Yemen: hard to be hopeful
I spent the morning with people who know a lot more about Yemen than I do. Nothing about the discussion convinced me that Yemen is any less complicated and difficult than I’ve already said. But here are some interesting points from the discussion:
- It is not yet clear what President Saleh will really do. He still controls a lot of guns and is not entirely reconciled to the “dignified exit” the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement in principle provides. He signed the agreement because he thought the UN Security Council resolution presaged sanctions if he did not. Things remain pretty much as they were six weeks ago, when he finally signed. His interest in coming to the United States for medical treatment was genuine, but motivated in part by wanting to be out of Yemen during the transition. He would however not be able to stay past the February 21 presidential election, when he would presumably lose diplomatic immunity as a sitting head of state.
- The impunity/immunity provisions of the GCC agreement remain problematic. The UN is uncomfortable with them because they cover things like crimes against humanity, human rights abuse, war crimes, genocide and gender-based violence, from which there is supposed to be no immunity. The Yemen parliament may balk at passing the necessary immunity legislation, which would give Saleh the excuse to renege on other aspects of the agreement.
- There is no real political settlement underlying the GCC agreement. The young protesters, Houthi rebels from the north and separatists from the south were not at the negotiating table. The protesters and separatists are so fragmented that it would have taken years to get them there. The Houthis may realign with Saleh. Islah, one of the main opposition parties, is strong among the protesters, but it does not control them.
- The agreement is basically between Saleh’s political party (General People’s Congress or GPC) and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the official “opposition.” The political dynamics inside the GPC are not yet clear. The JMP is fractious and may not hold together. A political realignment, even one that strengthens Saleh’s GPC, is possible. Islamist strength is not clear, though given the overall trend in the Arab Spring it would surprising if they did not emerge as a political force. Ali Mohsen and Hamid al Ahmar, the military/tribal leaders who have played a key anti-Saleh role in recent months, are on board with the GCC agreement and are still important players. It is not clear what their future political ambitions might be.
- No “democratic center” has yet emerged. Setting up the rules of the game so that it does is a major challenge. There is also a real need for transitional justice measures, even if immunity holds, to establish the facts, clarify accountability and begin to enable reconciliation. None of this will be easy.
- Al Qaeda continues to occupy territory around Zinjibar. This could be good news: it keeps them preoccupied with local issues and less able to launch attacks on the United States.
Much credit to those who deal with Yemen. At least they’ve got an agreement on which to base their efforts and backing from the Security Council. But is hard to be hopeful, even if Saleh does leave power, given the dimensions and complexity of the problems there.
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The end is nigh, again!
I made a bunch of predictions a year ago. Here is how they turned out:
- Iran: the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense. Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action. If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011. No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh). I wasn’t far off on this one. No Green Revolution, no military action yet.
- Pakistan: it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse. The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis. Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan. Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use. It got worse, as suggested. No I did not anticipate the killing of Osama bin Laden, or the increased tensions with the U.S., but otherwise I had at least some of it right: growing internal tension, no Army takeover, some American success.
- North Korea: no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be. Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul. I did not predict the death of Kim Jong Il, but otherwise I got it right. There was military action during the year, but no artillery barrage against Seoul.
- Afghanistan: sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July. But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective. There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces. This is pretty much on the mark.
- Iraq: no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented. But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues. The big unknown: can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)? I did not anticipate the break between Maliki and Iraqiyya, but I pegged Maliki’s intentions correctly. The Arab/Kurdish disputes are still unsettled.
- Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate): Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose. That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens. My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves. Wrong so far as I know about the Americans offering a detailed settlement, even if Obama’s “land swaps” went a few inches in that direction. Right about failure and Israel’s unfortunate direction.
- Egypt: trouble. Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow. Pretty good for late December, though I was happily wrong about Mubarak hanging on.
- Haiti: Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes. Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements. Presidential election was held and things have improved. Haiti has been calmer than anticipated. Good news.
- Al Qaeda: the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize. They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level. Happy to be wrong here too: they did not succeed, but they did try several times. And they did not recentralize.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter. Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others. Yemen has pretty much gone over the brink, and parts of Somalia are on their way back. Pretty much on the mark.
- Sudan: the independence referendum passes. Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat. Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls. Close to the mark, though Darfur has not deteriorated as much as I anticipated, yet.
- Lebanon: the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments. Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them. Four indictments were delivered against Hizbollah officials. I was also right about yawning and stretching.
- Syria: Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel. The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians. Dead wrong on both counts.
- Ivory Coast: the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!). The French and UN settled it by force of arms instead of the first-class ticket. Not cheaper, but less long-term trouble.
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance. If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket. If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction. He failed and the predicted delay ensued.
- Balkans: Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking. Right on Bosnia, wrong on Kosovo.
I’m content with the year’s predictions, even if I got some things wrong. Of course I also missed a lot of interesting developments (revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria, for example). But you wouldn’t have believed me if I had predicted those things, would you? Tomorrow I’ll discuss 2012.
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Saleh in the U.S. is not the worst of it
My gut tells me I’m with Andrew Exum, who objects forcefully to allowing Yemen’s former President Saleh into the U.S., supposedly for medical treatment. A serial human rights abuser and murderer of unarmed protesters, he merits neither our sympathy nor our safe haven. It is hard for me to imagine that an angry someone won’t find a way to drag him into a U.S. court.* But does the brain confirm the gut feeling?
I can imagine what John Brennan, the White House counter-terrorism “czar” and chief administration spokesman on Yemen, is arguing. Getting Saleh out of Yemen will remove an obstacle to the transition process there. It will also enable the U.S. to continue support for security forces that fight Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the local Al Qaeda franchise. This is Brennan’s first concern.
Unfortunately those forces are under the control of Saleh’s relatives. So continuing our support for them also helps Saleh to keep his regime in place, if not for his own return then for the ascendancy of one of his sons to power. What we are seeing is the emergence into the open of something that has clearly been true all along: the Americans don’t want too much change in Yemen, as it threatens their top priority, which is the fight against Al Qaeda. The American Ambassador’s recent denunciation of the protesters is part of this picture.
This is a big mistake, a bigger one than allowing Saleh into the U.S. The conditions that enable Al Qaeda to thrive in Yemen are not going away so long as Saleh and his family maintain their autocratic rule. It may be tactically convenient to get Saleh to the U.S., but it is strategically stupid for the United States to remain in his pocket, snookered into supporting his sons as the only bulwark against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The problems that make Yemen home to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula go far beyond terrorism: sectarian and secessionist rebellions are raging north and south, water and oil are running out, qat is king, poverty is endemic and abuse of the population is reaching epic proportions.
Any serious counter-terrorism effort in Yemen should include this bigger picture, as John Brennan knows. But I fear it does not. If Saleh comes to the U.S. it will be a symptom of a much bigger problem with U.S. policy in Yemen.
*This option is outlined by William F. Schulz at Huffpost.
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OK Santa Claus, here’s what I want
I’m hoping it’s true Yemen’s President Saleh is coming to the U.S. As that eagle-eyed young journalist Adam Serwer tweeted: “not to prosecute him…would be, u know, awkward.” That set me thinking about other good fortune that might come our way this Christmas eve:
1. Syria’s president Bashar al Assad decides he really wants to practice opthamology in London.
2. North Korea’s “supreme commander” Kim Jong Un wants to see professional American basketball so much he decides to give up the nuclear nonsense and buy an NBA team for Pyongyang instead. Lots more prestige and very lucrative.
3. Iran follows suit, abandoning its pan-Islamist pretensions, separating mosque and state and restoring close relations with Israel. It also buys an NBA team for Tehran.
4. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki declares peace on earth and good will towards Sunnis and Kurds, steps down from power and invites Iraqiyya to name a replacement.
5. The new Islamist-run governments in Tunisia, Egypt (and yes, eventually) Libya follow the Iranian example, which convinces them separation of mosque and state are the best protection for religious freedom and will encourage religious devotion, as it seems to do in the U.S.
6. The Saudis rise to the occasion and do likewise, making the king a constitutional monarch to boot.
7. Bahrain does the same. Yemen gets not only a democratic government but lots of water.
8. Without implacable enemies, Prime Minister Netanyahu reaches a quick agreement with the Palestinians, whose state is admitted to the UN with no opposition.
9. The Taliban see that their Islamist counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are on to a good thing and reach a power sharing agreement with the Northern Alliance, jettisoning President Karzai and precipitating an early American withdrawal.
10. Pakistan follows up American withdrawal and the new government in Kabul by reaching a broad-ranging agreement with India, including self-determination for Kashmir.
11. Al Qaeda opens a resort on the Somali coast called “The Caliphate.”
12. I retire to observe the peaceful competition between China and the United States, who compete in ping pong but do everything else collaboratively.
If Santa Claus really does exist, children, he’ll bring me those things for the 12 days of Christmas. If he doesn’t, then…
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