Tag: Yemen
Beyond success and failure lies attractive possibility
Michael Picard, a first-year Conflict Management student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes:
The Wilson Center February 24 hosted a panel discussion on “Revisiting the Arab Uprisings at 10: Beyond Success and Failure.” that weighed the societal impacts of the Arab uprisings 10 years after they broke out. The term “Arab Spring” is a misnomer as the revolts did not result in democratic reform – the term Arab uprisings was used instead.
The key question was whether the Arab uprisings werea failure that is now over or are they the beginning of a longer process of societal transformation?
Panelists
Liz Sly (moderator): Beirut Bureau Chief, Washington Post
Amy Austin Holmes: International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Marina Ottaway: Middle East Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Asher Orkaby: Fellow, Transregional Institute, Princeton University
Anas El Gomati: Founder and Director, Sadeq Institute
Focusing specifically on the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, the panelists presented and weighed the legacy of each country’s uprising 10 years on. Despite initial popular hope, there was never a serious expectation among observers that these states would transition to democracy overnight. What we have witnessed so far is the beginning of a long-term transformation of the MENA region. The memories of pre-uprising realities are still pertinent, and the youthful composition of Arab societies highlights the need for political and economic reforms.
Several panelists noted the US must examine how its policies and signals have impeded demoratic transitions. Regarding the 2013 coup that deposed Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected leader, the African Union immediately expelled Egypt in response to this setback. The US did not react until the Rabaa massacre, which killed hundreds of pro-Morsi demonstrators. This reflects a broader theme: that the US must consider its democracy promotion goals and what its precise role ought to be in realizing these goals.
The panel also discussed the role of the Gulf monarchies in the Arab uprisings, noting that they saw such movements – both those originating domestically and in nearby states – as existential threats. Ottaway offered an anecdote about a Saudi official who anticipated expatriate students would demand greater civil liberties. This compelled the Gulf states to act – near unanimously – to crush domestic uprisings and take an active international role in promoting counterrevolutions. This has caused immense destruction throughout the region, derailing local conflict management efforts and restraining Gulf proxies from negotiating settlements.
Ottaway observed that perhaps the most pessimistic lesson of the Arab uprisings was that removal of large, unitary, Arab regimes that dominated political life has revealed that the building blocks of democracy were absent, with the narrow exception of Tunisia. Tunisia was able to avoid fates similar to Libya and Yemen because it is a) socially homogenous with relatively few ethnic and sectarian minorities, and b) politically pluralistic. Historically salient political organizations already existed and held society together, albeit in uneasy, unstable balances.
The panelists spoke to new dynamics and outcomes that continue to emerge. Several elaborated on “second generation” protest movements in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan. In these contexts, protestors demonstrated greater understanding of how their movements could be more inclusive, better organized, and better at extracting meaningful government concessions. This has helped them avoid the high-stakes losses of the “first generation” protest movements.
The panelists noted unanimously that the Arab uprisings have had positive implications for women and some minorities. In several countries, women initiated the initial protest movements, focused on detention of their kin. In war-torn states, women have taken on a more active role in daily economic and social life. The panelists hope that these gains will be locked in with female participation quotas in emergent governance institutions. In Egypt, the Nubian minority gained recognition in the constitution and procured the right to return to ancestral lands from which they were forcibly displaced.
Conclusion
The panel agreed that the Arab uprisings were not failures that are now over but the beginning of a longer transitional process and state-building experiment. Orkaby noted these uprisings sparked the creation of local civil society organizations or strengthened existing ones. El Gomati noted the renewal of social protests in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan, indicating civilians are still willing to take to the streets. Austin Holmes emphasized that much will depend on how the Biden administration postures itself toward the region, especially with regard to countries that have retained despotic features.
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Arms trafficking: more breach than observance
An event at the Atlantic Council on February 4 discussed the measures and mitigation techniques for illicit transfer of arms and weaponry around the world. The event was prompted by a report published by the Atlantic Council, authored by investigative journalist Tim Michetti, which followed materiel procurement by a network of militants operating in Bahrain, specifically activities carried out by Iran. The report can be read here. The prompting questions for the discussion were based on how to prevent and disrupt the flow of international illicit weapons flows as well as strengthening arms embargos. Further topics of discussion analyzed specific examples of illicit transfers of weapons in different regions, as well as the policy implications and a road map to alleviate these weapon flows.
Speakers:
Time Michetti: Investigative Researcher on Illicit Weapon Transfers
Rachel Stohl: Vice President for Conventional Defense, Stimson Center
Jay Bahadur: Investigator, Author and Former Coordinator of the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia
David Mortlock: Nonresident Fellow, Global Energy Center
Norman Roule (Moderator): Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Challenges:
Moderator Norman Roule opened the discussion noting that the major concern revolves around Iran’s transfer of illegal weaponry throughout the Middle East, while also noting the consequences for regional geopolitical relations, reaching East Africa as well. Iran has provided weapons to Syria, which provoked a sort of “forever war” with Israel, as well as provided precision weapons and missiles to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Tim Michetti’s report on Illicit Iranian Weapon’s Transfers analyzes the mode of entry, either by land or by maritime means. The report analyzed the weapons in comparison to those that were taken from regional conflicts in order to trace the materiel back to Iran. This work established a guide for how materiel from different regions could be traced back to actors based on their characteristics, which are unique to each country that they are manufactured in. Michetti’s report on Bahrain is one of many examples of the illicit weapons flows in the Middle East and sets the stage for future investigations on how the linkages between illicit weapons and where they end up can be made.
Jay Bahadur discussed an illicit weapons seizure by the Saudi Arabian navy in the Arabian Sea in June 2020 that discovered Chinese- made assault rifles and missiles, along with other weaponry that was believed to be manufactured in Iran. This seizure was not the first of this type, as the Saudis have intercepted multiple ships in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea since 2015, many of which have been traced back to Iran, where the weapons originated. These weapon transfers have exacerbated the conflict in Yemen, while also potentially destabilizing East African countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea.
Historically, disrupting commercial trafficking of small arms and light weapons has been a secondary priority to counterterrorism, but according to Jay Bahadur this approach ignores the overlap that often exists between arms trafficking and terrorism.
International Regulation
According to Rachel Stohl, the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol form the international legal framework for weapons transfers. Several voluntary groups and committees exist as well, in the United Nations and elsewhere. Synergy among these groups and treaties can improve transparency and responsibility in the global arms trade. The treaty mechanisms are only meaningful if they are implemented and signatories held accountable. In the Middle East and Horn of Africa, fewer than than 20 percent of countries are parties to the international treaties. Stohl emphasized the need to hold countries and industry actors accountable, as the consequences of illicit weapons transfers coincide with other illicit activities such as terrorism, trafficking, and illegal trading of goods.
David Mortlock noted that the international systems in place to combat illicit weapons transfers depend on member-state governments to uphold them. Sanctions should be considered to hold governments accountable. They can increase the operational costs for groups transferring weapons illicitly, but the UN and European Union have not wanted to sanction Iran to the extent the United States has. As noted by Roule, the United States, particularly the Trump Administration, had a vastly different perspective on countering Iran compared to the rest of the international community.
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America is back, but where and how is not yet clear
President Biden today in two appearances at the State Department–one for the staff and one to address foreign policy–was anxious to say that America is back to diplomacy, to the defense of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and to cooperating with allies. His foreign policy will, he said, benefit Americans, whose security and welfare will be primary goals.
He is clear enough about Russia and China. He’ll be much tougher on the former than Trump, calling out its repression and even murder of dissidents and countering cyberhacking and election interference, while seeking areas of common interest like the already extended limits on strategic nuclear weapons. On China, the policy will be similar to Trump’s in aiming to compete as well as cooperate, but with more attention to human rights and less inclination to trade wars, though the tariffs don’t appear to be coming down yet.
In the Middle East, Biden was clear about one thing: he wants a negotiated end to the war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen and will cut off American support to the Saudis and Emiratis. So much materiel has already been transferred that this make take some time to have a logistical impact, but the psychological impact will be immediate. The Hadi government the Saudis and Emiratis have backed is going to have to cut a deal or step aside so someone else can. It is unclear what the Houthis will be willing to yield, as they currently have the upper hand in much of the fighting, but we’ll find out soon enough.
Biden has also made it clear he is prepared to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal) if Tehran does likewise. But the sequencing of the respective returns, and precisely what they amount to in terms of sanctions relief and nuclear reversal, are still unclear. So is any future nuclear agenda: the Iranians have so far refused widening, deepening, or prolonging the JCPOA.
On the rest of the Middle East, Biden has left things unclear. He has said little or nothing about:
- Syria, where the US still has forces pursuing ISIS, protecting oil wells, and cooperating with Kurdish-led insurgents regarded as terrorists by NATO ally Turkey,
- Palestine, though he has renewed diplomatic contacts with the Palestinian Authority and will presumably return to the two-state goal Trump tried to obliterate,
- Iraq, where US forces were drawn down to 2500 by his predecessor,
- Libya, where the UN has been making some apparent progress on ending the civil war.
- Egypt, where President Sisi has imposed a renewed autocracy at least as ferocious as either of his two immediate predecessors.
Each of these countries is at least as important to the United States as Yemen, but it is unclear what “America is back” means to them. Americans are tired of these longstanding messes, whose resolution is hard to tie directly to American security and welfare, even if we know that withdrawal from them could be costly.
America is really good at getting in, especially if can be done with warplanes and troops. It is much harder to get out, which requires diplomacy. But at least we now have a president who believes in diplomacy and is prepared to back America’s diplomats.
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A warm welcome to the no swagger Secretary of State!
Newly confirmed Secretary of State Blinken appeared at a press briefing today. The difference was dramatic. Secretary’s Pompeo bragged about his “swagger.” Blinken isn’t bragging and there was no swagger, just a deliberate and careful (though not over-cautious) effort to re-assert American competence and leadership. Blinken is not going to please those who won’t settle for less than hyperbolic denunciation of the Chinese Communist Party and over-the-top admiration for Russian President Putin, but he doesn’t mince words. He was unequivocal in denouncing Beijing’s genocide of Uighurs and Moscow’s effort to murder Alexei Navalny.
He was also anxious to allay the concerns of allies and friends, most of whom have found the Trump Administration little short of a disaster. Biden and Blinken see friendly foreigners as force multipliers, not burdens. They aren’t going engage in the Europe-baiting and South Korea-slamming that Trump’s people enjoyed. There will be differences with friends and allies, but this Administration will try to handle them calmly and professionally, not provocatively and counterproductively.
That will be true for individuals and issues as well. Blinken has already asked Zal Khalilzad, who has negotiated an agreement with the Taliban for US withdrawal from Afghanistan, to stay on. The Administration is reviewing a Trump decision on declaring the Houthis in Yemen terrorists that could hinder assistance to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Blinken praises Trump’s “Abrahamic” agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Israel and Bahrain, though he stayed silent on whether the Administration will stick with Trump’s decision to recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, which was a change in US policy offered as a quid pro quo for normalization of Morocco’s relationship with Israel.
Blinken’s strong endorsement of the free press and its role in democracy is just as welcome as his calm and professionalism. In the wake of an administration that regarded the best of the press as the “enemies of the people,” it is truly a pleasure to hear that the new administration welcomes interaction with the press and public scrutiny. A warm welcome to the no swagger Secretary of State!
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Stevenson’s army, January 12
SecState Pompeo seems determined to change many existing policies before January 20
in order to lock in Trump views and box in Biden. This week he did it with Taiwan and the Houthis. Yesterday he put Cuba on the terrorist supporter list. And today he going to link Iran to al Qaeda.
Meanwhile, Reuters says DOD is violating the new law blocking troop withdrawals from Afghanistan.
Dean Cohen calls for punishment of Capitol rioters.
Interesting case: MD Senators defend head of military medical school.
Politico warns of extremists in US military ranks.
As the son of a policeman, I’ve long been concerned about the militarization of local police. TNSR has good article.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 11
No 25th amendment removal: Pence doesn’t want it and those still in the cabinet are loyalists. Failed impeachment: House Democrats have the votes to impeach; I don’t see 17 GOP Senators voting to convict. Possible censure: toothless punishment, so most likely. Meanwhile, activists plan disruptions Jan 17 and 20.
Jim Fallows makes the case for punishment.
Meanwhile SecState Pompeo plants some landmines: designating Houthi as terrorists and dropping restrictions on dealing with Taiwan.
Biden will name Bill Burns as CIA Direector.
And don’t forget the 1997 law that lets Congress repeal late stage regulations.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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